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Abstract 
In most OECD countries the gap between rich and poor has widened over the past decades. This paper analyzes 
whether and to what extent taxes and social transfers have contributed to this trend. Has the redistributive 
power of different social programs changed over time? The paper contributes to the literature by disentangling 
several parts of fiscal redistribution in a comparative setting for the period 1967-2014.  
We use micro-data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to examine household primary income 
inequality and disposable income inequality, redistribution from transfers and income taxes, and the 
underlying social programs that drive the changes. We offer detailed information of fiscal redistribution in 47 
countries for the period 1967-2014, employing data that have been computed from LIS. LIS data are detailed 
enough to allow us to measure both overall redistribution, and the partial effects of redistribution by several 
taxes or transfers. We elaborate on the work of Jesuit and Mahler (2004) and Wang et al (2012 and 2014), and 
we refine, update and extend the Fiscal Redistribution approach. LIS data allow us to decompose the trajectory 
of the Gini coefficient from primary to disposable income inequality in several parts (i.e. 9 different benefits 
and income taxes and social contributions). 
The update and extension of the Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income Inequality 
(LLBIFR Dataset on Income Inequality 2017) allows researchers and public policy analysts to compare fiscal 
redistribution across developed countries and middle income countries over the last five decades. Research may 
employ these data in addressing several important research issues. Among the most commonly addressed 
questions in the empirical literature on the welfare state concerns the sources of variance across countries and 
over time in the extent and nature of fiscal redistribution. Changes (in the generosity) of welfare states can be 
linked to changes in the fiscal redistribution. Best-practice among countries can be identified and analyzed in 
more detail. In exploring the causes and effects of welfare state redistribution in the developed world, the 
literature has increasingly moved towards more disaggregated measures of social policy, an enterprise in which 
the LLBIFR on Income Inequality 2017, with its detailed data on taxes and a large number of individual social 
benefits, offers a rich source of information, which may be used by scholars and policy analysts to study the 
effects of different social programs on economic well-being. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The overall tendency over the past two or three decades has been for an increase in income 
inequality in the large majority of rich nations. In OECD countries, the widening of the income 
gap between rich and poor has been mainly driven by greater inequality in primary income from 
the mid-1980s (OECD, 2008, 2011 and 2015). Several explanations of income inequality have 
been introduced by researchers in sociology, economics, and political science.1 One of the main 
driving forces behind disposable income distribution is the reduction of inequality through the 
tax-transfer system. 2  The overall redistributive effect can be divided into redistribution by 
transfers and by taxes, or even into more details.3 In the mid-2000s, the average redistributive 
effect achieved by public cash transfers is twice as large as that achieved through household taxes, 
although for example the United States stands out for achieving a greater part of redistribution 
by taxes (OECD, 2008 and 2011; Whiteford, 2010, Wang & Caminada, 2011a; and Wang et al, 
2012). As the tax and transfer system was only able to offset a part of the rise in primary income 
inequality over the last 25 years, disposable income (i.e. after taxes and social benefits) has also 
become more unequal in many countries. 
This paper examines changes in the redistributive effects of taxation and income transfers to 
households in detail. Former, extensive literature on "welfare state retrenchment" that has 
emerged over the last decades seems to imply that welfare states have become less redistributive. 
Recent studies and data, to the contrary, show that most welfare states became more 
redistributive in the 1980s and 1990s (Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005 and Wang et al, 2014)). 
Welfare states have not compensated completely for the rise in inequality of primary income 
among households, but most have done so to some degree. By and large, welfare states have 
worked the way they were designed to work. It is markets, not redistribution policies, that have 
become more inegalitarian. It should be noted here that because tax-benefit system are generally 
progressive, one could expect that higher primary income inequality automatically leads to more 
redistribution, even without policy actions (Immervoll & Richardson, 2011). 
The growing interest in national and cross-national differences in earnings and income inequality 
has produced a wide range of studies. An important development has been the launching of the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in which microdata-sets from various countries have been 
"harmonized". Consequently it is possible to study income inequality across countries and years 
(see Atkinson et al, 1995). However, the improvement in methods of measurement and in 
empirical knowledge is in contrast with the lack of insight into causes of changes in equality over 
time.4 This should perhaps not come as a surprise as the distribution of income in a country is 
the outcome of numerous decisions made over time by households, firms, organizations and the 
public sector. One could think of an almost infinite number of micro-level causes for differences 
and changes in income inequality (Gottschalk & Smeeding, 2000). For many countries important 
forces behind growing disposable income inequality are the growth of inequality of earned 
primary income, demographic changes, changes in household size and composition, and other 
                                                 
1  Among others Kuznets (1955), Blinder & Esaki (1978), Blank & Blinder (1986), Harrison & Bluestone (1988), 
Blank & Card (1993), Nielsen & Alderson (1997), Gustafsson & Johansson (1999), Mocan (1999), Morris & 
Western (1999), Chevan & Stokes (2000), McCall (2001), Atkinson (2015), Piketty (2014). 
2  Among others Danziger et al (1981), O’Higgins et al (1990), Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997, 1998 and 2000), Ervik 
(1998), Atkinson & Brandolini (2001), Smeeding (2000, 2004 and 2008), Caminada &d Goudswaard (2001, 2002, 
2005, 2009 and 2010), Caminada et al (2012a), Atkinson (2003), Brady (2004), Brandolini and Smeeding (2007a 
and 2007b), Heisz (2007), Belfield et al (2017). 
3  Among others Plotnick (1984), Ferraini & Nelson (2003), Caminada & Goudswaard (2001), Kristjánsson (2011), 
Fuest et al (2010), Paul (2004), Chen et al (2011), Wang & Caminada (2011a), Wang et al (2012 and 2014).  
4  OECD (2008, 2011 and 2015) summarizes trends and driving factors in income distribution and poverty on the 
basis of a harmonized questionnaire of OECD Member Countries (i.e., distribution indicators derived from 
national micro-economic data). 
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endogenous factors. However, the evolution of income inequality is not simply the product of 
common economic forces: it also represents the impact of institutions and national policies 
(Atkinson, 2000).5 
 
Our analysis of the level and the evolution of the income distribution and fiscal redistribution is 
based on LIS data on income in a standardized way across countries and time. In this paper, we 
focus on the effect of income taxes (including social contributions) and transfers in redistributing 
income. Our expectation is that social transfers are mainly directed to lower income groups, 
while income taxes are mainly paid by the rich, and therefore both will have an impact on income 
(re)distribution. We use the traditional budget incidence approach—despite some 
methodological problems we will address— to study the combined effects of income taxes and 
transfers on the income (re)distribution. The distribution of primary income is compared with 
the distribution of income after taxes and after social transfers. The change in summary measures 
of inequality between pre- and post-government income represents direct government 
redistribution. For example, the mean of pre-government Gini indices of income inequality of 
the 47 countries in this study around 2011-2013 was 0.483. After adding government transfers 
and deducting income taxes and social insurance contributions the Gini fell to 0.347, 
representing a Gini reduction of 13.6 points or 28 percent. Social benefits account for 81 percent 
of this fiscal redistribution and mandatory payroll taxes and income taxes for 19 percent. 
We present empirical results by analyzing absolute levels of income inequality across countries for 
the most recent data year available (around 2011-2013) and by analyzing trends (1967-2014). Many 
factors make it difficult to compare the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across countries 
(differences in income concepts, the income units, (summary) measures, equivalence adjustments 
and other factors). Moreover, there are numerous possible ways to analyze the impact of taxes and 
transfers on the distribution of income; some of these approaches are listed in our references.6 It is 
generally agreed upon that there is no single 'correct' methodology. However, the budget incidence 
approach is - still - a standard methodology for studying the combined effects of all taxes and 
transfers on the magnitude of (re)distributing income.  
The increasing income inequality observed for most—but not all—Western economies and 
Middle Income Countries over the last decades has coincided with many structural changes in 
the economic system.  
 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold.  
 First, we provide evidence on the redistributive effect of welfare state regimes by income taxes 
and transfers across countries. Empirical data on the redistribution of income across 
countries is rare. Researchers conducting cross-national studies of the welfare state have until 
very recently been forced to rely on such proxies as the share of social benefits in gross 
domestic product. Even fewer cross-national studies have examined the redistributive role of 
taxes and transfers. The lack of cross-national data for so central a variable as state 
                                                 
5  More on this: OECD (2015). The report is the third OECD flagship publication on trends, causes and remedies to 
growing inequalities. The 2008 report Growing Unequal? documented and analyzed the key features and patterns 
of trends in income inequality in OECD countries. The 2011 publication Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps 
Rising analyzed the deep-rooted reasons for rising inequality in advanced and most emerging economies. The 
2015 publication It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All highlights the key areas where inequalities originate 
and where new policy approaches are required. It questions how trends in inequality have affected economic 
growth; looks at the consequences of the recent period of crisis and fiscal consolidation on household incomes; 
analyses the impact of structural labor market changes; documents levels of wealth concentration; and discusses 
the role for redistribution policies in OECD.  
6  Among others, see Atkinson et al (2001), Gustafson & Johanson (1997), Lambert et (2010), Moene and 
Wallerstein (2003), Swabish et al (2006). 
 6 
redistribution has been changed recently by the work of Caminada et al (2012a), Jesuit and 
Mahler (2010), Mahler and Jesuit (2006), and Wang et al (2012 and 2014). We elaborate on 
and update the work of Wang & Caminada (2011b). We offer a user-friendly dataset, the 
Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income Distribution (LLBIFR 
Dataset on Income Inequality 2017). A new database was asked for, because the LIS staff 
implemented a major LIS Database template revision linked to the release of the Wave VII 
(centered on 2007) microdata. Most components of this revised template have also been 
applied, retroactively, to all earlier waves of the microdata. The revised template increased 
both comparability over-time and cross-national. As a result, most figures of prior assembled 
datasets on fiscal redistribution are unfortunately not directly comparable with the figures 
produced for the current LLBIFR Dataset on Income Inequality 2017. Our dataset provides 
an update and extension of the Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset 
(Wang & Caminada, 2011b) in three ways.  First, the updated dataset covers a larger number 
of countries (47 versus 36) and a longer period (1967-2014 versus 1967-2006) using the most 
recent LIS data available. Second, to obtain a consistent time-series, all calculations of the 
database of Wang & Caminada (2011b) were redone using the new 2011 LIS Template, also 
extending the time-series with the most recent waves (2006 onwards). Finally, we offer a 
more user-friendly version of the database allowing users to easily select income inequality 
variables and fiscal redistribution variables for (a group of) countries and/or specific data 
years via pivot tables. 
 Secondly, we confront results obtained by the OECD with the results of the LIS database on 
the redistributive effect of social transfers across countries. The Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) offers micro-data on public and private sources of income that are comparable, detailed 
and accurate. Specifically, the LIS offers data on a large number of individual sources of 
income from both the private and public sectors. Moreover, the LIS data permit researchers to 
adjust for taxes and social insurance contributions assessed on income recipients. Using the 
LIS data set, it is possible to estimate direct redistribution for a large number of developed 
countries and middle income countries. Our aim is to offer a dataset on fiscal redistribution 
that is more accurate, comparable, detailed and recent than those that have been used in past 
work.  
 Finally, we refine our method. We undertake a more detailed study (compared to Wang et al, 
2012), containing a simulation approach which allows us to decompose income inequality 
through income taxes and several social transfers. We employ a budget incidence simulation 
model to investigate to what extent several social transfers and income taxes reduce income 
inequality in 47 countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize literature on the redistributive 
effect of taxes and transfers in LIS countries. Section 3 presents our research method. Section 4 
provides a descriptive analysis of income inequality and redistribution across 47 countries 
around 2011-2013. Section 5 presents the empirical results of our detailed decomposition of the 
redistributive effect of social transfers and income taxes across countries. Section 6 provides an 
analyses of trends in the distribution of primary and disposable income in LIS countries for the 
period 1967-2014. Section 7 presents results for the decomposition of the redistributive effects of 
social transfers and taxes over time. Section 8 concludes the paper and provides a research 
agenda. 
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2. Income inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers across countries 
 
The relationship between income inequality and redistribution in a cross-country perspective is 
not crystal clear (see on this Lambert et al, 2010). A large number of articles discuss the 
relationship between income inequality and redistribution among countries. Despite recent 
empirical evidence suggesting that there is more redistribution when pre-tax income inequality is 
high, it is claimed by others that societies with low pre-tax income inequality redistribute more 
than less equal societies. The main reason for the confusion stems from differences in 
measurement strategies. Indeed, with three distributions involved (pre-tax-transfer income, post-
tax-transfer income, and the tax/benefit-system), and with different inequality measures to sum 
up these distributions, not surprisingly the literature offers a plethora of research methods and 
empirical results. Below we shall briefly review the main ones, restricting us to Gini-based 
literature and applications, which are by far the most prevalent. 
Several studies analyze income distribution across countries, indicating that the role of social 
policy (taxes and transfers) is important in the magnitude of income redistribution.7 Korpi & 
Palme (1998) used data from LIS to study different types of welfare states. They illustrated that 
both the level of transfers and the targeting to the poor are important for reducing income 
inequality. Bradley et al (2003) divide the welfare states into three categories (Social Democratic, 
Christian Democratic and Liberal Democratic) to study government redistribution and 
distributive profiles of taxes and transfers. Their results indicate that welfare generosity does not 
have a significant effect on pre-tax and pre-transfer income inequality, but does have a positive 
impact on the total redistribution of incomes. By using LIS data for the mid-2000s, Pressman 
(2009) finds a larger proportion of middle-class households in countries with rather progressive 
national tax systems and relatively generous government spending programs. With respect to the 
relationship between inequality and redistribution, the results are not always in line with each 
other. Kenworthy & Pontusson (2005) examined the trend in primary income inequality and 
redistribution in OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s, indicating that redistribution increased 
in most countries. Welfare state policies compensated for the rise in primary income inequality 
across countries.  
A recent study by the OECD (2016) concludes that redistribution through income taxes and cash 
transfers cushions income inequality on average by about 27 percent in OECD countries. This 
effect would be larger when non cash transfers such as education and health care would be taken 
into account. Two thirds of the redistributive impact can be attributed to cash transfers and one 
third to income taxes. However, the OECD also finds that redistribution has weakened or 
stagnated since 2010 in most OECD countries, although there are exceptions. Remarkably, in 
countries that were hit hard by the crisis, like Greece, Spain and Portugal, redistribution has 
increased, despite fiscal consolidation measures. Jesuit & Mahler (2017) compare the 
redistributive effects of old-age pensions and transfers to those of working age in 20 developed 
countries between the late 1960s and 2010. They find that there is substantial variation across 
countries in overall fiscal redistribution and transfers account for the majority of the 
redistribution.       
With respect to income mobility, Morillas (2009) finds that primary income inequality is 
negatively associated with the level of the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across 
countries. Goudswaard & Caminada (2010) and Caminada & Goudswaard (2005) studied the 
redistribution of public versus private social programs which have opposite distributional effects. 
                                                 
7  Among others, Brandolini & Smeeding (2007a and 2007b), Atkinson & Brandolini (2001), Smeeding (2000, 2004 
and 2008), Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997, 1998 and 2000), Atkinson (2003), Ervik (1998), O’Higgins et al (1990), 
and Brady (2004). 
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The case for aggregate incidence studies was set down by Dalton (1936). The methodology has been 
implemented in many studies since research was initiated by Gillespie (1965). Of course, also critical 
literature on budget incidence analyses has emerged – but these criticisms leave the stylized 
conclusions intact; see a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by Smolensky et al 
(1987). For example, the important issue of tax/transfer shifting is totally ignored in analyses on 
budget incidence in such a classical framework. However, models that include all behavioral links 
are beyond the scope of existing empirical work (Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1998:3). Therefore, 
researchers have restricted themselves largely to accounting exercises which decompose changes 
in overall inequality into a set of components (see on this Kristjánsson, 2011; Fuest et al, 2010; 
Paul, 2004). Despite the problem of tax shifting, analyses on statutory and budget incidence can 
be found for decades in literature on public finance.8  
Most studies focus on overall redistribution; others have examined in more detail the impact of 
income components on overall inequality (Shorrocks, 1983; Lerman & Yitzhaki, 1985; Jenkins, 
1995; Breen et al, 2008). These suggest that income taxes and social benefits are important 
sources of reducing household income inequality. Plotnick (1984) calculates the redistributive 
impact of cash transfers in the US in 1967 and in 1974. Caminada & Goudswaard (2001) 
performed a budget incidence analysis for the Netherlands to investigate the effect of transfers 
and taxes in 1981, 1991 and 1997. Ferraini & Nelson (2003) focus on the effects of taxation and 
social insurance in 10 countries around 1995, analyzing inter- and intra- country comparisons of 
income (re)distribution. Mahler & Jesuit (2006) divide government redistribution into several 
components: the redistributive effects from unemployment benefits, from pensions, and from 
taxes. They applied their empirical exercise for 13 countries with LIS-data around the years 
1999/2000. Caminada et al (2012a) and Wang et al (2012 and 2014) updated and extended the 
analyses of Jesuit & Mahler (2004) and Mahler & Jesuit (2006) by taking into account many more 
benefits and taxes, and applied a budget incidence analysis to a wider range of 36 countries with 
LIS data up-to around 2004. They conclude that transfers account for 75 percent of 
redistribution, while direct taxes account for 25 percent. More than half of total redistribution 
owing to transfers is caused by pensions, although the redistributive character of pensions varies 
across countries. Unemployment benefits are the second important program in terms of 
redistribution, but their redistributive impact is only one fifth of the effect of pensions. Another 
finding of Mahler and Jesuit is that redistribution is more strongly related to the size of social 
benefits than to the extent to which benefits are targeted to lower income groups (targeting 
efficiency.  
Studies that apply tax-benefit instruments sequentially suggest that the redistributive effect of 
transfers is much more important than taxes (e.g. Immervoll et al, 2005; Mahler & Jesuit, 2006; 
Wang et al, 2012, 2014; Jesuit & Mahler, 2017). Few other studies comparing the redistributive 
effects of benefits and taxes simultaneously point in the same direction (e.g. Immervoll and 
Richardson, 2011; Kenworthy, 2011; Joumard et al, 2012; Avram et al, 2014). However, when 
categorizing pensions as income other than transfers, Guillaud et al (2017) argue that tax 
redistribution dominates transfer redistribution in most countries.  
A number of studies are using the EUROMOD microsimulation model to analyze the 
distributional impact of transfers and taxes. De Agostini et al (2014) analyze the tax-benefit 
policy reforms that have been implemented after the Great Recession. They find that the changes 
in direct taxes, pensions and cash benefits had broadly inequality reducing effects, except in 
Germany. However, after including the VAT, the policy package appears to have been more 
                                                 
8  See for example Dalton (1936), Musgrave & Tun Thin (1948), Gillespie (1965), Kakwani (1977a), Reynolds & 
Smolenskey (1977a and 1977b), Kiefer (1984), Mitchell (1991), Silber (1994), OECD (2008, 2011 and 2015) and 
analyses based on the Luxembourg Income Study database (some of them are listed in our references). 
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regressive. Hills et al (2014) point out that most of the structural policy changes, especially those 
introduced in the 2007-2011 crisis onset period, have inequality-increasing effects. Avram et al 
(2014) analyze different types of policies in reducing income disparities. They conclude that 
pensions and direct taxes have the strongest impact on redistribution, despite low progressivity of 
these programs in some countries. Thus, the size of the programs matters more, than their  
targeting to lower income groups. As suggested by Figari & Paulus (2015), the overall 
redistributive effect of the tax-benefit systems heavily depends on the income concept concerned. 
They introduce an extended income concept, which also includes indirect taxes, imputed rent 
and in kind benefits. Applying this concept to three European countries (Belgium, Greece and 
the United Kingdom), they find that differences in redistribution across countries become 
smaller. Another conclusion is that the use of the disposable income concept can lead to an 
overestimation of the redistributive effects of transfers and taxes. 
 
 
 
3. Research method 
 
3.1 Measuring the redistributive effects of income taxes and social transfers 
 
Usually, the impact of social policy on income inequality is calculated in line with the work of 
Musgrave et al (1974), i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. A standard analysis of the 
redistributive effect of taxes and income transfers is to compare pre-tax-transfer income 
inequality and post-tax-transfer income inequality (OECD 2008: 98). Our measure of the 
redistributive impact of social security on inequality is straightforwardly based on formulas 
developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991): 
Redistribution by taxes and social transfers = primary income inequality − disposable income inequality 
This formula is used to estimate the reduction in inequality produced by taxes and social 
transfers, where primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-
transfer incomes and disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of 
disposable equivalent incomes; see section 3.2 for more details. Table 1 presents the framework of 
accounting income inequality and redistribution through various income sources; see 
Documentation Guide LLBIFR Dataset on Income Inequality 2017 for details on the LIS Household 
Income Components List. 
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Table 1 The income inequality and redistribution accounting framework 
 
Income components Income inequality and redistributive effect 
Labor income + capital income + private transfers = 
Primary income 
Income inequality before social  
transfers and taxes 
+ Social security transfers -/- Redistributive effect of social transfers 
= Gross income = Income inequality before taxes 
-/- Income taxes and social security contributions -/- Redistributive effect of taxes 
= Disposable income 
= Income inequality after social  
transfers and taxes 
 
 
For some countries and years, private transfers9 are not available, including Canada (1997, 1994, 
1991, 1987, 1981, 1975, 1971), Czech Republic (1996, 1992), Italy (1986), Norway (2013, 2010, 
2007), Poland (1986), Romania (1997, 1995), Slovakia (1992), Spain (1985, 1980), Sweden (1981, 
1967). Taiwan (1995) has no information on private transfers or social security transfers. Austria 
(1995, 1987) only has information on disposable income. For cases without information on 
private transfers, we calculate all incomes without adding private transfers. 
 
The measures of both pre- and post-social security income are far from ideal. At a conceptual 
level, no conceivable measure of pre-social security income could indicate what the income 
distribution would look like if social security did not exist. A comparison between the standard 
Gini index of post-tax-transfer income inequality and the hypothetical situation where social 
transfers are absent, other things being equal, shows that such transfers have an important 
redistributive effect that helps to reduce inequality and the number of people who are at risk of 
poverty.10 In the absence of all social transfers, the average poverty risk would be considerably 
higher than it is in reality. It should however be noted that the indicator of income inequality 
before social transfers must be interpreted with caution (Kim, 2000b; Nell, 2005). First, some 
transfers that can also have the effect of the disposable incomes of households and individuals are 
not taken into account, namely transfers in kind, tax credits and tax allowances. Second, the pre-
transfer inequality is compared to the post-transfer inequality keeping all other things equal – 
namely, assuming unchanged household and labor market structures, thus disregarding any 
possible behavioral changes that the situation of absence of social transfers would involve. 
However, behavioral responses – with the strongest effects on reducing work effort - have been at 
the heart of the policy debates shaping the evolution of antipoverty policy.11 Kim (2000b) showed 
that both the generosity and efficiency of the tax/transfer system may influence the level of pre-
tax-transfer income inequality. Budget incidence calculations can only be seen as an 
approximation of the redistributive effects because the assumption that agents behave similar in 
situations with and without social transfers and social security. One may imagine the labor 
supply decision in absence of social transfers and social security. It is likely that in the absence of 
                                                 
9  Private transfer are for example alimony and other family transfers and private education transfers. 
10  Among others, see Behrendt (2002), Smeeding (2005), Förster (2000), Förster & Pearson (2002) and Förster & 
Mira d’Ercole (2005). 
11  We refer to a seminal review by Danziger, Haveman & Plotnick (1981). 
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social transfers more people will work (more) thereby earning higher incomes and having 
consequences for income inequality. In essence, budget incidence analyses assume that labor 
supply decisions in a situation with social transfers and social security are equal to a situation 
without social transfers. So, this standard approach biases the redistributive effect of generous 
and/or targeted welfare systems. Our estimates for redistribution through taxes and transfers of 
each country should consequently be regarded as upper bounds.  
 
3.2 Data: gross and net income datasets in LIS 
 
The LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg provides the largest available income 
database of harmonized microdata collected from 47 countries in Europe, North America, Latin 
America, Africa, Asia, and Australasia spanning five decades. Harmonized into a common 
framework, LIS datasets contain household- and person-level data labor income, capital income, 
social security and private transfers, taxes and contributions, demography, employment, and 
expenditures. 12  The LIS database allows scholars to access the microdata, so that income 
inequality measures and fiscal redistribution (and the partial effect per social program) can be 
derived consistently from the underlying data at the individual and household level. 
Country-comparative and trend analyses of income distribution based on LIS gross/net datasets 
should be done with caution. LIS provides gross income data in most countries and years while 
providing income data that are net of (income) taxes in others. Of the 293 LIS datasets available 
at the time of writing, 194 are classified as gross, 84 as net and 15 as ‘mixed’; see Documentation 
Guide LLBIFR Dataset on Income Inequality 2017  for a specification.  
Datasets on Egypt, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Paraguay, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and 
Uruguay have always been net. Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Spain are 
covered by both gross and net datasets, at different points in time. In the net dataset, Gini of 
gross income would be equal to Gini of disposable income. Mixed datasets are a special case in 
which total income can be gross of income taxes but net of contributions, or vice versa. Mixed 
datasets apply to Austria (1995, 1987), China (2002), Colombia (2013. 2010, 2007), Estonia 
(2000), France (2010, 2005, 2000, 1994, 1989, 1984, 1978), and Poland (1995). 
 
  
                                                 
12  The distinctive feature and value-added of LIS is the access it provides to a set of harmonized micro data files 
supplied by participating statistical agencies at the country level (Ravallion (2015: 529): Harmonization of 
income data increases quality and comparability across nations and across time; see Smeeding & Latner (2015) 
for a critical review of three other popular data sets which summarize inequality across countries and years 
(World Development Indicators (‘WDI’)/‘PovcalNet’ and ‘All the Ginis’). Following Ravallion (2015: 529): 
There are pros and cons of each source. While WIID is the largest (by far) it is probably the least 
methodologically consistent internally, while LIS is the smallest but most consistent. PovcalNet and the WDI are 
somewhere between the two. 
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Table 2 Datasets with gross and net income data in LIS 
 
 Gross incomes Mixed Net incomes Total 
 # obs # datasets # obs # datasets # obs # datasets # obs # datasets 
         
Historical wave 185,254 9 
    
185,254 9 
Wave I 148,766 10 10,468 1 23,921 1 183,155 12 
Wave II 204,268 15 22,610 2 43,016 7 269,894 24 
Wave III 218,537 16 8,603 1 73,851 9 300,991 26 
Wave IV 475,730 20 62,522 3 95,616 17 633,868 40 
Wave V 371,858 17 33,471 3 79,566 14 484,895 34 
Wave VI 544,920 26 10,240 1 117,578 9 672,738 36 
Wave VII 773,444 28 15,549 1 100,085 7 889,078 36 
Wave VII 798,618 30 31,683 2 150,824 10 981,125 42 
Wave IX 723,488 23 13,891 1 99,441 10 836,820 34 
Total 4,444,883 194 209,037 15 783,898 84 5,437,818 293 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
3.3 Sequential accounting decomposition of the Gini coefficient: partial effects of transfers and taxes 
 
The Gini coefficient is expressed as follows (cf. Jenkins, 1999; updated 2010): 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 1 + (
1
𝑛
) − [
2
𝑛2
 µ] ∑(𝑛 − 𝑖 + 1)𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 (1) 
 
In formula (1), n denotes number of individuals, µ denotes average income of individuals, and yi 
presents income of individual i. The level of Gini coefficient is given by number of individuals, 
average income of individuals. Using expression (1), we are able to decompose the Gini 
coefficient of primary income into the Gini coefficient of disposable income and the 
redistributive effects of transfers and taxes. Income (inequality) can be measured with or without 
transfers and/or taxes. 
 
𝑦𝑖 = y𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼𝐵𝑖 − 𝛽𝑇𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 , 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ {0,1}           (2) 
 
yi
pri, Bi and Ti denote primary income of individual i, total transfers of individual i and total taxes 
of individual i, respectively. Depending on α and β, individual income is determined by the sum 
of all cash incomes, such as wages and salaries, social security transfers, private transfers and so 
on, where we focus on social transfers and direct taxes. When α = 0 and β = 0, the resulting 
inequality measure presents the Gini coefficient before transfers and taxes (Ginipri); if α = 1 and β 
= 1, the measure corresponds to the Gini coefficient after transfers and taxes (Ginidhi). For α = 1 
and β = 0, Gini coefficient after transfers, but before taxes is measured (Ginigross). If α = 0 and β = 
1 the measure shows the Gini coefficient after taxes but before transfers.  
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In a more general expression, individual income can be shown as formula (3), consisting of 
primary income, m kinds of transfers and p types of taxes. Bik show the k
th transfer of individual i, 
and Til presents the lth tax of individual i. When αk =1, α-k = 0 (αj = 0 (j≠k)) and βl = 0, individual 
income includes primary income plus the kth transfer; when αk =1, βl = 1 and β-l = 0 (βq = 0 (q≠l)), 
individual income contains primary income plus all the transfers and the lth tax, we explain why 
we choose this order later. 
 
y𝑖 = y𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
− ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑇𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1
 ,  
𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛, 𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 𝑚, 𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 𝑝, 𝛼𝑘 , 𝛽𝑙  ∈ {0,1} 
(3) 
 
This allows us to calculate inequality (Gini) without a certain kind of transfer or tax, and 
consequently the partial redistributive effect of that transfer or tax. Likewise the redistributive 
effects of all income components within the trajectory between primary income inequality and 
disposable income inequality (like old-age/disability/survivor transfers, sickness transfers, 
family/children transfers, education transfers, unemployment transfers, housing transfers, 
general/food/medical assistance transfers and other social security transfers) can be calculated 
using this formula.  
We take a budget incidence approach to measure the redistributive effect of the welfare state, and 
we focus on the redistribution between individuals or households at one moment in time (not 
over the lifecycle). We apply the Reynolds-Smolensky (1977a and 1977b) measure of the 
redistributive impact of transfers and taxes to present the reduction in Gini coefficient from 
primary income (pri) to disposable income (dhi). The redistributive effect LG can be expressed as 
(c.f. Creedy & Ven, 2001): 
 
  LG = Ginipri – Ginidhi         (4) 
 
LG and Gini are the redistributive effect and the Gini coefficient of primary or disposable 
income. The total redistributive effect can be disentangled in several partial effects:  
 
  LGB = Ginipri – Ginipri+B         (5) 
 
  LGT = Ginipri+B – Ginidhi 
(6) 
 
LGB and LGT represent the partial redistributive effect of all benefit transfers B, and the partial 
redistributive effect of all taxes and social contributions T. Ginipri+B is equal to Ginigross. 
Consequently, the decomposition in formula (5) and (6) will offer us a quantitative measure for 
the overall reduction in the Gini by transfers and taxes in a country. 
 
In order to assess the effects of social benefits and taxes on the overall redistribution we apply a 
sequential accounting decomposition technique. It should be noted, however, that this procedure 
is somewhat arbitrary since the choice of benchmark income affects the outcome. Applying the 
redistribution from, say, taxes on gross income rather than primary income alters the outcome to 
some extent. Since taxes are levied on gross income (primary income plus benefits), the 
redistributive effects may be underestimated. Nevertheless the logic of this decomposition of Gini 
is that taxes are applied to gross income and benefits to primary income. This approach has been, 
among others, advocated by Kakwani (1986). 
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Our sequential accounting decomposition approach of income inequality follows studies by 
Jesuit & Mahler (2004) and Mahler & Jesuit (2006), with inequality indices accounted 
sequentially in order to determine the effective distributional impact of different income sources. 
Other techniques of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income source can be found in 
the literature as well; see e.g. Lerman & Yitzhaki (1985), Stark et al (1986), Kim (2000a), Creedy 
& Ven (2001). For example the well-known Lerman & Yitzhaki’s (1985) method derives the 
marginal impact of various income sources on overall income inequality.13 Fuest et al (2010) 
explore the redistributive effects of different tax benefit instruments in the enlarged European 
Union (EU) based on two families of approaches. When comparing both approaches, they lead 
to the same estimates of disposable income inequality. However, both lead to somewhat 
contradictory results with respect to the importance of benefits for redistributing income. 
Inequality analysis based on the sequential accounting decomposition approach suggests that 
benefits are the most important factor reducing inequality in the majority of countries (e.g. 
Immervoll et al, 2005; Mahler & Jesuit, 2006; Whiteford, 2008). The factor source decomposition 
approach, suggested by Shorrocks (1982), however, suggests that benefits play a negligible role 
and sometimes even contribute slightly positively to inequality, whereas taxes are by far the most 
important contributors to income inequality reduction (e.g., Jenkins 1995; Jäntti 1997; Burniaux 
et al, 1998).  
Although both approaches are used in the literature, studies analyzing the impact of tax benefit 
instruments based on the standard sequential accounting approach generally find rather 
intuitively straight forward results, i.e. that benefits are the most important source of inequality 
reduction in European countries. In order to assess the effects of taxes and benefits on the overall 
redistribution we (therefore) apply the sequential accounting decomposition technique in line 
with the comparative work of Mahler & Jesuit (2006), and recent studies by Kristjánsson (2011) 
and Kammer et al (2012). This choice for an sequential accounting decomposition approach is 
somewhat arbitrary, but fits in a strand of empirical literature that systematically illustrate that 
social transfers significantly improve the economic conditions of families, especially in European 
countries, and that the distribution of disposable incomes in these societies become more equal 
with the existence of these types of provisions.  
 
3.4 Decomposition: partial effects of different income sources 
 
Disentangling the inequality by income source could be affected by the ordering effect. For 
example, the partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program; see equation (3). The partial effects of these 
transfers in total redistribution could be computed in several orders. We correct for this as 
follows: we first consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added to primary 
income and then the last program following all other transfer programs. Consequently, we can 
get two Ginis: Ginipri+Bk and Ginigross-Bk. The redistributive effect of specific transfer programs can 
be presented by (7):  
 
  LGBK = ((Ginipri – Ginipri+Bk) + (Ginigross-Bk – Ginigross))/2  (7) 
 
The redistributive effect of income taxes and social security contributions will be calculated by 
formula (6). Consequently, the decomposition in formula (7) and (6) will offer us a quantitative 
measure for the reduction in the Gini by specific social programs in a country. When we take the 
mean of the decomposition results across countries, the sum of all partial redistributive effects 
amount (a little) over 100 percent due to missing observations. We rescaled the redistributive 
                                                 
13  See for ‘descogini’ in STATA (Lopez-Feldman, 2006).  
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effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (=100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of 
all programs (over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
3.5 Choice of income unit 
 
The unit of analysis is an important issue in income distribution studies. It is evident that the 
ultimate source of concern is the welfare of the individual. However, an individual is often not the 
appropriate unit of analysis. E.g. children and spouses working at home do not have recorded 
income, but may nevertheless be enjoying a high standard of living as a result of income sharing 
with parents/spouses. How to solve the problem of the key question of the unit of analysis? 
Traditionally, studies have used household income per capita to adjust total incomes according to 
the number of persons in the household. In the last decades, equivalence scales have been widely 
used in the literature on income distribution (Figini, 1998). An equivalence scale is a function that 
calculates adjusted income from income and a vector of household characteristics. The general 
form is given by the following expression: ES
D
W 
, where W is adjusted income, D is income 
(disposable income), S is size (number of persons in households) and E is equivalence elasticity. E 
varies between 0 and 1. The larger E, the smaller are the economies of scale assumed by the 
equivalence scales. Equivalence scales range from E=0 (no adjustment or full economics of scale) to 
E=1 (zero economies of scale). Between these extremes, the range of values used in different studies 
is very large, strongly affecting measured inequality.  
Equivalence scale elasticity for the LIS database is set around 0.5. This implies that in order to have 
an equivalent income of a household of one person where D is 100, a household of two persons 
must have an income of 140 to have equivalent incomes. Alternatively an one-person household 
must have 70 percent of the total income of a two-person household to have equivalent income. In 
our comparative analysis we use this equivalence scale of LIS, where E is around 0.5. However, it 
has been shown that the choice of equivalence scales affects international comparisons of income 
inequality to a wide extent. Alternatively adjustment methods would definitely affect the ranking of 
countries, although the broad pattern remains the same (Atkinson et al, 1995:52). 
As to missing data, we have included households which report zero primary income (i.e., all of their 
income is derived from the state) but have excluded households that report zero disposable 
income. We have employed standard LIS top- and bottom-coding conventions, top-coding income 
at 10 times the median of non-equivalized income and bottom-coding income at 1 percent of 
equivalized mean income. That is, income in the top of the distribution is cut off by ten times the 
median of the non-equivalized household income. Income at the bottom of the distribution is 
replaced by one percent of the average equivalized household income. The bottom coding is 
particularly relevant for households without primary income. Without bottom-coding, these 
households would not be included in the calculation of the Gini coefficient of primary income. On 
the other hand, these households would again be present in the calculation of the Gini coefficient 
on the basis of secondary income components as these households are entirely dependent on this. 
In other words, bottom-coding ensures that the calculations of the Gini coefficients are carried out 
over the same selection of households. 
 
3.6 Focus on total population – including public pension schemes 
 
This paper extends and deepens the analyses of both Immervoll & Richardson (2011), Wang & 
Caminada (2011a and 2011b) and Wang et al (2012 and 2014), using the tax-benefit models 
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across countries over time to show the combined redistributive effects of taxes and transfer 
systems. It attempts to gauge the effects of several taxes and benefits over a longer time period 
and for as many countries as data permit. 
Unlike most existing studies, it explicitly focuses on the total population, and not to the non-
elderly population (those aged 18-64).14 Indeed, restricting the analysis to the non-elderly would 
avoid some of the problems inherent to comparisons of incomes between people who are at 
different stages in their lives. For instance, an essential function of old-age pensions is to 
redistribute intertemporally over the life cycle; in that case a focus on the non-elderly helps in 
understanding the most important elements of interpersonal redistribution. However, we believe 
that in our analysis the largest government transfer program, public pensions, can not be 
excluded. Public pension plans are generally seen as part of the safety net, generating large 
antipoverty effects. So, state old-age pension benefits will be included in our analysis on 
redistribution. But countries differ to a large extent in public versus private provision of their 
pensions (OECD, 2008:120). Occupational and private pensions are not redistributive programs 
per se, although they too have a significant effect on redistribution when pre-tax-transfer 
inequality and post-tax-transfer inequality are measured at one moment in time, particularly 
among the elderly.15 The standard approach treats contributions to government pensions as a tax 
that finances the retirement pensions paid out in the same year, while contributions to private 
pensions are effectively treated as a form of private consumption. This may affect international 
comparisons of redistribution effects of social transfers and taxes. Overcoming this bias requires 
a choice: should pensions be earmarked as primary income or as a transfer? We deal with this 
bias rather pragmatically by following the LIS Household Income Variables List: occupational 
and private pensions are earmarked and treated as social security transfers. 
 
It should be noted that our results could be biased by the focus on the total population instead of 
non-elderly population (those aged 18-64). Income redistribution among the total population is 
higher compared to the redistribution within the working-age population. However, the 
correlation between inequality (and redistribution) of total population and inequality (and 
redistribution) of working-age population is rather high. Figure 1 (panel a) plots Gini coefficients 
of primary income and disposable incomes for both population groups; panel (b) plots figures 
for redistribution for both population groups. This suggests that focusing on the total population 
will not give a strong bias. 
 
  
                                                 
14  Tony Atkinson gave some helpful comments on the choice of different age groups. He supported our idea to take 
the total population into account (LIS Summer Workshop 2012). The definition of working age population is open 
to debate because of growing late retirement, so the range of working-age population is not easy to decide. 
15  See Been et al (2017) for such an analysis. Preferably, however, the redistributive effects of occupational and 
private pensions should be analysed on a life time basis. 
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Figure 1  Linkage income inequality total population and working-age population (18-64) 
across 47 LIS countries around 2011-2013 
 
Panel (a)      Panel (b) 
 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
3.7 Countries and other measurement issues 
 
In empirical literature, the selection of countries and data-years differ due to the consideration of 
data quality. LIS micro data seems to be the best available data for describing how income 
inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers vary across countries (Nolan & 
Marx, 2009; Smeeding, 2008). We apply a cross-national analysis using comparable income 
surveys for all countries of LIS from 1963-2014, allowing researchers to make comparisons in a 
straightforward manner, and the information is still updating and expanding. This dataset 
contains all countries in LIS: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. 16 
From nearly 300 variables in the dataset, we choose those related to household income (all kinds 
of income sources), total number of persons in a household and household weight (in order to 
correct sample bias or non-sampling errors) to measure income inequality and the redistributive 
effect across countries. In line with LIS convention and the work of Mahler & Jesuit (2006) and 
Wang & Caminada (2011a and 2011b), we have eliminated both observations with zero or a 
missing value of disposable income from LIS data. Household weights are applied for calculation 
of Gini coefficients. Levels of inequality can be shown in several ways, e.g., by Lorenz curves, 
specific points on the percentile distribution (P10 or P90), decile ratios (P90—P10), and Gini 
coefficients or many other summary statistics of inequality. All (summary) statistics of inequality 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that Taiwan is regarded by China as a district of China, while in this comparative study we 
simply refer to Taiwan (as coded by LIS). 
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can be used to rank income inequality in LIS countries, but they do not always tell the same story. 
In section 4.4 we will present a sensitivity analysis, using several indicators of income inequality 
to give a broader picture of the redistributive effects of transfers and taxes.  
 
It should be noted that there have been controversial arguments regarding the issues in the 
measurement of income inequality. These arguments have their own merits and shortcomings, 
and there has been little professional consensus among researchers with regard to the theoretical 
superiority of a particular way of measuring inequality. The choice of indicator used will mainly 
depend on the purpose of the research. Moreover, the availability of reliable data restricts the 
possibilities for conducting empirical research, which is especially problematic in cross-national 
studies. The aim of this database is not to review definitional issues that arise in assessing the 
extent of, and change in, income inequality across countries. We simply refer to a vast literature 
on the sensitivity of measured results to the choice of income definitions, inequality indices, 
appropriate equivalence scales, and other elements that may affect results in comparative 
research.17  
 
 
4. Inequality and fiscal redistribution across LIS countries around 2011-2013 
 
4.1 Inequality across countries 
 
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of annual disposable income 
inequality over 47 nations. This section is mainly descriptive and relies on the empirical evidence 
LIS for the levels of income inequality around 2011-2013. Figure 2 shows the Gini coefficient. 
Countries are listed in order of their Gini of disposable income from smallest to largest. The 
obvious advantage of the presentation of inequality by summary statistics like the Gini coefficient 
is its ability to summarize several nations in one picture. 
 
  
                                                 
17  Among others, see Atkinson (1970, 1979, 1987 and 2003), Champernowne (1974), Kakwani (1977b), Hagenaars 
& De Vos (1987), Coulter (1989), Atkinson et al (1995), Behrendt (2000), Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997 and 
2000), Marcus & Danziger (2000), Atkinson & Brandolini (2001 and 2006), Caminada & Goudswaard (2001), 
Förster & Pearson (2002), Smeeding (2005 and 2008), Förster & Mira d’Ercole (2005), OECD (2008, 2011 and 
2015), Caminada et al (2012a), Wang et al (2012 and 2014) and (other) papers listed in our reference section 
using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Recent comprehensive reviews on methodological assumptions 
underlying international levels and trends in inequality are found in Brandolini & Smeeding (2007a and 2009). 
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Figure 2 Disposable and primary income inequality across 47 LIS countries around 2011-2013 
 
 
Notes:  
- For Belgium, Egypt, Georgia, Hungary, India, Italy, Mexico, Russia, Paraguay, Serbia, Slovenia and Uruguay data 
for taxes are not available.  
- Results for Hungary 2012 should be treated with caution. We miss over 20 percent of the observations when we 
move from disposable income to primary income. 
- For Norway 2013, private transfers are not available; we calculate all incomes without adding private transfers. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
The lowest income inequality is found in Nordic countries, Czech Republic and the Netherlands, 
while India, Dominican Republic, Colombia, China and South Africa are the most unequal 
nations. Figure 2 indicates that a wide range of inequality exists across 47 LIS nations, with the 
nation with the highest inequality coefficient (South Africa) over twice as high as the nations with 
the lowest coefficient (Nordic Countries). 
With respect to income inequality after social transfers and taxes, there are 18 countries with the 
Gini coefficient below average (0.30). Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia have rather low values below 0.275,  followed by 
other 21 countries (Austria, Belgium, Romania, Luxembourg, Hungary, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Poland, Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Russia, Serbia, Greece and Spain) with Gini coefficients between 0.275 and 0.350. 
Above average inequality is found in 17 countries (Estonia, Israel, Uruguay, the United States, 
Guatemala, Georgia, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Paraguay, Egypt, Panama, India, Dominican Republic, 
Colombia, China and South Africa). 
The pattern of primary income inequality (before social transfers and taxes) is quite different 
from disposable income inequality. South Africa, Hungary, Greece, Ireland and China have the 
highest level of primary income inequality, with values above 0.55. Iceland, Japan, Romania, 
South Korea and Taiwan have rather low levels of primary income inequality, below 0.40. The 
redistributive effect of taxes and social transfers differs considerably across countries. The highest 
level of redistribution is found in Nordic Countries, Ireland, Greece, Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, while fiscal redistribution is rather small in 
Mexico, Colombia, Taiwan, India, Dominican Republic and Paraguay. This cross country 
difference in the redistributive effect will be analyzed in section 4.2. 
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4.2 The redistributive effect of taxes and transfers 
 
Figure 3 shows the overall redistribution across countries and the disaggregated effects of social 
transfers and taxes based on formula (5) and (6). Countries are listed in order of their total 
redistribution from largest to smallest. On average, the share of social transfers play a major role 
of 81 percent in the total reduction of inequality, while taxes (income taxes and mandatory 
payroll taxes) account for 19 percent of total reduction of income inequality. For some countries, 
such as Belgium, Egypt, Georgia, Hungary, India, Italy, Mexico, Russia, Paraguay, Serbia, 
Slovenia and Uruguay, data of taxes are not available in the dataset.  
 
Figure 3 Redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across 47 LIS countries around 2011-2013 
 
 
Notes: See below Figure 2 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
Besides China, only in a few countries taxes are important in equalizing incomes: China, 
Guatemala, Colombia and South Africa. Generally speaking, redistribution of income in most 
countries relies to a large extent on social transfers. This relative effect of social transfers and 
taxes in total redistribution is presented in Figure 4 (countries are listed according to the 
reduction of income inequality by taxes).  
 21 
Figure 4 Relative redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across countries around 2011-2013 
 
Notes: See below Figure 2 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
Note that the partial effect of taxes is negative for Taiwan and rather low for Switzerland. The 
rather low contribution of taxes in total fiscal redistribution for Switzerland is caused by tax 
competition (Kirchgässner and Pommerehne, 1996; Feld 1999). In this country it appears to be 
difficult to levy redistributive taxes from the rich and mobile persons to the poor. As a result the 
amount of taxes paid by rich people is relatively low. 
 
4.3 Redistribution, budget size and targeting 
 
Considering the redistributive effect of social benefits, scholars have distinguished between 
programs’ size and the extent to which they are targeted toward low-income groups by means-
testing. In a seminal paper by Korpi & Palme (1998: 663), they have posited a “paradox of 
redistribution” whereby “the more we target benefits to the poor . . . the less likely we are to 
reduce poverty and inequality.” The paradox arises from the fact that highly targeted programs 
have the support of a small and isolated political base. As they put it, targeted programs offer “no 
rational base for a coalition between those above and below the poverty line. In effect, the poverty 
line splits the working class and tends to generate coalitions between better-off workers and the 
middle class against the lower sections of the working class” (Korpi & Palme, 1998: 663). 
Comprehensive programs, on the other hand, even when they are organized according to social 
insurance principles, tend to encourage coalitions between the working and middle classes that 
leave low-income groups less isolated. 
With this background in mind, it is useful to explore empirically these two aspects of transfers 
with reference to the LIS database. Is redistribution associated with transfers’ overall size or with 
their target efficiency? Is there, as is often suggested, a tradeoff between the two? Using LIS micro 
data it is possible to calculate a measure of the average value of social transfers as a percentage of 
households’ pre-tax income (gross income): the larger the value, the greater the share of total 
income that derives from transfers. It is also possible to calculate a summary index of the degree 
to which transfers are targeted toward low-income groups. This is done by applying Kakwani’s 
(1986) ‘index of concentration’ to transfers. This index takes on the value of -1.0 if the poorest 
person gets all transfer income, 0 if everybody gets an equal amount, and +1.0 if the richest 
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person gets all transfer income (cf. Korpi & Palme, 1998: 684). Figures for the size and target 
efficiency of social benefits are calculated for all countries are reported in Table 3 and Figure 5. 
 
Table 3 Redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes around 2011-2013 
LIS Dataset – gross or net 
Gini Coefficient Relative Fiscal Redistribution 
Budget size 
transfers 
Efficiency / 
targeting Primary 
Income 
Disposable 
Income 
Total 
From 
Transfers 
From 
Taxes 
Australia 2010 Gross 0.477 0.33 31% 23% 8% 0.129 -0.318 
Austria 2013 Gross 0.493 0.279 44% 35% 9% 0.261 0.045 
Belgium 2000 Net 0.474 0.279 41% 41% 0% 0.245 -0.165 
Brazil 2013 Gross 0.542 0.45 17% 14% 3% 0.204 0.158 
Canada 2010 Gross 0.481 0.317 34% 26% 8% 0.182 -0.066 
China 2002 Mix 0.561 0.505 10% 1% 9% 0.127 0.324 
Colombia 2013 Mix 0.517 0.491 5% 2% 3% 0.112 0.250 
Czech Rep 2013 Gross 0.457 0.258 44% 36% 8% 0.205 -0.198 
Denmark 2013 Gross 0.476 0.249 48% 39% 9% 0.236 -0.199 
Dominican Rep 2007 Gross 0.498 0.49 2% 1% 1% 0.028 0.026 
Egypt 2012 Net 0.492 0.464 6% 6% 0% 0.097 -0.040 
Estonia 2013 Gross 0.54 0.352 35% 21% 14% 0.191 0.022 
Finland 2013 Gross 0.487 0.259 47% 29% 18% 0.255 -0.033 
France 2010 Mix 0.494 0.289 41% 38% 4% 0.291 0.082 
Georgia 2013 Net 0.481 0.394 18% 18% 0% 0.135 -0.036 
Germany 2013 Gross 0.52 0.291 44% 34% 10% 0.224 -0.118 
Greece 2013 Gross 0.567 0.332 41% 28% 14% 0.296 0.172 
Guatemala 2014 Gross 0.427 0.394 8% 1% 7% 0.028 -0.039 
Hungary 2012 Net 0.586 0.289 51% 51% 0% 0.326 0.011 
Iceland 2010 Gross 0.393 0.245 38% 27% 11% 0.164 -0.125 
India 2011 Net 0.492 0.479 3% 3% 0% 0.069 0.130 
Ireland 2010 Gross 0.564 0.294 48% 35% 13% 0.268 -0.087 
Israel 2012 Gross 0.494 0.371 25% 17% 8% 0.148 0.010 
Italy 2014 Net 0.488 0.319 35% 35% 0% 0.300 -0.004 
Japan 2008 Gross 0.382 0.302 21% 16% 5% 0.149 -0.036 
Luxembourg 2013 Gross 0.475 0.283 40% 33% 7% 0.260 0.106 
Mexico 2012 Net 0.486 0.459 6% 6% 0% 0.113 0.022 
Netherlands 2013 Gross 0.475 0.264 45% 32% 13% 0.222 -0.117 
Norway 2013 Gross 0.446 0.248 44% 34% 10% 0.232 -0.064 
Panama 2013 Gross 0.514 0.467 9% 6% 3% 0.116 0.111 
Paraguay 2013 Net 0.472 0.463 2% 2% 0% 0.039 0.007 
Peru 2013 Gross 0.483 0.455 6% 4% 2% 0.073 0.131 
Poland 2013 Gross 0.484 0.316 35% 35% 0% 0.255 0.068 
Romania 1997 Gross 0.375 0.28 25% 21% 4% 0.153 -0.021 
Russia 2013 Net 0.457 0.331 28% 28% 0% 0.222 0.055 
Serbia 2013 Net 0.518 0.332 36% 36% 0% 0.336 0.183 
Slovakia 2013 Gross 0.425 0.268 37% 32% 4% 0.209 -0.108 
Slovenia 2012 Net 0.449 0.271 40% 40% 0% 0.282 0.002 
South Africa 2012 Gross 0.664 0.572 14% 6% 8% 0.106 0.193 
South Korea 2012 Gross 0.337 0.306 9% 7% 2% 0.046 0.050 
Spain 2013 Gross 0.52 0.343 34% 27% 7% 0.263 0.153 
Sweden 2005 Gross 0.466 0.237 49% 41% 8% 0.281 -0.074 
Switzerland 2013 Gross 0.425 0.295 31% 29% 1% 0.172 -0.144 
Taiwan 2013 Gross 0.333 0.308 8% 9% -1% 0.099 0.077 
UK 2013 Gross 0.537 0.33 39% 32% 6% 0.217 -0.123 
USA 2013 Gross 0.509 0.377 26% 18% 8% 0.202 0.076 
Uruguay 2013 Net 0.466 0.372 20% 20% 0% 0.138 -0.091 
Mean LIS   0.483 0.347 28% 23% 5% 0.185 0.006 
 
- Results for Hungary 2012 should be treated with caution. We miss over 20 percent of the observations when we 
move from disposable income to primary income.  
- For Norway 2013, private transfers are not available; we calculate all incomes without adding private transfers. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
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As is shown, there is indeed considerable variance among developed countries in the average size 
of social benefits relative to total household income, ranging from 2.9% to 33.6%. Some LIS 
countries (Serbia, Italy and France) achieve the highest budget size of transfers (above 29%), 
followed by twenty countries with values between 20% and 29%, while seven countries have the 
lowest level (less than 10%). The budget size of the Unites States is far below-average (14% versus 
18.5%). 
As for target efficiency, it is more diverse across countries. France and Greece have rather high 
budget size of transfers (29-30%) with transfer programs slightly regressive in terms of the 
Kakwani index. Spain, Luxembourg, France and Poland have low target efficiency, but high social 
expenditures (above 25%). Australia and Switzerland show high figures for transfer targeting 
although with a modest redistributive budget size (less than 18%). The United States is one of the 
countries with rather low social transfers, also with a quite low target efficiency. Interestingly, 
Australia, at the bottom of our list of budget size (13%), achieves the highest target efficiency 
among rich countries.  
 
Figure 5 Redistribution, budget size and targeting across 47 LIS countries around 2011-2013 
 
Panel (a) Panel (b) 
 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
The budget size of transfers plays a very important role on overall redistribution, which is 
confirmed by a simple regression analysis in Figure 5 Panel (a). The estimated coefficient of the 
budget size is positive and statistically significant. Target efficiency is negatively associated with 
redistribution, although the linkage is weak (see Panel (b)). This is in line with the claim of Korpi 
& Palme that greater use of transfer targeting yields less redistribution. However, it should be 
noted that our analysis is based on 47 LIS countries. When we restrict our analysis to the twenty 
wealthiest countries of LIS, the correlations with target efficiency disappears. Redistribution of 
incomes across countries does not correlate with the target efficiency. This little or no indication 
of a relationship between targeting and redistribution is in line with recent work of Kenworthy 
(2011: Chapter 6, page 2-4). 
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Figure 6 Redistribution, budget size and targeting across rich countries around 2011-2013 
 
Panel (a)  Panel (b) 
 
Selected LIS-countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
  
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Global income inequality measure 
The literature shows that different indicators of income inequality are sensitive to different parts 
of the income distribution (among others, see Atkinson et al, 1995; Förster, 2000; Hauser & 
Becker, 1999; Lambert, 1993). In order to offer a broader picture of the redistributive effect of 
income transfers, we employed not only the Gini coefficient, but also other widely used 
indicators, namely Atkinson’s index (α=1.0 and α=0.5), mean log deviation and Theil index. 
Indicators more sensitive to the middle part of the income distribution are the Gini coefficient, 
Atkinson’s index (α=0.5) and Theil index, while Atkinson’s index (α=1.0) and mean log 
deviation are relatively more sensitive to the changes in the lower tail of the income distribution. 
We performed a sensitivity analysis for four countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United States) from around 1985 to around 2005 (see Caminada et al, 2012a for details). We 
found that all indicators followed the same pattern in each country, as far as the total 
redistribution was concerned; the largest redistribution was given by mean log deviation, the 
lowest by the Atkinson’s index (α=0.5). For the partial redistributive effects at a given moment in 
time, we found some differences for the various indicators. The highest redistribution always 
came from state old-age and survivors benefits, but the share of direct taxes and social assistance 
benefits changed slightly depending on the indicators used. The trends of decomposed 
redistribution were again quite similar. 
To sum up, in most cases the empirical result was hardly affected by using different global 
income inequality indicators. However, especially when the social program was targeted towards 
a certain group, for instance the lower tail of the income distribution, the results varied slightly, 
depending on the indicator used. 
 
Data source 
Our analysis is based on the Luxembourg Income Study database. Also the OECD Income 
Distribution and Poverty database is frequently used for comparative analyses (e.g. OECD, 2015, 
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and Thewissen et al, 2015). Detailed information is provided on the relevant websites. The LIS 
database allows users to access the microdata to derive consistent inequality measures from the 
underlying data at the individual and household level. The OECD database contains such 
variables based on a standardized questionnaire sent to member countries and filled out by them 
from national surveys. LIS has assembled data for most of the countries it covers in ‘waves’ for 
occasional years around 1975, 1980, 1985 and so on, at approximately 5-year intervals, whilst the 
OECD database has sought to include annual data for more recent years. LIS allows one to go 
back as far as around 1980 for rather more countries than the OECD database, but OECD has 
information on New Zealand, Portugal, and more than one year of information for Japan. 
Especially the coverage of the Gini’s of market income before the year 2004 is rather low in the 
OECD database: only twelve countries are well covered (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
While even the LIS-data are by no means perfect, they produce some consistent patterns. The 
range of income inequality among LIS and OECD countries seems very wide at any point in time. 
Moreover, in spite of differences in the measurement of income inequality and the databases 
used, most studies have consistently found that there is a large difference in inequality among 
welfare states. Reports on inequality profiles for EU15 and other OECD countries for the latest 
data year available from OECD-data also consistently show – in general - Scandinavian and 
Benelux countries have the lowest income inequality, followed by continental European 
countries. Anglo Saxon welfare states have relatively higher inequality. Among them, the level of 
income inequality is highest in the United States.  
Table 4 compares Gini coefficients (before and after social transfers and taxes) for the year 2010 
or later from the OECD database with figures from LIS (2017), which are completely in line with 
our calculations. 31 countries listed countries are adopted in both the OECD-database and the 
LIS-database around 2013. Note that disposable income inequality data across countries of 
OECD-data and LIS-data are highly correlated (around 0.975). Correlation coefficients for 
primary income and for redistribution are somewhat lower (resp. 0.949 to 0.923). For most 
countries the difference in primary income inequality from OECD and from LIS do not exceed 5 
percent, with exceptions for Brazil, Canada, Estonia, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Slovenia 
and Switzerland. What could explain these differences? 
First and foremost, it is because the difference between income surveys. LIS micro data are 
predicated on different surveys across countries. From those surveys, LIS staff refined and 
formalized rules used to classify variables, offering a comparable micro dataset. Computations in 
the OECD dataset are based on the OECD income distribution questionnaires. Therefore, the 
sample of surveys is not the same, leading to the different values of income inequality and the 
redistributive effects of taxes and transfers. Moreover, OECD applies a new income definition 
since 2011. Data is calculated according to the new OECD Terms of reference. Compared to 
previous terms of reference, these include a more detailed breakdown of current transfers 
received and paid by households as well as a revised definition of household income, including 
the value of goods produced for own consumption as an element of self-employed income. 
A second explanation for the diverging results is the difference in the definition of primary 
income, and the way income inequality before transfers and taxes is measured. Using LIS data, 
the degree of redistribution is calculated by comparing Gini coefficients on the basis of primary 
income and on the basis of gross income, in which primary income is considered as the sum of 
labor income, capital income and private transfers. With respect to pre-government income 
inequality using OECD data, it depends on market income. Consequently, the level of income 
disparity and overall redistributive effect differs when data is used from the LIS dataset and from 
the OECD dataset.  
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Table 4 OECD versus LIS: Income inequality and Redistribution across countries 
 
 
LIS around 2013 OECD around 2013 
  
Data  
year 
Gini  
Primary 
income 
Gini 
Disposable 
income 
Fiscal  
redistri-
bution 
Data  
year 
Gini  
Primary 
income 
Gini 
Disposable 
income 
Fiscal  
redistri-
bution 
Australia 2010 0.477 0.330 0.147 2010 0.496 0.280 0.216 
Austria 2013 0.493 0.279 0.215 2013 0.496 0.297 0.199 
Brazil 2013 0.542 0.450 0.093 2013 0.575 0.470 0.105 
Canada 2010 0.481 0.317 0.164 2010 0.440 0.316 0.124 
Czech Republic 2013 0.457 0.258 0.199 2013 0.461 0.259 0.202 
Denmark 2013 0.476 0.249 0.226 2013 0.476 0.249 0.226 
Estonia 2013 0.540 0.352 0.188 2013 0.510 0.357 0.153 
Finland 2013 0.487 0.259 0.228 2013 0.495 0.262 0.233 
France 2010 0.494 0.289 0.204 2012 0.518 0.308 0.210 
Germany 2013 0.520 0.291 0.229 2013 0.508 0.292 0.216 
Greece 2013 0.567 0.332 0.235 2013 0.565 0.342 0.223 
Hungary 2012 0.586 0.289 0.297 2012 0.564 0.338 0.226 
Iceland 2010 0.393 0.245 0.149 2010 0.400 0.249 0.151 
India 2011 0.492 0.479 0.013 2011 0.508 0.495 0.013 
Ireland 2010 0.564 0.294 0.270 2010 0.578 0.298 0.280 
Israel 2012 0.494 0.371 0.123 2012 0.481 0.371 0.110 
Italy 2014 0.488 0.319 0.169 2014 0.512 0.326 0.186 
Luxembourg 2013 0.475 0.283 0.192 2013 0.480 0.280 0.200 
Mexico 2012 0.486 0.459 0.027 2012 0.473 0.457 0.016 
Netherlands 2013 0.475 0.264 0.212 2013 0.439 0.289 0.150 
Norway 2013 0.446 0.248 0.198 2013 0.412 0.252 0.160 
Poland 2013 0.484 0.316 0.168 2013 0.464 0.299 0.165 
Russia 2013 0.457 0.331 0.126 2011 0.485 0.376 0.109 
Slovak Republic 2013 0.425 0.268 0.157 2013 0.428 0.269 0.159 
Slovenia 2012 0.449 0.271 0.178 2012 0.411 0.250 0.161 
South Africa 2012 0.664 0.572 0.093 2015 0.715 0.620 0.095 
South Korea 2012 0.337 0.306 0.031 2012 0.338 0.307 0.031 
Spain 2013 0.520 0.343 0.177 2013 0.523 0.345 0.178 
Switzerland 2013 0.425 0.295 0.130 2013 0.387 0.295 0.092 
United Kingdom 2013 0.537 0.330 0.207 2013 0.527 0.358 0.169 
United States 2013 0.509 0.377 0.132 2013 0.513 0.396 0.117 
Mean (31 common 
countries) 
2012.3 0.492 0.325 0.167 2012.4 0.490 0.332 0.157 
 
Source: OECD (data extracted 24 Aug 2017 from OECD.Stat) and Database Wang & Caminada (2017) 
 
 
Although the way of measuring income inequality differs to some extent in the LIS-dataset and 
the OECD-dataset, the general pictures from both datasets are the same. Table 5 ranks 31 
common countries in LIS-data and OECD-data from low to high for all data variables around 
2013. The smallest disposable income disparity exists in Iceland, Denmark and Norway, while the 
largest values are found for the United States, Brazil, Mexico, India and South Africa, 
independent of the data source used. With respect to fiscal redistribution by taxes and transfers, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece and Ireland achieve the highest level, while India, Mexico 
and South Korea show the lowest values, again independent of the source used. Both data sets 
rank South Korea on top of the list for the lowest primary income inequality. The largest value 
for primary income inequality is found for South Africa. 
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Table 5 Ranking of common countries in LIS and OECD dataset 
 
  
Gini primary income Gini disposable income Fiscal redistribution 
LIS OECD LIS OECD LIS OECD 
1 South Korea South Korea Iceland Iceland India India 
2 Iceland Switzerland Norway Denmark Mexico Mexico 
3 Slovak Republic Iceland Denmark Slovenia South Korea South Korea 
4 Switzerland Slovenia Czech Republic Norway Brazil Switzerland 
5 Norway Norway Finland Czech Republic South Africa South Africa 
6 Slovenia Slovak Republic Netherlands Finland Israel Brazil 
7 Russia Netherlands Slovak Republic Slovak Republic Russia Russia 
8 Czech Republic Canada Slovenia Luxembourg Switzerland Israel 
9 Luxembourg Czech Republic Austria Australia United States United States 
10 Netherlands Poland Luxembourg Netherlands Australia Canada 
11 Denmark Mexico Hungary Germany Iceland Netherlands 
12 Australia Denmark France Switzerland Slovak Republic Iceland 
13 Canada Luxembourg Germany Austria Canada Estonia 
14 Poland Israel Ireland Ireland Poland Slovak Republic 
15 Mexico Russia Switzerland Poland Italy Norway 
16 Finland Finland South Korea South Korea Spain Slovenia 
17 Italy Australia Poland France Slovenia Poland 
18 India Austria Canada Canada Estonia United Kingdom 
19 Austria India Italy Italy Luxembourg Spain 
20 France Germany United Kingdom Hungary Norway Italy 
21 Israel Estonia Australia Greece Czech Republic Austria 
22 United States Italy Russia Spain France Luxembourg 
23 Germany United States Greece Estonia United Kingdom Czech Republic 
24 Spain France Spain United Kingdom Netherlands France 
25 United Kingdom Spain Estonia Israel Austria Australia 
26 Estonia United Kingdom Israel Russia Denmark Germany 
27 Brazil Hungary United States United States Finland Greece 
28 Ireland Greece Brazil Mexico Germany Hungary 
29 Greece Brazil Mexico Brazil Greece Denmark 
30 Hungary Ireland India India Ireland Finland 
31 South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa Hungary Ireland 
 
Note: Ranking by the value of Gini primary income, Gini disposable income and fiscal redistribution, respectively, 
from low to high. 
 
Source: OECD (data extracted 24 Aug 2017 from OECD.Stat) and Database Wang & Caminada (2017) 
 
 
5.  Decomposition of redistributive effects of social transfers and taxes across LIS countries 
around 2011-2013 
 
5.1 Budget size per social program 
 
This section provides detailed results of the redistributive effect of welfare state programs across a 
selection of our 47 countries based on the most recent wave of LIS. We elaborate on the work of 
Mahler & Jesuit (2006) and Wang et al (2012 and 2014). However, we refine the Fiscal 
Redistribution approach. LIS data allow us to decompose the trajectory of the Gini coefficient 
from primary to disposable income inequality in several parts: we will distinguish 7 different 
social benefits and income taxes and social contributions in our empirical investigation across 
countries. We calculate the following (partial) redistributive effects, based on formula (6) and (7) 
and based on the LIS household income components list (see Documentation Guide LLBIFR 
Dataset on Income Inequality 2017 for details): old-age/disability/survivor transfers, sickness 
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transfers, family/children transfers, education transfers, unemployment transfers, housing 
transfers, general/food/medical assistance transfers, other social security transfers, and income 
taxes and social security contributions.  
It is useful to explore empirically two aspects of social benefits: programs’ size and the 
progressiveness of each social benefit; see section 4.3. Is fiscal redistribution associated with 
transfers’ overall size or with their target efficiency? Using LIS micro data it is possible to 
calculate a measure of the average value of social transfers as a percentage of households’ gross 
income for each social program: the larger the value, the greater the share of total income that 
derives from transfers.  
Figure 7 presents social benefits as a proportion of households’ gross income for each benefit 
categorized in LIS. We selected 34 LIS countries for which full information is available on the 
whole trajectory from primary income to disposable income for data year around 2013. 
Countries are listed in order of their level of budget size from largest to smallest.18 
We observe a considerable variance among developed countries in the average size of social 
benefits relative to total household income, ranging from 2.8% (Guatemala) to 33.6% (Serbia). 
Some countries (Italy, Greece and France) achieve the highest budget size of transfers (above 
29%), followed by the majority of the countries with values between 20% and 29%, while 11 
countries have the lowest level (less than 15%), among these the Unites States (14%). 
 
Figure 7 Social transfers as a proportion of households’ gross income around 2013 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
In most countries old-age/disability/survivor transfers account for above 50 to 80 percent of total 
budget size. Family/children benefits accounts on average for 9 percent, unemployment 
compensation benefits for 5 percent and general/food/medical assistance benefits. Rather small 
social programs are sickness benefits, education transfers and housing benefits, accounting each 
for on average 1 percent of the total budget size. Transfers not allocated to a specific category (the 
                                                 
18  We have done the accounting exercise for all countries listed in the LIS database; see for details Annex B1. 
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category Other transfers) are somewhat troublesome in our decomposition analysis. In most 
countries the category Other transfers is rather small (share below 5%), while in Israel (2012) and 
Guatemala (2014) it is above 10%. 
 
5.2 Fiscal redistribution per social program 
 
To illustrate the idea of decomposing disposable income inequality, Table 6 presents the results 
of our sequential accounting decomposition exercise for the mean of a selection of 26 LIS 
countries with full tax/benefit information.19 Among all 26 countries relative fiscal redistribution 
is on average 33 percent. 
Interestingly, only three programs account for 68 percent of total redistribution: old-
age/disability/survivor scheme (54%), social programs for family and children (8%) and the 
unemployment scheme (6%). Income taxes account for another 23 percent of total 
redistribution. Other social benefit programs and contributions seem to have a rather limited 
redistributive effect; together they account for only 9 percent of the reduction in income 
inequality through transfers.  
 
Table 6 Decomposition of disposable income inequality for 26 LIS countries 2013 
 
  Gini   
(a) Gini primary income 0.496   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.331   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.165   
    share 
Transfers 0.128 78% 
Old-age/Disability/Survivor transfers 0.089 54% 
Sickness transfers 0.002 1% 
Family/Children transfers 0.013 8% 
Education transfers 0.002 1% 
Unemployment transfers 0.010 6% 
Housing transfers 0.004 3% 
General/food/medical assistance transfers 0.005 3% 
Other transfers 0.003 2% 
      
Income taxes and social security contributions 0.038 23% 
      
Residual -0.001 -1% 
      
Overall redistribution 0.165 100% 
 
Notes: 
- When we take the mean of the decomposition results across countries, the sum of all partial redistributive effects 
amount (a little) over 100 percent due to missing observations. We rescaled the redistributive effects of each 
social program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution given by formula 
(4) (=100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs (over 100%), in order to correct 
for an over-estimated effect. 
- LIS 26: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland,  Slovakia, 
South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
                                                 
19 We lose another eight countries; for Egypt, Georgia, India, Italy, Russia, Paraguay, Serbia, and Uruguay data for 
taxes are not available. 
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In Table 7 we present the results of the decomposition of the trajectory of the Gini coefficient 
from primary to disposable income inequality for groups of countries for the 26 countries for the 
latest data year available in LIS. We clustered all countries to be a representative for English 
speaking countries, Continental European countries, Nordic countries, according to Esping-
Anderson types of welfare states (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; 
Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996).  
 
In Table 7, some benefits or taxes do not have any redistributive effect. The meaning of this is 
twofold. First, such a benefit scheme does not exist in a specific country and/or data is not 
available in LIS (represented as blanks). Second, such a program exist, but does not have a 
redistributive effect, because the social expenditures of this program are rather low or the 
program is distributed equally among the population (noted as 0%). 
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Table 7 Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes (latest data year) 
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panel a: LIS English speaking countries                         
Australia 2010 0.477 0.330 0.147 31% 40% 0% 19% 0% 5% 1% 0% 7% 26% 0% 
Ireland 2010 0.564 0.294 0.270 48% 29% 3% 15% 0% 19% 3% 1% 2% 26% 0% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.537 0.330 0.207 39% 47% 0% 14% 0% 2% 11% 4% 5% 17% 0% 
United States 2013 0.509 0.377 0.132 26% 53% 0% 8% 2% 2% 1% 5% -1% 31% 0% 
                              
panel b: LIS Continental European countries                         
Austria 2013 0.493 0.279 0.215 44% 62% 1% 8% 1% 6% 1% 2% 0% 20% 0% 
France 2010 0.494 0.289 0.204 41% 65%   9% 0% 7% 6%   4% 9% 0% 
Germany 2013 0.520 0.291 0.229 44% 61%   6% 1% 9% 1% 0% 0% 23% 0% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.475 0.283 0.192 40% 60% 0% 12% 0% 4% 1% 4% 1% 18% 0% 
Switzerland 2013 0.425 0.295 0.130 31% 77% 0% 6%   4% 0%   9% 4% 0% 
                              
panel c: LIS Nordic countries                           
Denmark 2013 0.476 0.249 0.226 48% 58%   2% 5% 4% 4% 8% 2% 18% -1% 
Finland 2013 0.487 0.259 0.228 47% 54% 0% 4% 2% 9% 3% 2% -4% 39% -9% 
Iceland 2010 0.393 0.245 0.149 38% 48% 0% 8% 0% 9% 5% 1% 0% 29% 0% 
Netherlands 2013 0.475 0.264 0.212 45% 56% 1% 3% 2% 4% 3% 6% 0% 28% -2% 
Norway 2013 0.446 0.248 0.198 44% 60% 4% 6% 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 22% 0% 
                              
panel d: LIS Southern European countries                         
Greece 2013 0.567 0.332 0.235 41% 61% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0%   1% 33% 0% 
Spain 2013 0.520 0.343 0.177 34% 59% 1% 1% 1% 17% 0%   2% 20% 0% 
                              
panel e: LIS Central Eastern European countries                       
Czech Republic 2013 0.457 0.258 0.199 44% 69%   5%   1% 2% 2% 3% 18% 0% 
Estonia 2013 0.540 0.352 0.188 35% 53% 0% 4% 0% 1%   0% 0% 41% 0% 
Poland 2013 0.484 0.316 0.168 35% 86%   6% 0% 2% 1% 4% 1% 0% 0% 
Slovakia 2013 0.425 0.268 0.157 37% 73% 0% 9% 0% 1%     5% 12% 0% 
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Table 7 Decomposition of income inequality ….. (continued) 
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panel f: LIS BRICS                             
Brazil 2013 0.542 0.450 0.093 17% 61%       4%   15% 2% 20% -1% 
South Africa 2012 0.664 0.572 0.093 14% 24%   17%         -1% 58% 1% 
                              
panel g: Latin America                           
Guatemala 2014 0.427 0.394 0.034 8% -3%     1%     8% 6% 88% 0% 
Panama 2013 0.514 0.467 0.048 9% 33%   8% 21%   0% 8% 0% 31% 0% 
Peru 2013 0.483 0.455 0.028 6% 21%   16% 3%   0% 23% 0% 37% 0% 
                              
panel g: LIS others                             
Israel 2012 0.494 0.371 0.123 25% 45%   9%   2%   4% 9% 32% 0% 
                              
               
Mean-LIS 26 0.496 0.331 0.165 33% 54% 1% 8% 1% 6% 3% 3% 2% 23% -1% 
 
Note: 
When we take the mean of the decomposition results across countries, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent due to missing 
observations. We rescaled the redistributive effects of each social program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution given by formula (4) 
(=100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs (over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations. 
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In most countries two dominant income components account for above 80 percent of total 
reduction in income inequality: the old-age/disability/survivor scheme, and the income taxes. 
However, cross country differences are huge. For example, in Switzerland, Poland and 
Slovakia, old-age/disability/survivor schemes account for over 70 percent of income 
redistribution while in Ireland and Peru it contributes to less than 30 percent. We even 
observe a negative impact in Guatemala.  
Large redistributive effects through income taxes and contributions can be found in most 
country groups (with the exception of the Continental European countries). The United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Spain, Poland, Slovakia and Brazil are special cases because the 
income taxes contribute for a relatively small part (20% or below) to the reduction of income 
inequality between primary and disposable income. 
The redistributive effect of family/children benefits is in the English speaking Countries 
relatively high (8-19%), compared to Nordic Countries (2-8%), Continental European 
Countries (6-9% with the exception of Luxembourg), and in Central Eastern European 
Countries (4-9%). Unemployment compensation benefits do have some effect too, especially 
in Continental European countries and Nordic countries. Remarkably, across countries all 
other social benefit programs seems to have rather limited redistributive effects. 
It should be noted that the results are hardly affected by the ordering effect. Following 
equation (8), the partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest 
(smallest) when computed as the first (last) social program; see section 3.4. Our analysis shows 
that the residual term is rather modest and in most cases below 2 percent (with exception for 
Finland). Changing the order of adding a specific benefit to primary income (or subtracting 
tax from gross income) does change the partial effect of this transfer (or tax) in total 
redistribution.  
 
 
6. Trends in the distribution of primary and disposable income in LIS countries 1967-2014 
 
6.1 Introduction and overview 
 
Under the circumstance of increasing income inequality and public expenditure cuts, 
attention needs to be paid to the design of welfare states. How good is the tax-benefit system 
as a whole and its programs in narrowing income distribution? What is the trend of 
redistribution over time?  
Figure 8 gives a sneak preview of the trend in the Gini’s of primary income, disposable income 
and fiscal redistribution across time and space for all 293 datasets in LIS 1967-2014. 
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Figure 8  Gini’s primary income, disposable income and fiscal redistribution across time 
and space 
 
 
 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
A wide variety exits across time and space in both the level of primary and disposable income 
inequality and fiscal redistribution. The general pattern is that income inequality rose over 
time across 47 LIS countries, which is confirmed by a simple regression analysis in Figure 8. 
The estimated trend coefficients of both the Gini of primary income and the Gini of 
disposable income are statistically significant (p<0.01) and positive. However, among the 47 
LIS countries we do not find a general pattern that tax-benefit systems became more 
redistributive over time. The redistributive effect of taxes and social benefits on household 
income inequality vary widely across countries and time.  
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6.2 Inequality across countries 1985-2013 
 
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of primary and disposable 
income inequality across countries over time. In empirical studies, the selection of countries 
and data-years differ due to the consideration of data quality and data availability. We selected 
15 countries, with at least three data points (around 1985, 1997 and 2010 or later). Moreover, 
we selected countries for which full information is available on the whole trajectory from 
primary income to disposable income: Australia (85-95-10), Canada (87-97-10), Denmark, 
(87-95-13), Finland (87-95-13), France (84-94-10), Germany (84-94-13), Ireland (87-96-10), 
Israel (86-97-12), the Netherlands (83-99-13), Norway (86-95-13), Sweden (87-95-05), 
Switzerland (82-00-13), Taiwan (86-97-13), the United Kingdom (86-99-13) and the United 
States (86-97-13). 
The changes in inequality levels are illustrated by the Gini coefficients. In order to give a 
general idea, we cluster the countries around 1985, 1997, and 2010 or later respectively, 
showing the average trends of inequality and redistribution. We show country profiles for all 
15 LIS countries later in Figure 9. 
Table 8 shows the 15 country-average trend of primary income and disposable income 
inequality from 1985 to 2013. This table highlights some significant differences across periods 
in a general way. On average, income inequality increased markedly. This increase was 
stronger during 1997-2013 compared to 1985-1997. The widening of income gaps was driven 
by rising inequality in the distribution of primary income, which was partly offset by social 
security transfers and income taxes and social security contributions. In the second decade, 
the primary income inequality and disposable income inequality rose more or less parallel.  
It can be shown that inequality of primary income has increased by 11 percent over a twenty-
five-year period averaged over the countries shown. This is a substantial increase over a 
relatively short period of time. Primary-income inequality has been the main driver of 
inequality trends in disposable incomes, but did redistribution policies have a substantial 
effect as well? Between 1983 and 2013, redistribution systems compensated 63 percent of the 
increase in primary-income inequality. Primary-income inequality rose by about 0.048, while 
redistribution rose 0.030. Taxes and transfers reduce inequality by about 38% around 2013; 
more than in the mid-1980s (35%); see Table 8. 
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Table 8 Trend Gini indices of primary income and disposable income and fiscal redistribution, 1983-2013 
 
 
Gini Primary income Gini Disposable income Fiscal redistribution 
  
around  
1985 
around  
1997 
around  
2013 
change 
85-13 
% 
around  
1985 
around  
1997 
around  
2013 
change 
85-13 
% 
around  
1985 
around  
1997 
around  
2013 
change 
85-13 
% 
Australia (85-95-10) 0.434 0.474 0.477 0.043 10% 0.292 0.308 0.330 0.039 13% 0.143 0.166 0.147 0.004 3% 
Canada (87-97-10) 0.407 0.450 0.481 0.074 18% 0.283 0.291 0.317 0.034 12% 0.124 0.158 0.164 0.040 33% 
Denmark (87-95-13) 0.416 0.444 0.476 0.060 14% 0.255 0.218 0.249 -0.005 -2% 0.161 0.227 0.226 0.065 41% 
Finland (87-95-13) 0.388 0.475 0.487 0.099 26% 0.207 0.216 0.259 0.052 25% 0.181 0.259 0.228 0.047 26% 
France (84-94-10) 0.496 0.486 0.494 -0.002 0% 0.338 0.288 0.289 -0.049 -14% 0.158 0.197 0.204 0.047 30% 
Germany (84-94-13) 0.442 0.458 0.520 0.079 18% 0.265 0.270 0.291 0.026 10% 0.177 0.188 0.229 0.052 30% 
Ireland (87-96-10) 0.510 0.481 0.564 0.055 11% 0.328 0.325 0.294 -0.034 -10% 0.181 0.156 0.270 0.089 49% 
Israel (86-97-12) 0.473 0.495 0.494 0.021 4% 0.309 0.336 0.371 0.063 20% 0.165 0.159 0.123 -0.042 -26% 
Netherlands (83-99-13) 0.483 0.426 0.475 -0.008 -2% 0.252 0.231 0.264 0.011 5% 0.231 0.196 0.212 -0.019 -8% 
Norway (86-95-13) 0.362 0.422 0.446 0.085 23% 0.234 0.239 0.248 0.015 6% 0.128 0.183 0.198 0.070 55% 
Sweden (87-95-05) 0.429 0.490 0.466 0.036 8% 0.212 0.221 0.237 0.025 12% 0.218 0.268 0.229 0.011 5% 
Switzerland (82-00-13) 0.398 0.385 0.425 0.027 7% 0.309 0.280 0.295 -0.014 -5% 0.089 0.105 0.130 0.041 46% 
Taiwan (86-97-13) 0.275 0.300 0.333 0.058 21% 0.269 0.287 0.308 0.039 15% 0.007 0.012 0.025 0.019 285% 
UK (86-99-13) 0.500 0.530 0.537 0.037 7% 0.303 0.346 0.330 0.027 9% 0.196 0.184 0.207 0.010 5% 
USA (86-97-13) 0.459 0.483 0.509 0.050 11% 0.340 0.360 0.377 0.037 11% 0.118 0.123 0.132 0.014 12% 
Mean-15 0.431 0.453 0.479 0.048 11% 0.280 0.281 0.297 0.018 6% 0.152 0.172 0.182 0.030 20% 
 
Notes 
Ireland 1996: income data net of income taxes (marked italic). 
Sweden is included although latest data year available is 2005. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
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Country-specific results are also presented in Table 8. Tax-benefit systems in Ireland, 
Germany, Sweden, Finland and Denmark achieve the greatest reduction in inequality, 
lowering the Gini value by 22.5 points or more around 2013, while the smallest redistributive 
effect is seen Taiwan, Israel, Switzerland, the United States and Australia (less than 15 points). 
Through the entire period, disposable income inequality became significantly larger in Israel 
and Finland, whereas it decreased in France, Ireland, Switzerland and Denmark. 
In the period around 1985-1997, higher disposable income inequality was mainly ‘caused’ by 
higher primary income inequality (although primary income inequality declined in Israel and 
Sweden). In this period, government redistribution has offset the widening of income gaps 
through public cash transfers and household taxes either in full (e.g. Denmark, France, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland) or in part (in all others; see Figure 9). On average across 
countries, disposable income inequality hardly changed (+0.001). Cross-country variance is 
larger since the mid-1990s. Primary income inequality increased in all countries (with Israel 
and Sweden as exceptions), markedly in Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
Disposable income inequality increased in all countries except for Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. On average only 37 percent of the rise of income inequality was offset by 
redistribution through taxes and transfers in the period 1997-2013  (was: 93% for 1985-1997).  
Fiscal redistribution rose in 11 of our 15 countries in the period 1985-1997 and in 9 countries 
in the period around 1997-2013. Moreover, fiscal redistribution rose since 1983 in all 
countries with Israel and the Netherlands as exceptions. 
 
In contrast to the results in Immervoll and Richardson (2011), we do not confirm their 
finding that tax-benefit policies have become less effective in redistribution since the mid-
1990s when the total population (instead of the working-age population) is taken into 
consideration; see Table 9. Among the total population both primary income inequality and 
redistribution continued to rise after the mid-1990s; we do not find that the fiscal 
redistribution effect of taxes and benefits on household income inequality declined, although 
is stabilized among the working-age population. As a result, among the total population tax-
benefit systems in the mid-2000s are even more effective at reducing inequality compared to 
the mid-1990s. So, the claim that reduced redistribution is a main driver of widening income 
gaps since the mid-1990’s must be toned down. Moreover, our finding is a stimulus to analyze 
several programs (parts) of fiscal redistribution in more detail, especially for 1995 onwards. 
Table 9 summarizes the results for trends in the redistribution among the working-age 
population and the total population for 15 countries with full tax and benefit information for 
around 1985, around 1995 and around 2013. 
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Table 9 Trend in fiscal redistribution among working-age and total population, 1985-2013 
 
 Total population  Working-age population 
  
Gini 
Primary 
income 
Gini 
Disposable 
income 
Fiscal 
redistribution 
 
Gini 
Primary 
income 
Gini 
Disposable 
income 
Fiscal 
redistribution 
Around 1985 0.431 0.280 0.152  0.384 0.275 0.109 
Around 1997 0.453 0.281 0.172  0.398 0.279 0.119 
Around 2013 0.479 0.297 0.182  0.417 0.296 0.121 
    
 
   
Change 1985-2013 0.048 0.018 +0.030  0.033 0.021 +0.012 
Change 1985-1997 0.022 0.002 +0.020  0.014 0.004 +0.010 
Change 1997-2013 0.026 0.016 +0.010  0.019 0.017 +0.002 
        
 
Share of rise inequality primary income 
offset by fiscal redistribution 
 
Share of rise inequality primary income 
offset by fiscal redistribution 
1985-2013  63%    37%  
1985-1997  93%    73%  
1997-2013  37%    10%  
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
6.3 Redistributive effect of taxes and transfers 1985-2013 
 
Table 10 highlights that the trend of overall redistribution is mainly caused by transfers. From 
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, total redistribution increased, driven by the stronger 
redistributive effect of transfers. In the decade from the mid-1990s to around 2013, hardly any 
change was observed in overall redistribution. The average total redistribution increased by 
0.030 point in 15 LIS countries from around 1985 to around 2013. 
Figure 9 illustrates the trends of overall, tax and transfers redistribution for each 15 LIS 
country. In all countries, total redistribution was mainly driven by transfer redistribution. The 
redistribution achieved by public cash transfers was more than twice as large as that achieved 
through taxes, except for Australia (1985), Finland (2013), Israel (1986 and 1997), Taiwan 
(1986) and the United States (1986 and 1997). 
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Table 10 Redistribution across 15 LIS countries, 1985-2013 
 
 
Fiscal redistribution 
 
Partial effects: changes 
1985-2013 
 
around  
1985 
around  
1997 
around  
2013 
change 
85-13  
From 
Transfers 
From 
Taxes 
Australia (85-95-10) 0.143 0.166 0.147 0.004 
 
0.021 -0.017 
Canada (87-97-10) 0.124 0.158 0.164 0.040 
 
0.038 0.002 
Denmark (87-95-13) 0.161 0.227 0.226 0.065 
 
0.053 0.013 
Finland (87-95-13) 0.181 0.259 0.228 0.047 
 
0.012 0.036 
France (84-94-10) 0.158 0.197 0.204 0.047 
 
0.042 0.005 
Germany (84-94-13) 0.177 0.188 0.229 0.052 
 
0.041 0.011 
Ireland (87-96-10) 0.181 0.156 0.270 0.089 
 
0.062 0.027 
Israel (86-97-12) 0.165 0.159 0.123 -0.042 
 
-0.016 -0.026 
Netherlands (83-99-13) 0.231 0.196 0.212 -0.019 
 
-0.035 0.016 
Norway (86-95-13) 0.128 0.183 0.198 0.070 
 
0.054 0.016 
Sweden (87-95-05) 0.218 0.268 0.229 0.011 
 
0.016 -0.005 
Switzerland (82-00-13) 0.089 0.105 0.130 0.041 
 
0.057 -0.016 
Taiwan (86-97-13) 0.007 0.012 0.025 0.019 
 
0.028 -0.009 
UK (86-99-13) 0.196 0.184 0.207 0.010 
 
0.013 -0.003 
USA (86-97-13) 0.118 0.123 0.132 0.014 
 
0.019 -0.005 
Mean-15 0.152 0.172 0.182 0.030 
 
0.027 0.003 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
From the mid-1980s to around 2013, total redistribution increased in all countries except 
Israel and the Netherlands. This was driven by additional redistribution of social transfers. Tax 
systems became less redistributive in half of the countries: Australia, Israel, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
From the mid-1990s to around 2013 the patterns of redistribution across countries are more 
diverse, both in overall redistribution and in tax and transfers redistribution. In this decade, 
total redistribution hardly changed or fell in all countries (with Ireland as exception). See 
figure 9 for the country profiles. 
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Figure 9 Trends in inequality and fiscal redistribution in 15 LIS countries 
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Figure 9 Trends in inequality and fiscal redistribution in 15 LIS countries (continued) 
 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) 
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6.4 Inequality and fiscal redistribution before and after the Great Recession 
 
This section examines the impact of the economic crisis that started in 2008 on income 
distribution and fiscal redistribution. 23 countries are selected which contain full information 
on income and taxes before the Great Recession (around 2006-2007) and the latest year (2012 
and later). As shown in Table 11, primary income inequality has increased in all countries 
since around 2007, except for Guatemala, Israel, Peru, Poland and Slovakia. However, Gini 
disposable income has decreased in a large number of countries with 1 percent decrease on 
average. The most significant reduction in disposable income inequality appears in Guatemala 
with 17 percent. Estonia and Spain, on the other hand, are the countries with the largest 
increase in inequality of disposable income. We do not find that fiscal redistribution has been 
less effective since the Great Recession. On the contrary, the increase in fiscal redistribution 
has been offsetting the rising primary income inequality and led to more equal disposable 
income distribution. Especially, Guatemala, Panama and Switzerland are the countries with 
the largest increase in fiscal redistribution (over 30%). 
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Table 11 Trend Gini indices of primary income and disposable income and fiscal redistribution, 2007-2013 
 
 
Gini Primary income Gini Disposable income Fiscal Redistribution 
  
Before 
crisis 
After  
crisis 
change  
07-13 
% 
Before 
crisis 
After 
crisis 
change  
07-13 
% 
Before 
crisis 
After  
crisis 
change  
07-13 
% 
Austria 2007-2013 0.485 0.493 0.009 2% 0.284 0.279 -0.005 -2% 0.201 0.215 0.014 7% 
Brazil 2006-2013 0.558 0.542 -0.016 -3% 0.487 0.450 -0.037 -8% 0.071 0.093 0.021 30% 
Czech Republic 2007-2013 0.446 0.457 0.011 2% 0.251 0.258 0.007 3% 0.195 0.199 0.004 2% 
Denmark 2007-2013 0.438 0.476 0.038 9% 0.238 0.249 0.011 5% 0.200 0.226 0.027 13% 
Estonia 2007-2013 0.493 0.540 0.047 9% 0.312 0.352 0.040 13% 0.181 0.188 0.007 4% 
Finland 2007-2013 0.469 0.487 0.018 4% 0.264 0.259 -0.005 -2% 0.205 0.228 0.023 11% 
Germany 2007-2013 0.512 0.520 0.008 2% 0.289 0.291 0.002 1% 0.223 0.229 0.006 3% 
Greece 2007-2013 0.515 0.567 0.052 10% 0.320 0.332 0.012 4% 0.195 0.235 0.040 20% 
Guatemala 2006-2014 0.490 0.427 -0.063 -13% 0.472 0.394 -0.078 -17% 0.018 0.034 0.016 85% 
Israel 2007-2012 0.512 0.494 -0.018 -3% 0.369 0.371 0.003 1% 0.143 0.123 -0.020 -14% 
Luxembourg 2007-2013 0.456 0.475 0.020 4% 0.276 0.283 0.007 3% 0.180 0.192 0.012 7% 
Netherlands 2007-2013 0.468 0.475 0.007 2% 0.274 0.264 -0.011 -4% 0.194 0.212 0.018 9% 
Norway 2007-2013 0.439 0.446 0.008 2% 0.244 0.248 0.005 2% 0.195 0.198 0.003 1% 
Panama 2007-2013 0.516 0.514 -0.001 0% 0.481 0.467 -0.014 -3% 0.035 0.048 0.013 37% 
Peru 2007-2013 0.524 0.483 -0.041 -8% 0.500 0.455 -0.045 -9% 0.024 0.028 0.004 18% 
Poland 2007-2013 0.490 0.484 -0.006 -1% 0.310 0.316 0.006 2% 0.180 0.168 -0.012 -7% 
Slovakia 2007-2013 0.503 0.425 -0.078 -16% 0.248 0.268 0.021 8% 0.255 0.157 -0.099 -39% 
South Korea 2006-2012 0.330 0.337 0.007 2% 0.305 0.306 0.001 0% 0.025 0.031 0.006 26% 
Spain 2007-2013 0.475 0.520 0.046 10% 0.307 0.343 0.037 12% 0.168 0.177 0.009 6% 
Switzerland 2007-2013 0.410 0.425 0.015 4% 0.311 0.295 -0.016 -5% 0.099 0.130 0.031 31% 
Taiwan 2007-2013 0.329 0.333 0.004 1% 0.307 0.308 0.001 0% 0.022 0.025 0.003 15% 
United Kingdom 2007-2013 0.524 0.537 0.012 2% 0.339 0.330 -0.009 -3% 0.186 0.207 0.021 11% 
United States 2007-2013 0.483 0.509 0.027 6% 0.371 0.377 0.006 2% 0.111 0.132 0.020 18% 
Mean 0.472 0.477 0.005 1% 0.329 0.326 -0.003 -1% 0.144 0.151 0.007 5% 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
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On average income inequality decreased slightly and fiscal redistribution rose since the Great 
Recession. The increase in fiscal redistribution mainly comes from social transfers while the 
redistributive effect of income taxes has been decreasing, for both total population and working-
age population. Although all changes are rather small, our findings are not fully in line with 
OECD (2016) which states that the economic recovery has not reduced income inequality, 
because redistribution decreased in a majority of countries recently. However, both OECD (2016: 
3) and our analysis find that fiscal redistribution dampened the increase in market income 
inequality since 2007. The differences in inequality between market income and disposable 
income varied considerably across countries and time, thus revealing significant differences in the 
ability of tax-benefit systems to cushion the rise of inequality (cf. OECD, 2015: 103). 
 
Table 12 Trend in fiscal redistribution among working-age and total population, 2007-2013 
 
 
Total population   Working-age population 
  
Gini 
Primary 
income 
Gini 
Disposable 
income 
Fiscal 
redistribution 
  
Gini 
Primary 
income 
Gini 
Disposable 
income 
Fiscal 
redistribution 
Around 2007 0.472 0.329 0.144 
 
0.422 0.324 0.099 
Around 2013 0.477 0.326 0.151 
 
0.423 0.324 0.099 
        
Change 0.005 -0.003 0.007 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
- from social transfers 
  
0.014 
   
0.006 
- from taxes 
  
-0.006 
   
-0.006 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
6.5 Program size and targeting of transfers 
 
Considering the redistributive effect of social benefits, a distinction can be made between 
programs’ size and the extent to which benefits are targeted toward low-income groups by means-
testing; see section 4.3. Using LIS micro data it is possible to calculate a measure of the average 
value of social transfers as a percentage of households’ gross income: the larger the value, the 
greater the share of total income that is derived from transfers. It is also possible to calculate a 
summary index of the degree to which transfers are targeted toward low-income groups. This is 
done by applying Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’ to transfers (see section 4.3). This 
index takes on the value of -1.0 if the poorest person gets all transfer income, 0 if everybody gets 
an equal amount, and +1.0 if the richest person gets all transfer income.  
Based on a rather lengthy time-series around 1985-2013 figures for the size and target efficiency of 
social benefits are calculated for 15 LIS countries and are reported in Table 13. 
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Table 13 Budget size and targeting efficiency across 15 LIS countries, 1985-2013 
 
 
Budget size (%) Targeting 
 
around  
1985 
around  
2013 
change 
85-13 
around  
1985 
around  
2013 
change 
85-13 
Australia (85-10) 10.7% 12.9% 2.2% -0.340 -0.318 0.022 
Canada (87-10) 12.8% 18.2% 5.4% -0.184 -0.066 0.119 
Denmark (87-13) 20.5% 23.6% 3.0% -0.122 -0.199 -0.077 
Finland (87-13) 19.1% 25.5% 6.4% -0.150 -0.033 0.117 
France (84-10) 23.0% 29.1% 6.1% 0.026 0.082 0.056 
Germany (84-13) 16.9% 22.4% 5.5% -0.250 -0.118 0.132 
Ireland (87-10) 18.9% 26.8% 7.9% -0.149 -0.087 0.062 
Israel (86-12) 14.6% 14.8% 0.2% -0.109 0.010 0.119 
Netherlands (83-13) 29.0% 22.2% -6.8% -0.003 -0.117 -0.114 
Norway (86-13) 14.0% 23.2% 9.2% -0.244 -0.064 0.180 
Sweden (87-05) 27.6% 28.1% 0.4% -0.030 -0.074 -0.044 
Switzerland (82-13) 8.1% 17.2% 9.1% 0.089 -0.144 -0.232 
Taiwan (86-13) 0.5% 9.9% 9.4% 0.048 0.077 0.029 
UK (86-13) 21.9% 21.7% -0.1% -0.138 -0.123 0.016 
USA (86-13) 10.9% 13.8% 2.9% -0.207 -0.091 0.116 
Mean-15 16.6% 20.6% 4.1% -0.118 -0.084 0.033 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
There is considerable variance among countries in the average size of social benefits relative to 
total household income. In the mid-1980s, five countries (Denmark, France, the Netherlands,  
Sweden and the United Kingdom) achieve a high budget size of transfers (20% or more),  whereas 
it is low in Australia, Canada, Israel, Norway, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States (less than 
15%). Around 2013, more countries achieve a high budget size (20% or over), while Australia, 
Canada, Israel, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States still have budget sizes less than 15 
percent. Over time social benefits size increased in all countries, with an exception for the 
Netherlands. 
Targeting efficiency is more diverse across countries. In the mid-1980s, cash benefits are most 
targeted to the poor in Australia and Germany (values less than -0.25), and more universally 
distributed in Sweden, the Netherlands and France (values between -0.03 and +0.03). Around 
2013, Australia targeted more to the poor than other countries (-0.34). Transfers were spread 
more universally in 11 out of our 15 countries. Generally speaking, transfers are less targeted to 
the poor and more universally distributed around 2013 than in earlier periods. On the contrary, 
we observe social benefits to be more targeted to the poor over time in Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. 
Changes in the fiscal redistribution appear to be statistically significant related to changes in the 
overall budget size (see figure, panel a), while no relationship is found with changes in the 
targeting of T/B systems is found (see figure 10, panel b). Especially Ireland, Denmark and 
Norway experienced an increase in both the budget size an fiscal redistribution, while fiscal 
redistribution and the budget size of social programs declined in the Netherlands. 
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Figure 10 Changes in fiscal redistribution, budget size and targeting 15 countries, 1985-2013 
 
Panel (a) Panel (b) 
 
  
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
7. Decomposition of redistributive effects of social transfers and taxes over time 
 
How have the redistributive effects of the different parts of welfare states altered over time and 
across countries? This section shows trends of detailed redistributive effects across a selection of 
LIS countries with full information on taxes and benefits. 8 countries are selected based on two 
criteria: 1) the country has full tax/benefit information at least three data points (around 1985, 
around 1997 and 2010 or later); 2) the category Other transfers amounts to less than 20 percent of 
total fiscal redistribution20.  
We calculate the following (partial) redistributive effects over time, based on the LIS household 
income components list: old-age/disability/survivor transfers, sickness transfers, family/children 
transfers, education transfers, unemployment transfers, housing transfers, general/food/medical 
assistance transfers, other social security transfers and income taxes and social security 
contributions. As explained before, we consider state old-age pension benefits as part of our 
analysis, because they are part of the safety net and generate significant reduction in poverty and 
income inequality. Occupational and private pensions are also taken into account.  
To illustrate the idea of decomposition from primary to disposable income inequality, Table 14 
reports the trends of redistributive effects of the different parts of tax-benefit system averaged for 
eight LIS countries from the mid-1980s to around 2013. 
The dominant pattern was that of increasing fiscal redistribution. Increasing fiscal redistribution 
came from old-age/disability/survivor benefits and to a lesser extent from unemployment benefits 
and housing benefits. Less fiscal redistribution was generated by sickness benefits, education 
benefits and income taxes.  
  
                                                 
20 In fact after our selection, other transfers amounts to more than 10 percent only in Finland 1987.  
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Table 14 Decomposition of disposable income inequality for 8 countries 1985-2013: averages 
by periods 
    
Gini  
around  
1985 
Gini  
around  
1995 
Gini  
around  
2013 
Change  
1985-2013 
(a) Gini primary income   0.447 0.460 0.485 0.039 
(b) Gini disposable income   0.289 0.286 0.310 0.021 
Overall redistribution (a-b)   0.158 0.174 0.176 0.018 
            
Transfers   75% 78% 78% 3% 
Old-age/Disability/Survivor transfers   47% 52% 56% 9% 
Sickness transfers   1% 1% 0% -1% 
Family/Children transfers   7% 8% 7% 0% 
Education transfers   6% 2% 1% -5% 
Unemployment transfers   5% 7% 6% 1% 
Housing transfers   1% 3% 2% 2% 
General/food/medical assistance transfers   2% 3% 3% 0% 
Other transfers   7% 3% 2% -5% 
            
Income taxes and social security contributions   25% 22% 24% -1% 
            
Residual   0% 0% -2% -2% 
            
Overall redistribution   100% 100% 100%   
 
Notes 
- When we take the mean of the decomposition results across countries, the sum of all partial redistributive effects 
amount (a little) over 100 percent due to missing observations. We rescaled the redistributive effects of each social 
program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution given by formula (4) 
(=100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs (over 100%), in order to correct for an 
over-estimated effect. 
- Selected countries: Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
With respect to trends in the redistributive effects of several social programs across countries, the 
results are diverse. Figure 11 presents how the redistributive effect of each social program changed 
over time across 8 LIS countries.  
Countries are ranked in order to their fiscal redistribution from highest to lowest. For example, 
Finland, Germany and the Netherlands rank high in descending order of redistribution around 
1985 and 2013. On the other extreme, Switzerland and the United States rank low at the bottom 
of our list of redistribution. Note that the country ranking altered over time. 
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Figure 11 Decomposition of fiscal redistribution of social transfers and taxes in 8 countries, 
1985-2013 
Panel (a) around 1985 
 
 
Panel (b) around 1997 
 
 
Panel (c) around 2013 
 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
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Over time, the Netherlands dropped in our country ranking on redistribution from place 1 to 3. 
Germany did the opposite. Also Finland is located in the top-3 of countries with relatively high 
levels of fiscal redistribution. On the bottom of our list we find the United States, Switzerland and 
Israel with the lowest levels of redistribution by social transfers and taxes. 
Old-age/disability/survivor benefits attribute most to redistribution in all countries around 2013 
(35% and over). From the mid-1980s to around 2013, the main pattern was an increasing 
contribution of these programs to redistribution, except for Australia and Germany. Overall, old 
age and survivors benefits account for 47 percent of the total fiscal redistribution among our 8-
country-average around 1985 and 56 percent around 2013. 
The redistributive effect of benefits for family/children, education and housing varies across 
countries. Overall, these benefits account for 11 percent of the total fiscal redistribution among 
our 8-country-average in 2013; an decrease with 3 points since 1985. The decrease comes mainly 
from education benefits. 
The redistributive effect of unemployment compensation and sickness benefits decreased in halve 
of the countries, namely Australia, France, the Netherlands and the United States. The overall 
contribution of unemployment and sickness benefits to total fiscal redistribution among our 8-
country-average was 6 percent, both around 1985 and around 2013. 
Taxes attributed less to fiscal redistribution in the period 1985-2013 on average (25% versus 24% 
among our 8-country-average). However, cross-country differences are large. Income taxes 
became more progressive in Finland, France and the Netherlands – consistent with the trend 
towards greater primary-income inequalities, which, in itself, would increase taxation at the top 
end. Effective income-tax rates faced by households, however, on average declined in Australia, 
Germany, Israel, Switzerland and the United States.  
 
8. Conclusion and future research 
 
8.1 Income inequality and fiscal redistribution around 2001-2013 
 
In the first part of this paper, we have investigated income distribution and redistributive effect 
attributed to social transfers and taxes across 47 countries around 2011-2013, based on the micro 
household income data from LIS. We have provided primary and disposable income inequality, 
total and disaggregated redistributions in a comparative way, across much more countries than 
that have been studied before, offering an accurate, detailed picture of redistribution of incomes 
through taxes and transfers across social welfare states. 
Nordic countries, Czech Republic and the Netherlands have the smallest income disparity, while 
India, Dominican Republic, Colombia, China and South Africa have the largest. Nordic countries 
show the most equally distributed disposable incomes and primary incomes. On average, large 
primary income disparity exists in English speaking countries. Generally speaking, European 
countries achieve lower levels of income inequality than other countries.  
With respect to redistributive effect, our budget incidence analysis indicates that the pattern is 
diverse across countries. The largest redistribution is found for Nordic Countries, Ireland, Greece, 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, while Mexico, Colombia, 
Taiwan, India, Dominican Republic and Paraguay show rather limited overall redistributive 
effects. On average, the share of social transfers in total redistribution is 81 percent, while taxes 
account for 19 percent of redistribution. Thus, in most countries social transfers are the dominant 
instruments in reducing income inequality. We also find that this redistributive effect can almost 
fully be attributed to the budget size of transfers, while the extent to which benefits are targeted 
toward low income groups does not seem to play a role.   
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As far as specific social programs are concerned, in most countries two dominant income 
components account for above 50 to 75 percent of total reduction in income inequality: the 
public old age pensions and the survivors schemes (including disability benefits), and the income 
taxes. However, cross country differences are huge. For example, in Continental European, 
Central Eastern European and Southern European Countries the public old age and survivor 
benefits account for a large part of total redistribution, while these figures are much lower for 
English speaking Countries (29-47%), for Nordic Countries (48-60%). In Nordic Countries, 
English speaking Countries and Latin America income taxes play a major role (above 25%) 
compare to other countries (with the exceptions of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway).  
Also the redistributive effect of social assistance (family and children benefits) is in the English 
speaking Countries relatively high (8-19%), compared to Nordic Countries (2-8%), Continental 
European Countries (6-12%), and in Central Eastern European Countries (4-9%). In Nordic 
Countries also a variety of other social programs contribute to the reduction of inequality. 
Remarkably, across countries all other social benefit programs seems to have rather limited 
redistributive effects, although the food and medical assistance schemes do have some effect too. 
 
8.2 Trends in income inequality and fiscal redistribution 1967-2014 
 
In the second part of this paper, we have investigated changes in the income distribution over 
time and whether and to what extent taxes and social contributions have contributed to this 
trend. We have provided trends of primary and disposable income inequality, overall and 
disaggregated redistributions by social programs in a comparative way, across much more 
countries than that have been studied before, offering an accurate, detailed picture of 
redistribution of incomes through taxes and transfers across social welfare states. 
We have applied a sequential budget incidence analysis for a selected group of 15 countries (with 
full tax/benefit information). The welfare states reduce income inequality on average by 38 
percent around 2013; higher compared to 35 percent for around 1985. Inequality of primary 
income has increased by 11 percent over a twenty-five-year period averaged over these 15 
countries. This is a substantial increase over a relatively short period of time. Primary-income 
inequality has been the main driver of inequality trends in disposable incomes, but fiscal 
redistribution compensated 63 percent of the increase in primary-income inequality.  
In contrast to the results of other studies, especially by the OECD, we do not find that tax-benefit 
systems have become less effective in fiscal redistribution. Tax-benefit systems around 2013 are 
more effective at reducing income inequality compared to the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. So, 
the claim that reduced redistribution is a main driver of widening income gaps must be toned 
down.  
State old age and survivors benefits (including disability schemes) attribute most to fiscal 
redistribution in the majority of the countries; the main pattern was a increasing contribution of 
these programs to redistribution in the period 1985-2013 (except for Germany and Finland). 
Overall, old age and survivors benefits account for 47 percent of the total fiscal redistribution 
among our 8-country-average around 1985 and 56 percent around 2013. Also taxes attributed 
more to fiscal redistribution in the period 1985-2013 on average (25% versus 24% among our 8-
country-average). Again, cross-country differences are large. Income taxes became more 
progressive in Finland and the Netherlands, and generated less fiscal redistribution in the United 
States, Australia and Israel. For some countries the redistributive effect of benefits for family, 
children, education and housing is rather high and account for r 15 percent and over of the total 
fiscal redistribution, as in Australia and France. Overall, these benefit account for 11 of the total 
fiscal redistribution among our country-average around 2013, while it was 14 percent around 
1985. 
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8.3 Future research 
This empirical analysis does not show why benefits and taxes have become more or less 
redistributive. It can be expected that, as primary income inequality rises, the tax-benefit systems 
will automatically have a more redistributive impact, because of the progressivity built into these 
systems. But also policy chances will certainly explain a part of the changes in redistribution. 
Future research should shed some light on the impact of specific policy reforms in changing the 
redistributive effect of welfare states. 
In near future research will focus on households with very low income as well—those in poverty. 
The budget incidence approach based on LIS data allows us to employ all kind of cross-national 
analyses.21 How well is social expenditure targeted to the poor? Moreover, with LIS data on fiscal 
redistribution we are able to analyze differences in anti-poverty approaches of countries (Europe 
versus the United States) and/or to judge the effectiveness of poverty reduction by taxes and 
transfers across countries. To this end, we are able to assemble a databank of fiscal redistribution 
on poverty that can be used by scholars and policy analysts to study the effects of different kinds 
of programs on poverty, income adequacy in retirement, and the distribution of financial well-
being generally. This project is named Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on 
Relative Income Poverty Rates (2017/2018) and will become available soon via our website (Leiden 
Law School / Economics / Data).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21  In line with our earlier work. See Caminada et al (2012b) and Caminada & Martin (2011 and 2015). 
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Annex A Documentation Guide Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on 
Income Inequality 2017 for 47 LIS countries - 1967-2014  
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E-mail: j.wang@law.leidenuniv.nl 
 
and / or  
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Dataset available via websites: 
 
 LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg:  
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-databases/ 
 
 Leiden University, Department of Economics: 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-for-tax-law-and-economics/economics/data-sets 
 
 
Download 
Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income Inequality 2017 
 
A more detailed description of these data and method will come available in Koen Caminada, Jinxian 
Wang, Kees Goudswaard & Chen Wang (2017), Income inequality and fiscal redistribution in 47 LIS-
countries (1967-2014), LIS Working Paper. Please cite this working paper when referring to the data set, 
along with the web address www.economie.leidenuniv.nl.  
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Aim 
The update and extension of the Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on 
Income Inequality 2017 presents the disentanglement of income inequality and the redistributive 
effect of social transfers and taxes in 47 LIS countries for the period 1967-2014 (Waves I - Wave 
IX of LIS). This dataset allows researchers and public policy analysts to compare fiscal 
redistribution across developed countries and middle income countries over the last five decades. 
Research may employ these data in addressing several important research issues. Often addressed 
questions in the empirical literature on the welfare state concerns the sources of variance across 
countries and over time in the extent and nature of fiscal redistribution. Changes (in the 
generosity) of welfare states can be linked to (changes in the fiscal redistribution). Best-practice 
among countries can be identified and analyzed in more detail. In exploring the causes and effects 
of welfare state redistribution in the developed countries and middle income countries, the 
literature has increasingly moved towards more disaggregated measures of social policy, an 
enterprise in which the Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income 
Inequality 2017, with its detailed data on taxes and a large number of individual social benefits, 
offers a rich source of information.  
Research could focus on households with very low income as well—those in poverty. The budget 
incidence approach based on LIS data allows researchers to employ all kinds of cross-national 
analyses. How well is social expenditure targeted to the poor? Moreover, with LIS data on fiscal 
redistribution research is able to analyze differences in anti-poverty approaches of countries 
(Europe versus the United States) and/or to judge the effectiveness of poverty reduction by taxes 
and transfers across countries. 
The assembled databank of fiscal redistribution can be used by scholars and policy analysts to 
study the effects of different kind of programs on poverty, income adequacy in retirement, and 
the distribution of economic well-being generally.  
 
Content dataset 2017 
This data set offers a number of measures of fiscal redistribution in the developed countries, 
drawing upon data from 293 Luxembourg Income Study surveys conducted in 47 countries 
between 1967 and 2014 (5,437,818 disposable income observations). In this dataset we have 
computed several kinds of results, namely income inequality before social transfers and taxes, 
income inequality after social transfers and taxes, the overall redistributive effect, the partial effect 
of redistribution by several social transfers and the partial effect of redistribution by income taxes 
and social security contributions.  
 
This dataset provides an update and extension of the Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal 
Redistribution Dataset (Wang & Caminada, 2011b) in three ways.  
 First, the updated dataset covers a larger number of countries (47 versus 36) and a longer 
period (1967-2014 versus 1967-2006) using the most recent LIS data available.  
 Second, the LIS staff implemented a major LIS Database template revision linked to the 
release of the Wave VII (centered on 2007) microdata. Most components of this revised 
template have also been applied, retroactively, to all earlier waves of the microdata. The 
revised template increased both comparability over-time and cross-national. As a result, most 
figures of our prior assembled dataset on fiscal redistribution are – unfortunately - not 
directly comparable with the figures produced for the current Leiden LIS Budget Incidence 
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Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income Inequality 2017. To obtain a consistent time-series, 
all calculations of the database of Wang & Caminada (2011b) were redone using the new 2011 
LIS Template, also extending the time-series with the most recent waves (2006 onwards). 
 Third, we offer a more user-friendly version of the database allowing users to easily select 
income inequality variables and fiscal redistribution variables for (a group of) countries 
and/or specific data years via pivot tables. Somewhat arbitrary we labeled countries as follows: 
Anglo-Saxon (3): Australia, Canada and United States; 
EU15 (14):  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom; 
CEE (6):  Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; 
Europe – other (5): Georgia, Iceland, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland; 
BRICS (5):  Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa; 
Latin America (9): Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay; 
Middle East (2):  Egypt and Israel; 
South-East Asia (3): Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
Based on the current assembled dataset, we explore how income inequality have evolved across 
countries and over time and what effects of fiscal redistribution are. Our dataset offers a number 
of measures of fiscal redistribution in the developed countries and middle income countries, 
namely: 
 
 
1) LIS descriptives: Median and mean equivalized income, gross versus net information of 
income and the number of observation for each wave (= 293 datasets; 47 countries over time; 
5,437,818 disposable income observations ).  
[Table A1 in Excel Spreadsheet; a pivot table allows users to select countries and/or specific data years] 
 
  
2) A measure of overall fiscal redistribution, as reflected in the difference between the Gini 
indexes of pre-tax-transfer primary income and post-tax-transfer disposable income. We offer 
measures of both absolute fiscal redistribution (Gini pri - Gini dhi) and relative fiscal 
redistribution ((Gini pri - Gini dhi)/ Gini pri). Moreover, we have computed the shares of 
absolute and relative fiscal redistribution resulting from direct taxes and social transfers. All 
figures are presented for both the Total population and the Working-age population (18-64). 
[Table A2 in Excel Spreadsheet; a pivot table allows users to select countries and/or specific data years] 
 
 
3) The average size of social transfers as a proportion of households’ pre-tax income (gross 
income), and a summary index of the degree to which transfers are targeted toward low-
income groups. Our measure ranges from -1.0 (the poorest recipient receives all transfer 
income) to +1.0 (the richest recipient receives all transfer income).  
[Table A3 in Excel Spreadsheet; a pivot table allows users to select countries and/or specific data years] 
 
 
In order to disentangle income inequality even further by income source two additional statistics 
are provided for: 
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4) The budget size that is associated with several social transfers. The average size of a social 
transfer is defined as a proportion of households’ gross income (codes refer to LIS Household 
Income Components List; see Annex A1 for details): 
a) Old-age/disability/survivor transfers (hitsil+hitsup+hitsudi+hitsap) 
b) Sickness transfers (hitsissi+hitsiswi) 
c) Family/children transfers (hitsisma+hitsufa+hitsafa) 
d) Education transfers (hitsued+hitsaed) 
e) Unemployment transfers (hitsisun+hitsuun+hitsaun) 
f) Housing transfers (hitsaho+hitsahe) 
g) General/food/medical assistance transfers (hitsagen+hitsafo+hitsame) 
h) Other transfers (all social transfers minus transfers a to g) 
i) Income taxes and social security contributions (hxit) 
[Table A4 in Excel Spreadsheet; a pivot table allows users to select countries and/or specific data years] 
 
 
5) A measure of the extent of fiscal redistribution that is associated with several social transfers 
and income taxes and social security contributions (codes refer to LIS Household Income 
Components List; see Annex A1 for details): 
a) Old-age/disability/survivor transfers (hitsil+hitsup+hitsudi+hitsap) 
b) Sickness transfers (hitsissi+hitsiswi) 
c) Family/children transfers (hitsisma+hitsufa+hitsafa) 
d) Education transfers (hitsued+hitsaed) 
e) Unemployment transfers (hitsisun+hitsuun+hitsaun) 
f) Housing transfers (hitsaho+hitsahe) 
g) General/food/medical assistance transfers (hitsagen+hitsafo+hitsame) 
h) Other transfers (all social transfers minus transfers a to g) 
i) Income taxes and social security contributions (hxit) 
[Table A5 in Excel Spreadsheet; a pivot table allows users to select countries and/or specific data years]  
 
A description of the decomposition method of Gini coefficient is given in sections 3.3 and 3.4 of 
the main text. 
 
For 289 out of all 293 LIS datasets, we are able to decompose total redistribution into partial 
effects of one to seven social transfer programs and taxes and social security contributions 
mentioned above. Unfortunately, in Austria (1995 and 1987) and Spain (1980) data of the social 
programs are not available at all. Taiwan (1995) is not computed as it misses information on total 
social security transfers and income taxes and social security contributions.  
The data set presents the results of the decomposition of income inequality and the redistributive 
effect of several social transfers and taxes and contributions for LIS countries. Some benefits or 
taxes do not have any redistributive effect. The meaning of this is twofold. First, such a benefit 
scheme does not exist in a specific country and/or data is not available in LIS (represented as 
blanks). Second, such a program exist, but does not have a redistributive effect, because the social 
expenditures of this program is rather low or the program is distributed equally among the 
population (noted as 0%). In all tables, when Gross/net information is marked as “net”, the 
redistributive effect of taxes is represented as blanks.  
It should be noted that LIS allocate social transfers to several categories (see above and in Tables 
A4 and A5 of our Excel Spreadsheet). Unfortunately, the category Old-age/disability/survivor 
transfers cannot be further divided into old-age, disability and survivor transfers distinctively as 
part of the variable hitsil does not contain more specific income sources; see Annex A.  
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Results should be interpreted with caution because the redistributive effect of the category Other 
transfers (= transfers not allocated to a specific category) amounts for several countries and years 
20 percent and over. This high share of the category Other transfers is the case for 53 datasets (out 
of 289) concerning 18 countries (out of all 47):  Canada (1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2007, 
2010), Colombia (2013), Denmark (1987, 1992), Dominican Republic (2007), Estonia (2000), 
Germany (1973), Hungary (2007, 2009, 2012), Ireland (1987), Japan (2008), Mexico (1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2012), Norway (1979, 1986), Paraguay (2010), Slovenia (1997, 
1999, 2004. 2007, 2010, 2012), South Korea (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012), Spain (1980, 1985), Sweden 
(2005), Taiwan (1991, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2013), the United Kingdom (1986, 1991) and 
Uruguay (2004). Of course, high figures for transfers not allocated to a specific category (the 
category Other transfers) are somewhat troublesome in our decomposition analysis of fiscal 
redistribution, especially when LIS allocates less to this category over time due to higher data 
quality. 
The treatment of pensions needs special attention. Public pension plans are generally seen as part 
of the safety net, generating large antipoverty effects through transfers and taxes (contributions). 
So, state old-age pension benefits will be included in our analysis on redistribution. But countries 
differ to a large extent in public versus private provision of their pensions (OECD, 2008:120). 
Occupational and private pensions are not antipoverty programs per se, although they too have a 
significant effect on redistribution when pre-tax-transfer inequality and post-tax-transfer 
inequality are measured at one moment in time, particularly among the elderly. The standard 
approach treats contributions to government pensions as a tax that finances the retirement 
pensions paid out in the same year, while contributions to private pensions are effectively treated 
as a form of private consumption. This may affect international comparisons of redistribution 
effects of social transfers and taxes. Overcoming this bias requires a choice: should pensions be 
earmarked as primary income or as a transfer? We deal with this bias rather pragmatically by 
following LIS Household Income Variables List (LIS, 2017): occupational and mandatory private 
pensions are earmarked and treated as  social security transfers; see Annex A1 for details. 
 
Choice of income unit: see section 3.5 main text 
Gross and net income datasets in LIS: see section 3.2 main text 
Measuring the redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers: see section 3.1 main text 
Countries and other measurement issues: see section 3.7 main text 
 
Origin of the idea 
The original database on Fiscal Redistribution based on LIS data was initiated by Jesuit & Mahler 
in 2004 (LIS Working Paper #392). This Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on 
Income Inequality 2017 refines, updates and extends their Fiscal Redistribution approach. LIS 
data allowed us to decompose the trajectory of the Gini coefficient from primary to disposable 
income inequality in several parts: the dataset distinguish 7 main different social benefits and 
income taxes and social contributions across countries. 
Jesuit & Mahler (2004) and Mahler & Jesuit (2006) divided overall government redistribution 
only into 3 components: the redistributive effects from unemployment benefits, from pensions, 
and from taxes. They applied their empirical exercise for 13 countries with LIS-data around the 
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years 1999/2000 (59 datasets). Wang & Caminada (2011b) assembled a comparable dataset for 36 
LIS-countries for the period 1979-2006 (177 datasets). Overall government redistribution was 
divided into 13 components. The current Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution 
Dataset on Income Inequality 2017 covers a much wider range of 47 countries using the most 
recent LIS data available (293 datasets). Data on disposable income e.g. is available for 5,437,818 
individual disposable income observations summarized over all countries and waves, i.e. on 
average 18,559 observations per dataset. The coverage varies per country. The highest number of 
observations is for Norway 2013 (# 234,519), while the lowest number of observations is for 
Hungary 1999 (#1,636); see Descriptives for details (Table A1 in Excel Spreadsheet]. 
 
 
Comparability of fiscal redistribution datasets 2005/2008, 2011 and 2017 
LIS has, for 35 years, grown and evolved in order to adapt to the needs of researchers throughout 
the world. The LIS staff implemented a major LIS Database template revision – referred to as the 
2011 Template – linked to the release of the Wave VII (centered on 2007) microdata. Most 
components of this revised template have also been applied, retroactively, to all earlier waves of 
the microdata. As a result, figures of prior assembled datasets on fiscal redistribution by both 
Jesuit & Mahler (2005/2008) and Wang & Caminada (2011b) are unfortunately not comparable 
with the figures produced for the current Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution 
Dataset on Income Inequality 2017. 
Especially the inclusion of an increasing number of datasets from middle-income countries by the 
LIS staff necessitated conceptual adjustments and changes to the list of harmonized variables into 
the 2011 Template. The revision by LIS was guided by several principles and goals (Gornick et al, 
2013): (1) to restructure the variables, especially the income variables, to achieve a more logical, 
comparable, and comprehensive list; (2) to standardize most of the variables, which led to the use 
of fewer country-specific codes; and (3) to introduce easy-to-use dummy or categorical variables 
to complement the more detailed ones that are still provided. The revised 2011 LIS Template 
increased both comparability over-time and cross-national. Moreover, LIS’ data users have to 
make fewer assumptions and do less recoding as they carry out their research. A drawback of the 
new 2011 LIS Template is that results obtained today for income, income inequality and fiscal 
redistribution are not comparable with results obtained before 2011.  
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Jinxian Wang & Koen Caminada 
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Direct taxes 
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Housing transfers (hitsaho+hitsahe) 
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Annex A1: Household Income Components List 
Table A1 presents the framework for accounting income inequality and redistribution through 
various income sources. Below we provide the household income components list of LIS, by 
variable name and meaning. More specific explanation of the data can be found in the user-
friendly LIS website (http://www.lisdatacenter.org/). In Table A2 household (pre-tax) income is 
divided into 3 parts: factor income (labor income + capital income), social security transfers and 
private transfers. In each part, there are more specific income sources, which can be helpful for 
studies focusing on different elements of income. Table A5 provides household aggregated 
income sources provided by LIS. Using those aggregated variables, it is more convenient to 
process and present income distribution and decomposition results.  
In this Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Database on Income Inequality 2017 we 
compute five kinds of results, namely income inequality before social transfers and taxes, income 
inequality after social transfers and taxes, the overall redistributive effect, the partial effect of 
transfer redistribution and the partial effect of redistribution by several transfers and income 
taxes. In calculating pre-tax-transfer income inequality, we use primary income, which consists of 
factor income (sum of labor income and capital income), and private transfers; gross income is 
equal to primary income plus social security transfers; in calculating post-tax-transfer income, we 
use net disposable income (dhi). Difference between Ginipri and Ginigross is the redistribution from 
total transfers while difference between Ginigross and Ginidhi is the redistribution from income taxes 
and social security contribution. For some countries and waves which only report net incomes, 
gross income is equal to net disposable income (dhi). In addition, we use the number of persons 
in a household (nhhmem) and household weight (hwgt) in LIS dataset so as to obtain equivalized 
income and weighted results. 
 
Table A1 Income distribution indicator list 
Income Distribution 
Indicator 
Redistribution 
Measurement 
Specific Income Source 
Gini (pri)  
Primary Income 
(factor+hitp) 
Transfers 
Redistribution 
Gini (pri)-Gini 
(pri+trans) 
 
Gini (pri+trans)  
Primary Income + social security transfers 
(factor+hitp+hits) 
Taxes Redistribution 
Gini (pri+trans)-Gini 
(dhi) 
 
Gini (dhi)  
Net disposable Income 
(dhi) 
Overall Redistribution Gini (pri)-Gini (dhi)  
 
Source: LIS 
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Table A2 Household income variables in LIS dataset 
Factor 
income 
HILERB basic wages and salaries HILER 
regular paid 
employment income 
HILE 
paid employment 
income HIL  
labor 
income 
HILERS wage supplements 
HILERD director wages 
HILEC casual paid employment income 
HILSF farm self-employment income 
HILS 
self-employment 
income 
HILSNB profit from businesses HILSN 
non-farm self-
employment income HILSNH household production activities 
HICIDI interest HICID 
interest and dividends 
HIC  
capital 
income 
HICIDD dividends 
HICVIP voluntary individual pensions 
HICRENR rental income from real estate 
HICREN 
rental income 
HICRENL rental income from land 
HICRENM rental income from machinery 
HICROY royalties 
HITP 
Private 
transfers 
HITPED merit-based education transfers 
HITP 
private 
transfers 
HITPNP transfers from non-profit institutions 
HITPIHA alimony/child support HITPIH 
interhousehold 
transfers 
HITPIHR remittances 
HITPIHFT other family transfers 
HITS 
Social 
security 
transfers 
HITSILMIP mandatory individual pensions 
HITSIL 
long-term insurance 
transfers HITSI 
work-
related 
insurance 
transfers 
HITSILO occupational pensions 
HITSILEPO old-age insurance public pensions HITSILEP 
employment-related 
public pensions 
HITSILEPD disability insurance public pensions 
HITSILEPS survivors insurance public pensions 
HITSILWI work-injury pensions 
HITSISSI sickness wage replacement 
HITSIS 
short-term insurance 
HITSISMA maternity/parental wage replacement 
HITSISWI work-injury wage replacement 
HITSISUN unemployment wage replacement 
HITSUPO old-age universal pensions HITSUP 
old-
age/disability/survivors 
universal pensions 
HITSU 
universal 
benefits 
HITSUPD disability universal pensions 
HITSUPS survivors universal pensions 
HITSUUN unemployment universal benefits 
HITSUDI disability universal benefits 
HITSUFACA child allowances HITSUFA 
family/child universal 
benefits 
HITSUFAAM advance maintenance 
HITSUFACC non-work related child care benefits 
HITSUED education-related universal benefits 
HITSAGEN general social assistance 
HITSA 
assistance 
benefits 
HITSAPO old-age assistance pensions HITSAP 
old-age/disability/ 
survivors assistance 
pensions 
HITSAPD disability assistance pensions 
HITSAPS survivors assistance pensions 
HITSAUN unemployment assistance 
HITSAFA family/maternity/child assistance 
HITSAED education assistance 
HITSAHO housing assistance 
ITSAHE heating assistance 
HITSAFO food assistance 
HITSAME medical assistance 
 
Detailed information via http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/our-lis-documentation-variables-list.pdf  
 
Source: LIS  
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Table A3 Household aggregated income variables in LIS dataset 
Name Label Definition 
DHI disposable household income 
Total monetary and non-monetary current income net of income taxes and 
social security contributions. 
FACTOR factor income 
Total current monetary and non-monetary income from labor and capital 
(HIL+HIC). 
HITS social security transfers Total current monetary and non-monetary social security transfers 
HITP private transfers Total current monetary and non-monetary private transfers. 
HXIT 
income taxes and social 
security redistribution 
Total monetary and non-monetary expenditures on income taxes and social 
security contributions. 
HITSIL+HITSUP
+HITSUDI+HITS
AP 
old-age/disability/survivor 
transfers 
1) Monetary long-term work-related insurance transfers from the public social 
security system and/or from private insurers through monetary long-term 
work-related insurance transfers from the public social security system and/or 
from private insurers through mandatory schemes, and from the employers or 
occupational organizations (occupational schemes), which cover mainly the 
active population. 2) Pensions and monetary transfers for old-age, disability 
and survivors from the public programs, which are universal in structure. 3) 
Monetary disability-related transfers from public programs, which are 
universal in structure. Such transfers cover people in connection with 
disability, sickness or injury. 4) Pensions and similar monetary transfers for 
old-age, disability and survivors, received from the state through social 
programs targeted towards individuals or households in need. 
HITSISSI+HITSIS
WI 
sickness transfers 
1) Short-term work-related insurance monetary transfers from sickness 
insurance schemes that cover mainly the active population. Such transfers 
replace or supplement employment income during periods of temporary 
interruptions (or reductions) of employment caused by temporary inability to 
work due to (non-work related) sickness or injury, or cover the additional 
costs incurred in such circumstances (e.g. rehabilitations benefits). 2) Short-
term insurance monetary transfers for temporary total or partial work 
inability caused by a work-injury or occupational disease, stemming from 
schemes specifically set up with the purpose of covering work-injury and 
occupational diseases. 
HITSISMA+HITS
UFA+HITSAFA 
family/children transfers 
1) Short-term work-related monetary insurance transfers from maternity, 
paternity, or parental leave insurance schemes. 2) Monetary family-related 
transfers from public programs, which are universal in structure. 3) Monetary 
and non-monetary family-related transfers received from the state through 
social programs that are targeted on individuals or households in need. 
HITSUED+HITS
AED 
education transfers 
1) Monetary education-related transfers from public programs, which are 
universal in structure. 2) Monetary and non-monetary education-related 
transfers received from the state through social programs that are targeted on 
individuals or households in need. 
HITSISUN+HITS
UUN+HITSAUN 
unemployment transfers 
1) Short-term monetary transfers from the unemployment insurance aimed to 
compensate for the partial or total loss of labor income and to help the job 
seeker integrate the labor market. 2) Monetary transfers from unemployment 
public programs, which are universal in structure. 3) Monetary transfers 
received from unemployment social programs that are targeted on individuals 
or households in need. 
HITSAHO+HITS
AHE 
housing transfers 
1) Monetary and non-monetary housing-related transfers received from the 
state through social programs that are targeted on individuals or households 
in need. 2) Monetary and non-monetary heating-related transfers received 
from the state through social programs that are targeted on individuals or 
households in need. 
HITSAGEN+HIT
SAFO+HITSAME 
General/food/medical  
assistance transfers 
1) Monetary transfers from minimum income guarantee systems/last resort 
systems, received from the state through social programs that are targeted on 
individuals or households in need. 2) Monetary and non-monetary food-
related transfers received from the state through food assistance programs that 
are targeted on individuals or households in need. 3) Monetary and non-
monetary health-related transfers received from the state through medical care 
programs that are targeted on individuals or households in need.  
 
Notes:  
- Old-age/disability/survivor transfers: in some cases the variable HITSIL is missing but its sub-components are 
available, we then use it sub-components (sum of HITSILMIP, HITSILO, HITSILEP and HITSILWI) instead, 
including AU10, AU08, CA10, CA07, CA04, CA00, CA98, CA97, CA94, CA91, CA87, CA81, CA75, CA71, DK92, 
DK87, JP08. In other cases, HITSIL and its subcomponents, together with variables HITSUP, HITSUDI AND 
HITSAP are missing or provides poor information while the variables in the additional set 1 in the LIS variable list 
are available. In such cases old-age/disability/survivor transfers are computed based on sum of HIATOLD, 
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HIATDIS and HIATSUR, including EE13, EE10, EE07, EE04, GR04, GR00, GR95, IS10, IS07, IS04, LU04, NL04, 
NO13, NO10, NO07, NO04, NO00, NO95, RU00, ES04, SE00. 
- Sickness transfers are computed based on the variable HIATSIC in the additional set1 in LIS variable list in IS10, 
IS07, IS04, LU04, UK13, UK10, UK07. 
- Family/children transfers are computed based the variable HIATFAM in the additional set1 in LIS variable list in 
AT04, CA07, EE04, GR04, IS10, IS07, IS04, LU04, RU13, RU10, RU07, RU04, RU00, ES04. 
- Education transfers are computed based the variable HIATEDU in the additional set1 in LIS variable list inIT14, 
IT10, IT08, LU04, US13, US10, US07, US04, US00, US97, US94, US91. 
- Unemployment transfers are computed based the variable HIATFAM in the additional set1 in LIS variable list in 
AT04, LU04, ES04, ES90, ES85. 
- Housing transfers are computed based the variable HIATHOU in the additional set1 in LIS variable list in GR10, 
GR07, LU04, RU00. 
 
Variable construction via http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/lis-database/documentation/.  
 
Source: LIS 
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Annex A2: Gross and net income datasets in LIS 
Country-comparative and trend analyses of income distribution based on LIS gross/net datasets 
should be done with caution. LIS provides gross income data in most countries and years while 
providing income data that are net of (income) taxes in others. Of the 293 LIS datasets available at 
the time of writing, 194 are classified as gross, 84 as net and 15 as ‘mixed’; see Table A4 for a 
specification.  
To compare LIS gross and net datasets, researchers can apply at least four different approaches. 
The first approach includes both gross and net datasets in the same comparative analysis, 
acknowledging that the incomparabilities may lead to biased results (e.g. Wang et al, 2012; Wang 
et al, 2014). The second approach is to restrict analyses to either gross or net datasets (e.g. 
Gornick & Jäntti, 2012). This will result in accurate findings but limits the scope of the analyses. 
Third, one can present separate analyses based on LIS gross and net datasets (e.g. Wang et al, 
2014). However, the limitation of this approach is that the different results using gross and net 
datasets could originate from the different income concepts, or from real differences across 
countries or both. The fourth strategy is to gross up net income data or net down gross income 
data. With LIS, grossing up is not possible as most net datasets do not contain information on 
taxes.  To estimate gross income, country-specific details on the tax systems are required. Instead, 
Nieuwenhuis et al (2016) come up with a net down procedure to modify income data to 
approximate net income data. One shortcoming of this strategy is that in net datasets the 
comparison between pre-tax-transfer income and post-tax-transfer income only captures the 
effects of transfers, whereas in gross datasets this comparison would capture both effects of taxes 
and transfers. We offer a user-friendly version of the database allowing users to easily select 
income inequality variables (gross and/or net) and fiscal redistribution variables for (a group of) 
countries and/or specific data years via pivot tables. 
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Table A4 Gross and net income data in LIS 
 
 
Gross income Net income Mixed 
 
Australia 
 
AU10, AU08, AU03, AU01, AU95, AU89, AU85, AU81   
Austria AT13, AT10, AT07, AT04 AT00, AT97, AT94 AT95, AT87 
Belgium BE97, BE92 BE00, BE95, BE88, BE85 
 
Brazil BR13, BR11, BR09, BR06 
  
Canada CA10, CA07, CA04, CA00, CA98, CA97, CA94, CA91, 
CA87, CA81, CA75, CA71   
China 
  
CN02 
Colombia CO04 
 
CO13, CO10, CO07 
Czech Republic CZ13, CZ10, CZ07, CZ04, CZ02, CZ96, CZ92 
  
Denmark DK13, DK10, DK07, DK04, DK00, DK95, DK92, DK87 
  
Dominican Rep DO07 
  
Egypt 
 
EG12 
 
Estonia EE13, EE10, EE07, EE04 
 
EE00 
Finland FI13, FI10, FI07, FI04, FI00, FI95, FI91, FI87 
  
France 
  
FR10, FR05, FR00, 
FR94, FR89, FR84, 
FR78 
Georgia 
 
GE13, GE10 
 
Germany DE13, DE10, DE07, DE04, DE00, DE94, DE89, DE84, 
DE83, DE81, DE78, DE73   
Greece GR13, GR10, GR07 GR04, GR00, GR95 
 
Guatemala GT14, GT11, GT06 
  
Hungary 
 
HU12, HU09, HU07, 
HU05, HU99, HU94, HU91  
Iceland IS10, IS07, IS04 
  
India 
 
IN11, IN04 
 
Ireland IE10, IR07, IE04, IE87 IE00, IE96, IE95, IE94 
 
Israel IL12, IL10, IL07, IL05, IL01, IL97, IL92, IL86, IL79 
  
Italy 
 
IT14, IT10, IT08, IT04, 
T00, IT98, IT95, IT93, 
IT91, IT89, IT87, IT86 
 
Japan JP08 
  
Luxembourg 
LU13, LU10, LU08, LU04 
LU00, LU97, LU94, LU91, 
LU85  
Mexico 
 
MX12, MX10, MX08, 
MX04, MX02, MX00, 
MX98, MX96, MX94, 
MX92, MX89, MX84 
 
Netherlands NL13, NL10, NL07, NL04, NL99, NL93, NL90, NL87, 
NL83   
Norway NO13, NO10, NO07, NO04, NO00, NO95, NO91, 
NO86, NO79   
Panama PA13, PA10, PA07 
  
Paraguay 
 
PY10, PY13 
 
Peru PE13, PE10, PE07, PE04 
  
Poland PL13, PL10, PL07, PL04, PL99 PL92, PL86 PL95 
Romania RO97, RO95 
  
Russia 
 
RU13, RU10, RU07, RU04, 
RU00  
Serbia 
 
RS13, RS10, RS06 
 
Slovak Republic SK13, SK10, SK07, SK04, SK92 SK96 
 
Slovenia 
 
SI12, SI10, SI07, SI04, SI99, 
SI97  
South Africa ZA12, ZA10, ZA08 
  
South Korea KR12, KR10, KR08, KR06 
  
Spain 
ES13, ES10, ES07 
ES04, ES00, ES95, ES90, 
ES85, ES80  
Sweden SE05, SE00, SE95, SE92, SE87, SE81, SE75, SE67 
  
Switzerland CH13, CH10, CH07, CH04, CH02, CH00, CH92, CH82 
  
Taiwan TW13, TW10, TW07, TW05, TW00, TW97, TW95, 
TW91, TW86, TW81   
United Kingdom UK13, UK10, UK07, UK04, UK99, UK95, UK94, UK91, 
UK86, UK79, UK74, UK69   
United States US13, US10, US07, US04, US00, US97, US94, US91, 
US86, US79, US74   
Uruguay 
 
UY13, UY10, UY07, UY04 
  
 
See for a continuously updated overview: http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/lis-database/datasets-information/  
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Annex B1 Social transfers as a proportion of housholds' gross income (total population) 
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Australia 2010 Gross 12.9% 7.0% 0.0% 3.4% 0.1% 1.0% 0.2% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 15.5% 
Australia 2008 Gross 11.9% 6.6% 0.0% 3.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 17.2% 
Australia 2003 Gross 13.5% 7.6% 0.1% 3.6%   1.4%   0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 20.0% 
Australia 2001 Gross 14.0% 7.6% 0.0% 3.9%   1.4%   0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 19.0% 
Australia 1995 Gross 13.7% 7.3% 0.1% 3.1% 0.5% 1.9%   0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 20.1% 
Australia 1989 Gross 9.7% 5.7% 0.2% 2.0% 0.2% 1.1%     0.6% 0.0% 21.6% 
Australia 1985 Gross 10.7% 6.6% 0.2% 1.2% 0.1% 1.4%     1.3% 0.0% 22.4% 
Australia 1981 Gross 9.7% 5.8% 0.2% 1.3% 0.2% 1.0%     1.0% 0.0% 21.6% 
Austria 2013 Gross 26.1% 19.8% 0.4% 3.5% 0.2% 1.7% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 25.4% 
Austria 2010 Gross 25.7% 18.7% 0.4% 4.3% 0.2% 1.8% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 24.6% 
Austria 2007 Gross 23.8% 17.7% 0.3% 4.0% 0.2% 1.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 25.6% 
Austria 2004 Gross 26.7% 20.4% 0.2% 4.3% 0.2% 1.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 25.1% 
Austria 2000 Net 27.4% 20.1% 0.1% 5.6% 0.2% 1.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   
Austria 1997 Net 26.9% 19.5% 0.1% 5.3% 0.2% 1.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%   
Austria 1995 Mix                       
Austria 1994 Net 25.4% 17.9% 0.1% 5.3% 0.3% 1.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%   
Austria 1987 Mix                       
Belgium 2000 Net 24.5% 16.1% 0.4% 4.7% 0.1% 3.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%   
Belgium 1997 Gross 21.7% 13.6%   3.6% 0.1% 2.5% 0.0% 0.2% 1.7% 0.0% 30.3% 
Belgium 1995 Net 28.0% 17.4% 0.3% 6.0% 0.1% 3.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0%   
Belgium 1992 Gross 22.6% 14.9%   4.4% 0.2% 2.9%     0.2% 0.0% 26.6% 
Belgium 1988 Net 27.8% 14.6% 1.6% 6.5%   4.0%     1.0% 0.0%   
Belgium 1985 Net 26.8% 13.8% 1.6% 6.9%   3.7%     0.8% 0.0%   
Brazil 2013 Gross 20.4% 18.0%       0.7%   1.4% 0.4% 0.0% 9.0% 
Brazil 2011 Gross 20.2% 18.1%       0.6%   1.0% 0.4% 0.0% 8.6% 
Brazil 2009 Gross 21.0% 18.8%       0.9%   0.9% 0.4% 0.0% 8.4% 
Brazil 2006 Gross 20.7% 18.7%       0.6%   0.7% 0.7% 0.0% 8.2% 
Canada 2010 Gross 18.2% 11.7%   0.3%       1.0% 5.1% 0.0% 18.9% 
Canada 2007 Gross 17.0% 9.1%   1.6%       0.9% 5.4% 0.0% 20.0% 
Canada 2004 Gross 17.0% 9.0%           1.0% 7.0% 0.0% 21.2% 
Canada 2000 Gross 15.8% 8.1%           1.2% 6.4% 0.0% 23.7% 
Canada 1998 Gross 17.5% 8.1%           1.9% 7.5% 0.0% 20.2% 
Canada 1997 Gross 16.2% 7.3%           1.5% 7.4% 0.0% 20.3% 
Canada 1994 Gross 17.0% 6.7%           2.1% 8.3% 0.0% 19.9% 
Canada 1991 Gross 15.8% 8.3%   0.9%   3.4%     3.3% 0.0% 19.8% 
Canada 1987 Gross 12.8% 7.1%   0.9%   2.2%     2.5% 0.0% 19.0% 
Canada 1981 Gross 10.1% 5.1%   1.1%   1.7%     2.2% 0.0% 15.3% 
Canada 1975 Gross 10.3% 4.4%   2.3%   2.1%     1.5% 0.0% 14.7% 
Canada 1971 Gross 7.7% 3.9%   1.4%   0.6%     1.7% 0.0% 14.8% 
China 2002 Mix 12.7% 11.1%       0.5%   0.1% 0.7% 0.4% 5.1% 
Colombia 2013 Mix 11.2% 8.3%             2.9% 0.0% 12.5% 
Colombia 2010 Mix 11.4% 9.5%             1.8% 0.0% 11.4% 
Colombia 2007 Mix 10.3% 8.6%             1.7% 0.0% 12.4% 
Colombia 2004 Gross 8.2% 8.2%             0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 
Czech Republic 2013 Gross 20.5% 16.4%   1.7%   0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.3% 0.0% 13.8% 
Czech Republic 2010 Gross 20.8% 16.1%   2.2%   0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 1.7% 0.0% 13.8% 
Czech Republic 2007 Gross 20.0% 14.6%   3.2%   0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 1.6% 0.0% 17.0% 
Czech Republic 2004 Gross 20.7% 15.1%   2.8%   0.6% 0.2% 0.6% 1.4% 0.0% 17.4% 
Czech Republic 2002 Gross 20.9% 14.9%   2.8%   0.7% 0.2% 1.1% 1.2% 0.0% 16.3% 
Czech Republic 1996 Gross 17.0% 11.7%   1.9%   0.3% 0.1% 0.6% 2.4% 0.0% 17.5% 
Czech Republic 1992 Gross 24.1% 14.5%   3.2%   0.3%     6.1% 0.0% 13.4% 
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Denmark 2013 Gross 23.6% 15.5%   1.5% 1.3% 1.6% 0.8% 1.9% 0.9% 0.0% 32.1% 
Denmark 2010 Gross 22.4% 14.7%   1.6% 1.0% 1.8% 0.7% 1.5% 1.0% 0.0% 31.8% 
Denmark 2007 Gross 20.0% 13.1%   1.7% 0.8% 1.2% 0.7% 1.4% 1.1% 0.0% 33.5% 
Denmark 2004 Gross 22.6% 13.2% 0.9% 2.4% 0.8% 2.5% 0.8% 1.6% 0.3% 0.0% 32.6% 
Denmark 2000 Gross 21.2% 12.5% 0.9% 2.1% 0.8% 2.5% 0.7% 1.6% 0.1% 0.0% 34.1% 
Denmark 1995 Gross 24.3% 12.8% 1.1% 2.3% 0.6% 4.9% 0.8% 1.7% 0.1% 0.0% 34.1% 
Denmark 1992 Gross 22.7% 1.7% 1.1% 1.6%   5.0%     13.3% 0.0% 33.4% 
Denmark 1987 Gross 20.5% 1.0% 1.0% 1.5%   3.3%     13.7% 0.0% 31.5% 
Dominican Rep. 2007 Gross 2.8% 2.4%             0.3% 0.0% 2.4% 
Egypt 2012 Net 9.7% 9.2%             0.5% 0.0%   
Estonia 2013 Gross 19.1% 13.5% 0.7% 3.9% 0.1% 0.5%   0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 15.0% 
Estonia 2010 Gross 21.0% 14.3% 0.5% 5.0% 0.2% 0.7%   0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 15.5% 
Estonia 2007 Gross 15.4% 11.1% 0.4% 3.5% 0.1% 0.1%   0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 15.9% 
Estonia 2004 Gross 17.5% 12.1% 0.3% 3.9% 0.5% 0.4%   0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 16.7% 
Estonia 2000 Mix 22.4%   0.8%   1.5% 0.3%     19.7% 0.0% 12.1% 
Finland 2013 Gross 25.5% 16.8% 0.1% 2.2% 0.5% 3.1% 0.6% 0.4% 1.7% 0.2% 24.3% 
Finland 2010 Gross 24.6% 15.4% 0.1% 2.3% 0.6% 3.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.8% 0.1% 23.3% 
Finland 2007 Gross 23.5% 13.7% 0.1% 2.3% 0.5% 4.1% 0.6% 0.3% 1.7% 0.1% 24.2% 
Finland 2004 Gross 23.4% 14.5% 0.1% 2.7% 0.7% 2.9% 0.6% 0.4% 1.3% 0.2% 25.6% 
Finland 2000 Gross 23.6% 14.2% 0.1% 3.1% 0.6% 3.0% 0.7% 0.4% 1.3% 0.1% 27.5% 
Finland 1995 Gross 29.9% 15.6%   4.3% 0.7% 5.6% 0.8% 0.5% 2.4% 0.0% 28.2% 
Finland 1991 Gross 22.5% 13.5% 0.7% 4.1%   1.5%     2.6% 0.0% 25.0% 
Finland 1987 Gross 19.1% 12.0% 0.6% 2.8%   0.7%     3.0% 0.0% 26.6% 
France 2010 Mix 29.1% 20.9%   3.4% 0.0% 2.9% 1.2%   0.8% 0.0% 4.8% 
France 2005 Mix 30.3% 21.7% 0.6% 3.5% 0.2% 2.3% 1.3% 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 4.8% 
France 2000 Mix 27.5% 18.6% 0.6% 3.9% 0.3% 2.2% 1.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 6.0% 
France 1994 Mix 27.9% 18.9% 0.6% 3.5% 0.5% 2.7% 1.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 5.3% 
France 1989 Mix 25.7% 16.1%   4.0%   2.8%     2.8% 0.0% 6.5% 
France 1984 Mix 23.0% 14.3%   4.0%   2.2%     2.5% 0.0% 6.6% 
France 1978 Mix 20.4% 12.4%   4.1% 0.3% 0.9%     1.0% 1.9% 5.4% 
Georgia 2013 Net 13.5% 11.7%   1.4% 0.0%       0.4% 0.0%   
Georgia 2010 Net 14.6% 12.6%   1.4% 0.0%       0.5% 0.0%   
Germany 2013 Gross 22.4% 16.8%   3.1% 0.3% 1.9% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 26.1% 
Germany 2010 Gross 23.1% 17.3%   3.1% 0.2% 2.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 26.3% 
Germany 2007 Gross 22.2% 16.2%   2.9% 0.1% 2.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 26.5% 
Germany 2004 Gross 22.1% 15.6%   3.2% 0.2% 1.9% 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 25.3% 
Germany 2000 Gross 20.6% 14.9%   3.0% 0.2% 1.6% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% 27.3% 
Germany 1994 Gross 18.5% 14.1%   1.6% 0.2% 1.9% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 25.9% 
Germany 1989 Gross 16.8% 13.6%   1.4% 0.2% 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 27.1% 
Germany 1984 Gross 16.9% 13.6%   1.6% 0.2% 1.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 25.6% 
Germany 1983 Gross 17.9% 13.4%   1.6%   0.8%     2.1% 0.0% 18.8% 
Germany 1981 Gross 17.8% 12.2%   1.9%   0.4%     3.3% 0.0% 24.2% 
Germany 1978 Gross 16.9% 13.5%   1.9%   0.4%     1.1% 0.0% 19.2% 
Germany 1973 Gross 12.2% 4.2%             8.0% 0.0% 18.7% 
Greece 2013 Gross 29.6% 26.8% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0%   0.5% 0.4% 20.5% 
Greece 2010 Gross 26.2% 23.4% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0%   0.2% 0.8% 22.0% 
Greece 2007 Gross 20.2% 17.7% 0.1% 1.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1%   0.1% 0.3% 24.6% 
Greece 2004 Net 22.0% 20.2% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%   
Greece 2000 Net 21.8% 20.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%   
Greece 1995 Net 20.9% 19.6% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0%   
Guatemala 2014 Gross 2.8% 1.9%     0.0%     0.5% 0.3% 0.0% 14.6% 
Guatemala 2011 Gross 1.9% 1.7%     0.0%     0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 5.6% 
Guatemala 2006 Gross 3.0% 1.7%     0.4%   0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 6.0% 
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Hungary 2012 Net 32.6% 16.9% 0.3% 4.2%   0.6% 0.3%   3.1% 7.2%   
Hungary 2009 Net 38.7% 19.9% 0.6% 3.7%   1.6% 0.3%   2.3% 10.4%   
Hungary 2007 Net 34.7% 15.4% 0.6% 3.9%   1.3% 0.2%   3.1% 10.3%   
Hungary 2005 Net 35.4% 24.2% 0.7% 6.3%   1.2% 0.1%   3.0% 0.0%   
Hungary 1999 Net 31.6% 23.4% 0.7% 6.0%   1.2%     0.3% 0.0%   
Hungary 1994 Net 33.0% 20.2% 1.1% 8.0%   1.5%     2.3% 0.0%   
Hungary 1991 Net 31.5% 17.9% 1.0% 9.2%   2.0%     1.5% 0.0%   
Iceland 2010 Gross 16.4% 10.6% 0.0% 2.2% 0.2% 1.8% 1.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 26.6% 
Iceland 2007 Gross 10.9% 7.8% 0.0% 1.9% 0.1% 0.2% 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 25.9% 
Iceland 2004 Gross 12.6% 8.6% 0.0% 2.1% 0.2% 0.5% 1.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 27.1% 
India 2011 Net 6.9% 5.0%   0.0%   0.0% 0.2% 1.6% 0.1% 0.0%   
India 2004 Net 4.7% 3.4%   0.0%   0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0%   
Ireland 2010 Gross 26.8% 11.5% 1.4% 5.7% 0.1% 6.1% 0.8% 0.3% 0.8% 0.0% 19.2% 
Ireland 2007 Gross 21.0% 10.0% 1.0% 5.5% 0.1% 2.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.9% 0.0% 15.3% 
Ireland 2004 Gross 18.2% 9.4% 0.8% 4.9% 0.0% 1.9% 0.5% 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% 16.1% 
Ireland 2000 Net 16.8% 9.1% 0.8% 3.8% 0.3% 2.2% 0.2%   0.5% 0.0%   
Ireland 1996 Net 20.5% 10.2% 0.7% 3.7% 0.3% 5.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%   
Ireland 1995 Net 19.9% 10.0% 0.7% 3.6% 0.3% 4.8% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%   
Ireland 1994 Net 20.7% 9.7% 0.7% 3.2% 0.4% 6.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%   
Ireland 1987 Gross 18.9% 6.0% 1.2% 2.2%   2.2%     7.2% 0.0% 19.9% 
Israel 2012 Gross 14.8% 10.3%   1.8%   0.5%   0.5% 1.8% 0.0% 16.4% 
Israel 2010 Gross 15.2% 10.3%   1.7%   0.7%   0.5% 2.0% 0.0% 16.9% 
Israel 2007 Gross 15.6% 10.7%   1.8%   0.5%   0.7% 1.9% 0.0% 19.0% 
Israel 2005 Gross 16.5% 11.2%   1.8% 0.3% 0.4%   0.9% 1.9% 0.0% 19.2% 
Israel 2001 Gross 17.9% 10.0%   3.3% 0.3% 1.1%   1.2% 2.1% 0.0% 23.8% 
Israel 1997 Gross 16.0% 8.8%   3.3%   0.9%   0.7% 2.2% 0.0% 23.6% 
Israel 1992 Gross 15.5% 8.5% 1.0% 2.2%   0.9%     2.9% 0.0% 19.6% 
Israel 1986 Gross 14.6% 8.6%   3.7%   0.3%     1.9% 0.0% 22.8% 
Israel 1979 Gross 11.0% 5.6%   3.7%         1.6% 0.0% 29.1% 
Italy 2014 Net 30.0% 29.0%     0.1% 0.8%   0.0% 0.2% -0.1% 33.1% 
Italy 2010 Net 28.1% 27.3%     0.1% 0.6%   0.0% 0.1% -0.1% 32.5% 
Italy 2008 Net 27.3% 26.9%     0.1% 0.3%   0.0% 0.1% -0.1% 31.1% 
Italy 2004 Net 25.6% 25.1%     0.1% 0.4%   0.0% 0.1% -0.1% 32.0% 
Italy 2000 Net 24.7% 24.1%     0.1% 0.4%   0.0% 0.2% -0.1%   
Italy 1998 Net 24.8% 24.4%     0.1% 0.3%   0.0% 0.1% -0.1%   
Italy 1995 Net 25.4% 24.6%     0.1% 0.5%   0.0% 0.2% -0.1%   
Italy 1993 Net 22.7% 22.0%     0.0%     0.4% 0.2% 0.0%   
Italy 1991 Net 20.7% 20.2%     0.0%     0.2% 0.2% 0.0%   
Italy 1989 Net 19.0% 18.6%     0.0%     0.2% 0.2% 0.0%   
Italy 1987 Net 18.3% 17.8%     0.0%     0.3% 0.2% 0.0%   
Italy 1986 Net 20.2% 17.6%             2.7% 0.0%   
Japan 2008 Gross 14.9% 3.9%   0.4%       0.1% 10.5% 0.0% 15.5% 
Luxembourg 2013 Gross 26.0% 19.3% 0.2% 4.4% 0.1% 0.9% 0.1% 0.6% 0.3% 0.0% 22.7% 
Luxembourg 2010 Gross 25.3% 18.2% 0.2% 4.9% 0.1% 0.9% 0.1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.0% 21.0% 
Luxembourg 2007 Gross 22.1% 16.1% 0.2% 4.3% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 21.0% 
Luxembourg 2004 Gross 23.3% 16.5% 0.1% 5.0% 0.1% 1.1% 0.1%   0.4% 0.0% 19.4% 
Luxembourg 2000 Net 25.3% 18.2% 0.3% 5.7% 0.0% 0.3%   0.5% 0.3% 0.0%   
Luxembourg 1997 Net 26.2% 19.0% 0.3% 5.3% 0.0% 0.4%   0.5% 0.7% 0.0%   
Luxembourg 1994 Net 25.0% 18.3% 0.6% 4.1% 0.1% 0.3%   0.4% 1.2% 0.0%   
Luxembourg 1991 Net 23.1% 18.0% 0.5% 3.3%   0.1%     1.2% 0.0%   
Luxembourg 1985 Net 22.4% 17.4% 0.3% 3.7% 0.1% 0.3%     0.6% 0.0%   
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Mexico 2012 Net 11.3% 7.4% 0.0%   0.3% 0.3%   0.0% 3.3% 0.0%   
Mexico 2010 Net 10.3% 6.4% 0.0%   0.2% 0.4%   0.0% 3.2% 0.0%   
Mexico 2008 Net 9.1% 5.3% 0.1%   0.2% 0.3%     3.1% 0.0%   
Mexico 2004 Net 5.9% 4.5%     0.2%       1.3% 0.0%   
Mexico 2002 Net 5.4% 3.9%     0.4%       1.1% 0.0%   
Mexico 2000 Net 4.4% 4.1%             0.2% 0.0%   
Mexico 1998 Net 3.7% 3.5%             0.2% 0.0%   
Mexico 1996 Net 3.3% 2.6%     0.2%       0.5% 0.0%   
Mexico 1994 Net 3.4% 2.5%     0.1%       0.8% 0.0%   
Mexico 1992 Net 2.4% 2.2%     0.1%       0.0% 0.0%   
Mexico 1989 Net 2.2% 2.1%     0.1%       0.0% 0.0%   
Mexico 1984 Net 1.9% 1.8%     0.1%       0.0% 0.0%   
Netherlands 2013 Gross 22.2% 16.4% 0.4% 1.3% 0.5% 1.7% 0.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 32.6% 
Netherlands 2010 Gross 21.3% 15.7% 0.3% 1.4% 0.6% 1.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.6% 0.0% 34.4% 
Netherlands 2007 Gross 19.3% 14.6% 0.2% 1.2% 0.6% 0.9% 0.4% 0.7% 0.6% 0.0% 32.2% 
Netherlands 2004 Gross 21.1% 15.3% 0.3% 1.4% 0.5% 1.5% 0.5%   1.8% 0.0% 32.3% 
Netherlands 1999 Gross 21.2% 16.6% 0.3% 2.0% 0.3% 1.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 25.8% 
Netherlands 1993 Gross 23.3% 16.2% 0.3% 2.4% 0.5% 2.7% 0.3% 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 32.2% 
Netherlands 1990 Gross 24.1% 17.2% 0.7% 2.1%   1.0%     3.0% 0.0% 25.9% 
Netherlands 1987 Gross 29.4% 13.2%   2.1% 7.1% 1.9%     5.2% 0.0% 34.1% 
Netherlands 1983 Gross 29.0% 14.1%   3.1% 7.1% 2.4%     2.4% 0.0% 31.5% 
Norway 2013 Gross 23.2% 16.3% 2.3% 2.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 0.0% 25.8% 
Norway 2010 Gross 23.3% 15.2% 2.5% 2.9% 0.5% 0.8% 0.2% 0.3% 1.0% 0.0% 25.8% 
Norway 2007 Gross 22.4% 13.5% 2.4% 3.1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 2.1% 0.0% 25.3% 
Norway 2004 Gross 22.7% 12.7% 4.2% 3.6% 0.6% 1.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 24.4% 
Norway 2000 Gross 18.4% 12.5% 1.0% 3.1% 0.6% 0.7% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 
Norway 1995 Gross 19.3% 13.3%   2.7% 0.5% 1.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.3% 0.0% 24.4% 
Norway 1991 Gross 17.2% 13.3%   2.5%         1.4% 0.0% 22.7% 
Norway 1986 Gross 14.0% 1.1%   2.0%   0.4%     10.5% 0.0% 24.2% 
Norway 1979 Gross 12.7% 0.9%   1.6%         10.2% 0.0% 25.6% 
Panama 2013 Gross 11.6% 9.4%   0.3% 1.5%   0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 8.9% 
Panama 2010 Gross 12.5% 10.2%   1.0% 0.6%   0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2% 
Panama 2007 Gross 12.7% 11.0%     0.4%   0.1% 1.1% 0.2% 0.0% 6.8% 
Paraguay 2013 Net 3.9% 3.7%             0.2% 0.0%   
Paraguay 2010 Net 4.2% 4.0%             0.2% 0.0%   
Peru 2013 Gross 7.3% 4.0%   0.4% 0.2%   0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 
Peru 2010 Gross 8.1% 4.5%   0.4% 0.2%   0.0% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 
Peru 2007 Gross 8.9% 5.4%   0.4% 0.2%   0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 
Peru 2004 Gross 8.8% 5.7%     0.0%   0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
Poland 2013 Gross 25.5% 22.5%   1.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.8% 0.3% 0.0% 2.4% 
Poland 2010 Gross 25.2% 22.2%   1.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% 3.4% 
Poland 2007 Gross 27.7% 24.0%   1.7% 0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0% 5.2% 
Poland 2004 Gross 32.9% 28.6% 0.3% 1.9% 0.1% 0.8% 0.4% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 6.9% 
Poland 1999 Gross 30.4% 26.0% 0.3% 1.7%   1.6% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 10.8% 
Poland 1995 Mix 36.0% 28.4%   2.9%   2.8%     1.8% 0.0% 15.7% 
Poland 1992 Net 22.3% 13.4%   5.0%   3.9%     0.0% 0.0%   
Poland 1986 Net 15.2% 11.6%   0.4%         3.2% 0.0%   
Romania 1997 Gross 15.3% 11.2% 0.1% 2.9% 0.1% 0.8%     0.1% 0.0% 11.5% 
Romania 1995 Gross 14.1% 10.8% 0.2% 1.6% 0.1% 1.2%     0.3% 0.0% 12.7% 
Russia 2013 Net 22.2% 20.5%   1.0%   0.0% 0.1%   0.7% 0.0%   
Russia 2010 Net 21.0% 19.4%   1.1%   0.1% 0.1%   0.3% 0.0%   
Russia 2007 Net 16.7% 15.4%   0.7%   0.0% 0.1%   0.4% 0.0%   
Russia 2004 Net 17.3% 15.8%   0.7%   0.0% 0.1%   0.7% 0.0%   
Russia 2000 Net 16.3% 12.9%   0.9% 0.3% 0.1% 0.7%   1.4% 0.0%   
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Serbia 2013 Net 33.6% 31.4%   0.6%   0.4%     1.3% 0.0%   
Serbia 2010 Net 34.3% 32.4%   0.5%   0.6%     0.8% 0.0%   
Serbia 2006 Net 27.5% 25.5%   0.6%   0.6%     0.8% 0.0%   
Slovakia 2013 Gross 20.9% 16.6% 0.2% 2.8% 0.1% 0.3%     0.8% 0.0% 12.6% 
Slovakia 2010 Gross 22.2% 17.7% 0.3% 2.7% 0.2% 0.6%     0.8% 0.0% 10.6% 
Slovakia 2007 Gross 20.1% 16.0% 0.2% 2.2% 0.2% 0.2%     0.7% 0.6% 14.2% 
Slovakia 2004 Gross 21.8% 16.0% 0.3% 3.1% 0.1% 0.7%     1.5% 0.1% 16.0% 
Slovakia 1996 Net 26.5% 18.2% 0.6% 5.7%   1.9%     0.1% 0.0%   
Slovakia 1992 Gross 29.0% 14.4% 0.9% 6.5%   1.1%     6.1% 0.0% 12.9% 
Slovenia 2012 Net 28.2%     2.3% 1.0% 1.1%     23.8% 0.0%   
Slovenia 2010 Net 26.1%     3.1% 0.7% 0.8% 0.0% 0.4% 21.1% 0.0%   
Slovenia 2007 Net 25.8%     3.1% 0.8% 0.6% 0.0% 0.4% 21.0% 0.0%   
Slovenia 2004 Net 26.7%     3.2% 0.9% 0.7% 0.0% 0.5% 21.4% 0.0%   
Slovenia 1999 Net 26.1%     2.7% 1.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.2% 20.8% 0.0%   
Slovenia 1997 Net 26.1%     3.0% 1.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.2% 20.6% 0.0%   
South Africa 2012 Gross 10.6% 6.0%   4.0%         0.2% 0.4% 18.8% 
South Africa 2010 Gross 14.1% 9.4%   3.6%         0.1% 0.9% 19.8% 
South Africa 2008 Gross 10.9% 7.3%   2.8%         0.5% 0.2% 15.2% 
South Korea 2012 Gross 4.6% 2.5%             2.1% 0.0% 8.6% 
South Korea 2010 Gross 4.6% 2.4%             2.1% 0.0% 8.2% 
South Korea 2008 Gross 4.0% 1.9%             2.1% 0.0% 7.7% 
South Korea 2006 Gross 3.2% 1.4%             1.7% 0.0% 7.3% 
Spain 2013 Gross 26.3% 19.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 5.8% 0.0%   0.5% 0.0% 16.1% 
Spain 2010 Gross 23.4% 17.5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 3.9% 0.1%   0.4% 0.5% 13.5% 
Spain 2007 Gross 17.9% 14.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 1.6% 0.1%   0.6% 0.2% 14.6% 
Spain 2004 Net 20.4% 17.1% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 2.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%   
Spain 2000 Net 20.3% 18.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   
Spain 1995 Net 22.1% 18.1% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 2.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%   
Spain 1990 Net 21.0% 17.2%       2.5%     1.4% 0.0%   
Spain 1985 Net 20.3%         2.8%     17.5% 0.0%   
Spain 1980 Net 15.1%                     
Sweden 2005 Gross 28.1% 0.0% 2.3% 3.4% 2.0% 2.5% 0.7% 0.5% 16.6% 0.0% 28.1% 
Sweden 2000 Gross 26.2% 15.3% 2.8% 3.1% 1.0% 2.7% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% -0.7% 30.2% 
Sweden 1995 Gross 33.1% 17.2% 1.7% 5.7% 1.3% 4.5% 1.5% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0% 28.6% 
Sweden 1992 Gross 30.7% 16.7% 2.5% 4.4%   3.5%     3.5% 0.0% 25.1% 
Sweden 1987 Gross 27.6% 15.9% 4.0% 3.6% 1.0% 1.6%     1.6% 0.0% 32.5% 
Sweden 1981 Gross 26.8% 15.0% 3.4% 3.0%   0.9%     4.4% 0.0% 29.8% 
Sweden 1975 Gross 19.4% 9.8% 3.3% 2.6%   0.4%     3.3% 0.0% 30.7% 
Sweden 1967 Gross 11.9% 6.3% 2.4% 2.6%   0.4%     0.3% 0.0% 28.8% 
Switzerland 2013 Gross 17.2% 12.9% 0.0% 2.0%   0.9% 0.0%   1.3% 0.0% 28.1% 
Switzerland 2010 Gross 16.1% 12.4% 0.0% 1.6%   1.2% 0.1%   0.8% 0.0% 27.4% 
Switzerland 2007 Gross 15.5% 12.7% 0.0% 1.2%   0.7%     0.9% 0.0% 27.3% 
Switzerland 2004 Gross 17.4% 13.4% 0.4% 1.6%   1.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% 26.1% 
Switzerland 2002 Gross 16.0% 12.8% 0.5% 1.6%   0.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 25.1% 
Switzerland 2000 Gross 15.3% 12.3% 0.4% 1.6%   0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 24.5% 
Switzerland 1992 Gross 12.2% 11.2% 0.2%     0.6% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 16.9% 
Switzerland 1982 Gross 8.1% 7.4%       0.1%     0.6% 0.0% 18.0% 
 
  
83 
 
L
IS
 D
ataset 
G
ro
ss / n
et 
A
ll so
cial 
b
en
efits 
O
ld
-age/ D
isab
ility/ 
S
u
rvivo
r 
S
ick
n
ess 
F
am
ily/ C
h
ild
ren
 
E
d
u
catio
n
 
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
H
o
u
sin
g 
G
en
eral/fo
o
d
/ 
m
ed
ical assistan
ce 
O
th
er tran
sfers 
R
esid
u
al 
T
axes 
Taiwan 2013 Gross 9.9% 1.1%           0.1% 8.6% 0.0% 13.3% 
Taiwan 2010 Gross 8.1% 1.2%           0.1% 6.8% 0.0% 12.3% 
Taiwan 2007 Gross 8.1% 1.1%           0.1% 7.0% 0.0% 10.3% 
Taiwan 2005 Gross 8.9% 0.9%           0.1% 8.0% 0.0% 4.8% 
Taiwan 2000 Gross 5.9% 0.5%           0.1% 5.3% 0.0% 4.4% 
Taiwan 1997 Gross 4.6% 0.4%           0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 4.4% 
Taiwan 1995 Gross                       
Taiwan 1991 Gross 1.3% 0.4%             0.9% 0.0% 1.4% 
Taiwan 1986 Gross 0.5% 0.1%             0.4% 0.0% 1.4% 
Taiwan 1981 Gross 0.4% 0.0%             0.4% 0.0% 1.0% 
United Kingdom 2013 Gross 21.7% 13.8% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% 0.4% 2.0% 0.9% 1.1% 0.0% 16.7% 
United Kingdom 2010 Gross 21.4% 12.9% 0.0% 3.6% 0.1% 0.4% 2.0% 1.1% 1.2% 0.0% 17.8% 
United Kingdom 2007 Gross 18.9% 11.6% 0.0% 3.0% 0.1% 0.2% 1.6% 1.2% 1.1% 0.0% 17.8% 
United Kingdom 2004 Gross 19.6% 12.5% 0.0% 2.9% 0.2% 0.3% 1.8% 1.2% 0.7% 0.0% 20.5% 
United Kingdom 1999 Gross 19.6% 12.4% 0.1% 2.3% 0.1% 0.7% 1.9% 1.7% 0.4% 0.0% 21.2% 
United Kingdom 1995 Gross 20.6% 12.5% 0.2% 2.0% 0.3% 0.2% 1.7% 2.7% 1.0% 0.0% 22.1% 
United Kingdom 1994 Gross 21.1% 13.0% 0.1% 1.8% 0.3% 0.4% 1.9% 2.7% 0.9% 0.0% 20.9% 
United Kingdom 1991 Gross 17.2% 10.8% 0.2% 1.7%   0.3%     4.2% 0.0% 23.5% 
United Kingdom 1986 Gross 21.9% 11.1% 0.6% 2.9%   1.4%     5.9% 0.0% 21.9% 
United Kingdom 1979 Gross 17.2% 8.4% 0.7% 3.2%   1.5%   0.5% 2.9% 0.0% 19.5% 
United Kingdom 1974 Gross 9.7% 7.9% 0.2% 1.0%   0.3%     0.4% 0.0% 14.2% 
United Kingdom 1969 Gross 10.2% 6.6% 0.7% 1.8%   0.3%     0.8% 0.0% 12.6% 
United States 2013 Gross 13.8% 11.0% 0.1% 1.3% 0.7% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.1% -0.6% 19.6% 
United States 2010 Gross 14.8% 10.5% 0.1% 1.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% -0.5% 19.6% 
United States 2007 Gross 11.5% 9.3% 0.1% 1.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% 20.1% 
United States 2004 Gross 12.0% 9.4% 0.2% 1.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% -0.5% 19.8% 
United States 2000 Gross 10.2% 8.7% 0.2% 0.5% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% -0.4% 22.4% 
United States 1997 Gross 11.2% 9.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% -0.4% 21.5% 
United States 1994 Gross 12.1% 9.5% 0.3% 0.9% 0.6% 0.5% 0.1% 0.7% 0.0% -0.4% 20.5% 
United States 1991 Gross 12.0% 9.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% -0.4% 20.0% 
United States 1986 Gross 10.9% 8.5% 0.3% 0.6%   0.4% 0.1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.0% 21.1% 
United States 1979 Gross 10.4% 7.7% 0.2% 0.7%   0.4% 0.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.0% 20.4% 
United States 1974 Gross 8.5% 6.1%       0.4%     2.0% 0.0% 18.3% 
Uruguay 2013 Net 20.2% 17.3%   0.9%   0.5%   0.9% 0.5% 0.0%   
Uruguay 2010 Net 19.9% 17.3%   1.0%   0.4%   0.7% 0.4% 0.0%   
Uruguay 2007 Net 20.2% 16.9%   0.9%   0.3%   1.8% 0.3% 0.0%   
Uruguay 2004 Net 25.2%     0.4%   0.4%     24.5% 0.0%   
                          
Mean    18.5% 11.2% 0.5% 2.3% 0.4% 1.2% 0.3% 0.5% 1.9% 0.1% 19.1% 
Observations  290 280 141 223 162 226 134 165 289 289 210 
 
Notes 
- Results for Hungary 2012, 2009 and 2007 should be treated with caution. We miss over 20% of the observations 
when we move from disposable income to primary income. 
- For Norway (2013, 2010, 2007) and Spain (1985) private transfers are not available. 
- Gross income data for most countries and years, while income data net of income taxes for other countries and 
years (marked italic). 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
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Annex B2 Redistributive effect of social programs for a selected group of countries and waves (total population) 
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Australia 2010 Gross 0.477 0.368 0.330 0.147 31% 40% 0% 19% 0% 5% 1% 0% 7% 26% 0% 
Australia 2008 Gross 0.475 0.376 0.333 0.142 30% 39% 0% 20% 0% 4% 1% 0% 5% 30% 0% 
Australia 2003 Gross 0.475 0.360 0.312 0.163 34% 40% 0% 19%   7%   0% 4% 29% 0% 
Australia 2001 Gross 0.488 0.366 0.317 0.171 35% 40% 0% 20%   7%   0% 4% 29% 0% 
Australia 1995 Gross 0.474 0.357 0.308 0.166 35% 39% 1% 16% 2% 10%   0% 3% 29% 0% 
Australia 1989 Gross 0.435 0.353 0.302 0.132 30% 38% 1% 12% 1% 7%     2% 38% 0% 
Australia 1985 Gross 0.434 0.346 0.292 0.143 33% 41% 1% 4% 1% 8%     7% 38% 0% 
Australia 1981 Gross 0.402 0.327 0.281 0.122 30% 41% 2% 5% 1% 7%     7% 38% 0% 
Austria 2013 Gross 0.493 0.322 0.279 0.215 44% 62% 1% 8% 1% 6% 1% 2% 0% 20% 0% 
Austria 2010 Gross 0.491 0.325 0.279 0.212 43% 59% 1% 10% 0% 6% 1% 1% 0% 22% 0% 
Austria 2007 Gross 0.485 0.329 0.284 0.201 41% 61% 1% 10% 0% 5% 1% 1% 0% 22% 0% 
Austria 2004 Gross 0.458 0.303 0.269 0.190 41% 64% 0% 11% 1% 5% 1% 1% 0% 18% 0% 
Austria 2000 Net 0.427 0.257 0.257 0.170 40% 78% 0% 15% 1% 4% 1% 0% 0%   0% 
Austria 1997 Net 0.427 0.266 0.266 0.161 38% 75% 0% 16% 1% 7% 1% 0% 0%   0% 
Austria 1995 Mix     0.277                         
Austria 1994 Net 0.439 0.280 0.280 0.158 36% 76% 0% 17% 1% 5% 1% 1% 0%   0% 
Austria 1987 Mix     0.227                         
Belgium 2000 Net 0.474 0.279 0.279 0.195 41% 78% 2% 7% 0% 13% 0% 1% 0%   -1% 
Belgium 1997 Gross 0.482 0.324 0.250 0.231 48% 46%   6% 0% 9% 0% 1% 6% 32% 0% 
Belgium 1995 Net 0.467 0.266 0.266 0.200 43% 72% 0% 11% 0% 15% 0% 1% 0%   1% 
Belgium 1992 Gross 0.450 0.285 0.222 0.227 51% 53%   8% 0% 10%     1% 28% 0% 
Belgium 1988 Net 0.421 0.232 0.232 0.189 45% 61% 7% 13%   17%     2%   0% 
Belgium 1985 Net 0.414 0.227 0.227 0.188 45% 60% 7% 15%   16%     3%   0% 
Brazil 2013 Gross 0.542 0.468 0.450 0.093 17% 61%       4%   15% 2% 20% -1% 
Brazil 2011 Gross 0.544 0.476 0.460 0.084 15% 63%       3%   13% 2% 19% 0% 
Brazil 2009 Gross 0.546 0.483 0.467 0.079 14% 59%       4%   15% 3% 20% 0% 
Brazil 2006 Gross 0.558 0.500 0.487 0.071 13% 62%       4%   11% 5% 19% -1% 
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Canada 2010 Gross 0.481 0.356 0.317 0.164 34% 48%   1%       7% 21% 24% 0% 
Canada 2007 Gross 0.471 0.355 0.315 0.156 33% 34%   9%       6% 26% 26% 0% 
Canada 2004 Gross 0.475 0.358 0.318 0.156 33% 35%           7% 33% 25% 0% 
Canada 2000 Gross 0.465 0.356 0.315 0.151 32% 32%           9% 32% 27% 0% 
Canada 1998 Gross 0.475 0.354 0.311 0.164 35% 28%           12% 33% 26% 0% 
Canada 1997 Gross 0.450 0.336 0.291 0.158 35% 27%           10% 34% 28% 0% 
Canada 1994 Gross 0.448 0.329 0.284 0.164 37% 24%           13% 35% 28% 0% 
Canada 1991 Gross 0.426 0.325 0.281 0.145 34% 36%   3%   12%     20% 30% 0% 
Canada 1987 Gross 0.407 0.320 0.283 0.124 30% 39%   3%   10%     18% 30% 0% 
Canada 1981 Gross 0.381 0.315 0.284 0.097 26% 35%   5%   9%     19% 32% 0% 
Canada 1975 Gross 0.385 0.320 0.289 0.096 25% 32%   10%   11%     15% 32% 0% 
Canada 1971 Gross 0.404 0.349 0.316 0.087 22% 32%   8%   4%     19% 38% 0% 
China 2002 Mix 0.561 0.557 0.505 0.056 10% 2%       -1%   0% 5% 94% 0% 
Colombia 2013 Mix 0.517 0.509 0.491 0.026 5% 3%             28% 69% 0% 
Colombia 2010 Mix 0.497 0.499 0.482 0.014 3% -12%             -6% 117% 0% 
Colombia 2007 Mix 0.533 0.536 0.523 0.010 2% -20%             -7% 127% 0% 
Colombia 2004 Gross 0.506 0.508 0.506 0.000 0% -3019%             0% 3119% 0% 
Czech Republic 2013 Gross 0.457 0.293 0.258 0.199 44% 69%   5%   1% 2% 2% 3% 18% 0% 
Czech Republic 2010 Gross 0.447 0.291 0.256 0.191 43% 69%   7%   1% 1% 1% 4% 18% 0% 
Czech Republic 2007 Gross 0.446 0.293 0.251 0.195 44% 63%   9%   1% 1% 1% 4% 21% 0% 
Czech Republic 2004 Gross 0.466 0.304 0.266 0.200 43% 62%   9%   2% 1% 3% 3% 19% 0% 
Czech Republic 2002 Gross 0.464 0.296 0.255 0.208 45% 60%   9%   2% 1% 5% 2% 19% 0% 
Czech Republic 1996 Gross 0.431 0.293 0.256 0.175 41% 61%   5%   1% 0% 3% 8% 21% 0% 
Czech Republic 1992 Gross 0.400 0.232 0.205 0.195 49% 63%   6%   1%     17% 14% 0% 
Denmark 2013 Gross 0.476 0.291 0.249 0.226 48% 58%   2% 5% 4% 4% 8% 2% 18% -1% 
Denmark 2010 Gross 0.465 0.289 0.248 0.217 47% 58%   3% 4% 5% 4% 7% 2% 19% -1% 
Denmark 2007 Gross 0.438 0.285 0.238 0.200 46% 56%   3% 3% 3% 4% 7% 2% 24% -1% 
Denmark 2004 Gross 0.447 0.271 0.228 0.219 49% 52% 3% 4% 3% 6% 4% 7% 1% 19% 0% 
Denmark 2000 Gross 0.438 0.272 0.225 0.213 49% 51% 3% 4% 3% 6% 4% 7% 0% 22% 0% 
Denmark 1995 Gross 0.444 0.261 0.218 0.227 51% 49% 3% 5% 2% 12% 4% 7% 0% 19% 0% 
Denmark 1992 Gross 0.447 0.286 0.238 0.210 47% 3% 3% 3%   12%     56% 23% -1% 
Denmark 1987 Gross 0.416 0.283 0.255 0.161 39% 3% 4% 3%   11%     62% 18% 0% 
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Dominican Rep. 2007 Gross 0.498 0.494 0.490 0.008 2% 28%             26% 45% 0% 
Estonia 2013 Gross 0.540 0.429 0.352 0.188 35% 53% 0% 4% 0% 1%   0% 0% 41% 0% 
Estonia 2010 Gross 0.516 0.394 0.319 0.197 38% 54% 0% 5% 0% 2%   1% 0% 38% 0% 
Estonia 2007 Gross 0.493 0.400 0.312 0.181 37% 47% 0% 4% 0% 0%   0% 0% 48% 0% 
Estonia 2004 Gross 0.496 0.379 0.347 0.149 30% 66% 0% 10% 0% 0%   1% 1% 22% 0% 
Estonia 2000 Mix 0.499 0.362 0.361 0.138 28%   0%   1% 2%     96% 1% 0% 
Finland 2013 Gross 0.487 0.347 0.259 0.228 47% 54% 0% 4% 2% 9% 3% 2% -4% 39% -9% 
Finland 2010 Gross 0.478 0.337 0.261 0.217 45% 54% 0% 5% 2% 10% 3% 2% -3% 35% -8% 
Finland 2007 Gross 0.469 0.350 0.264 0.205 44% 51% 0% 5% 2% 11% 3% 2% -5% 42% -11% 
Finland 2004 Gross 0.472 0.349 0.257 0.214 45% 51% 0% 6% 2% 10% 3% 2% -5% 43% -12% 
Finland 2000 Gross 0.468 0.325 0.252 0.216 46% 49% 0% 7% 2% 10% 4% 2% -2% 34% -7% 
Finland 1995 Gross 0.475 0.271 0.216 0.259 54% 44%   8% 2% 16% 3% 2% 5% 21% 0% 
Finland 1991 Gross 0.406 0.258 0.209 0.197 49% 51% 1% 9%   4%     10% 25% 0% 
Finland 1987 Gross 0.388 0.259 0.207 0.181 47% 50% 1% 7%   2%     12% 29% 0% 
France 2010 Mix 0.494 0.307 0.289 0.204 41% 65%   9% 0% 7% 6%   4% 9% 0% 
France 2005 Mix 0.478 0.295 0.280 0.198 41% 62% 2% 10% 1% 7% 7% 3% 0% 8% 0% 
France 2000 Mix 0.483 0.300 0.278 0.205 42% 59% 1% 12% 1% 6% 7% 2% 0% 11% 0% 
France 1994 Mix 0.486 0.306 0.288 0.197 41% 62% 1% 10% 2% 7% 7% 2% 1% 9% 0% 
France 1989 Mix 0.478 0.309 0.287 0.191 40% 55%   12%   10%     11% 12% 0% 
France 1984 Mix 0.496 0.351 0.338 0.158 32% 59%   13%   10%     10% 8% 0% 
France 1978 Mix 0.611 0.553 0.312 0.299 49% 17%   1% 0% 1%     0% 81% 0% 
Georgia 2013 Net 0.481 0.394 0.394 0.086 18% 77%   17% 0%       2%   4% 
Georgia 2010 Net 0.526 0.437 0.437 0.089 17% 86%   16% 0%       2%   -5% 
Germany 2013 Gross 0.520 0.344 0.291 0.229 44% 61%   6% 1% 9% 1% 0% 0% 23% 0% 
Germany 2010 Gross 0.514 0.338 0.285 0.229 45% 61%   6% 1% 9% 1% 1% 0% 23% 0% 
Germany 2007 Gross 0.512 0.343 0.289 0.223 44% 59%   5% 0% 9% 1% 1% 1% 24% 0% 
Germany 2004 Gross 0.498 0.331 0.278 0.220 44% 58%   6% 1% 8% 1% 1% 1% 24% 0% 
Germany 2000 Gross 0.473 0.318 0.266 0.207 44% 59%   6% 1% 6% 1% 1% 1% 25% 0% 
Germany 1994 Gross 0.458 0.314 0.270 0.188 41% 60%   4% 1% 8% 1% 2% 1% 24% 0% 
Germany 1989 Gross 0.438 0.305 0.258 0.180 41% 63%   4% 0% 3% 1% 1% 1% 26% 0% 
Germany 1984 Gross 0.442 0.307 0.265 0.177 40% 65%   4% 1% 4% 1% 1% 0% 24% 0% 
Germany 1983 Gross 0.415 0.284 0.260 0.154 37% 69%   3%   3%     9% 16% 0% 
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Germany 1981 Gross 0.405 0.273 0.244 0.161 40% 61%   5%   1%     15% 18% 0% 
Germany 1978 Gross 0.415 0.289 0.263 0.152 37% 72%   4%   2%     5% 18% 0% 
Germany 1973 Gross 0.377 0.287 0.271 0.106 28% 21%             64% 15% 0% 
Greece 2013 Gross 0.567 0.410 0.332 0.235 41% 61% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0%   1% 33% 0% 
Greece 2010 Gross 0.564 0.445 0.324 0.240 43% 47% 0% 1% 0% 2% 0%   0% 50% 0% 
Greece 2007 Gross 0.515 0.409 0.320 0.195 38% 52% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0%   0% 46% 0% 
Greece 2004 Net 0.458 0.327 0.327 0.131 29% 89% 0% 2% 0% 3% 0% 2% 0%   3% 
Greece 2000 Net 0.465 0.333 0.333 0.132 28% 92% 1% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1%   2% 
Greece 1995 Net 0.462 0.349 0.349 0.113 24% 94% 1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%   0% 
Guatemala 2014 Gross 0.427 0.424 0.394 0.034 8% -3%     1%     8% 6% 89% 0% 
Guatemala 2011 Gross 0.493 0.492 0.481 0.012 3% 3%     1%     4% 4% 88% 0% 
Guatemala 2006 Gross 0.490 0.485 0.472 0.018 4% -4%     12%   2%  21% 1% 69% 0% 
Hungary 2012 Net 0.586 0.289 0.289 0.297 51% 22% 45% 3%   45% 0%   46%   -61% 
Hungary 2009 Net 0.558 0.278 0.278 0.280 50% 28% 45% 3%   45% 0%   47%   -66% 
Hungary 2007 Net 0.543 0.274 0.274 0.268 49% 23% 46% 3%   46% 0%   47%   -66% 
Hungary 2005 Net 0.530 0.289 0.289 0.241 45% 74% 0% 14%   4% 0%   8%   0% 
Hungary 1999 Net 0.513 0.292 0.292 0.220 43% 78% 1% 15%   4%     1%   1% 
Hungary 1994 Net 0.543 0.319 0.319 0.224 41% 67% 2% 17%   5%     7%   2% 
Hungary 1991 Net 0.468 0.283 0.283 0.185 40% 67% 1% 20%   7%     4%   0% 
Iceland 2010 Gross 0.393 0.287 0.245 0.149 38% 48% 0% 8% 0% 9% 5% 1% 0% 29% 0% 
Iceland 2007 Gross 0.375 0.302 0.276 0.099 26% 56% 0% 12% 0% 1% 4% 1% 0% 26% 0% 
Iceland 2004 Gross 0.367 0.286 0.255 0.112 31% 54% 0% 10% 0% 3% 5% 1% 0% 28% 0% 
India 2011 Net 0.492 0.479 0.479 0.013 3% 27%   2%   0% 9% 61% 2%   -1% 
India 2004 Net 0.479 0.472 0.472 0.007 1% 0%   0%   1% 32% 67% 0%   0% 
Ireland 2010 Gross 0.564 0.366 0.294 0.270 48% 29% 3% 15% 0% 19% 3% 1% 2% 26% 0% 
Ireland 2007 Gross 0.501 0.348 0.297 0.204 41% 36% 3% 17% 0% 11% 2% 1% 4% 25% 0% 
Ireland 2004 Gross 0.496 0.362 0.317 0.179 36% 39% 3% 18% 0% 9% 3% 1% 3% 25% 0% 
Ireland 2000 Net 0.440 0.313 0.313 0.127 29% 56% 3% 18% 1% 13% 1%   4%   4% 
Ireland 1996 Net 0.481 0.325 0.325 0.156 32% 48% 3% 16% 1% 30% 2% 1% 0%   0% 
Ireland 1995 Net 0.490 0.336 0.336 0.154 31% 48% 3% 16% 1% 29% 2% 1% 0%   -1% 
Ireland 1994 Net 0.500 0.333 0.333 0.167 33% 46% 3% 13% 1% 34% 2% 1% 0%   0% 
Ireland 1987 Gross 0.510 0.373 0.328 0.181 36% 21% 5% 7%   9%     34% 24% 0% 
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Israel 2012 Gross 0.494 0.410 0.371 0.123 25% 45%   9%   2%   4% 9% 32% 0% 
Israel 2010 Gross 0.506 0.417 0.377 0.129 25% 43%   8%   4%   4% 9% 31% 0% 
Israel 2007 Gross 0.512 0.417 0.369 0.143 28% 42%   8%   2%   6% 9% 34% 0% 
Israel 2005 Gross 0.517 0.416 0.370 0.146 28% 43%   8% 0% 2%   7% 9% 31% 0% 
Israel 2001 Gross 0.530 0.410 0.347 0.183 35% 33%   12% 0% 4%   8% 9% 34% 0% 
Israel 1997 Gross 0.495 0.393 0.336 0.159 32% 32%   13%   4%   5% 10% 36% 0% 
Israel 1992 Gross 0.467 0.363 0.305 0.161 35% 32% 3% 10%   4%     16% 35% 0% 
Israel 1986 Gross 0.473 0.373 0.309 0.165 35% 36%   14%   2%     9% 39% 0% 
Israel 1979 Gross 0.427 0.358 0.303 0.124 29% 33%   14%         8% 45% 0% 
Italy 2014 Net 0.489 0.319 0.319 0.170 35% 96%     0% 3%     1%   0% 
Italy 2010 Net 0.482 0.320 0.320 0.162 34% 96%     0% 3%     1%   0% 
Italy 2008 Net 0.470 0.319 0.319 0.151 32% 98%     0% 1%     0%   0% 
Italy 2004 Net 0.486 0.329 0.329 0.158 32% 98%   0% 0% 2%   0% 0%   0% 
Italy 2000 Net 0.467 0.328 0.328 0.140 30% 97%     0% 2%   0% 1%   0% 
Italy 1998 Net 0.474 0.340 0.340 0.134 28% 98%     0% 2%   0% 0%   0% 
Italy 1995 Net 0.470 0.336 0.336 0.134 29% 96%     0% 3%   0% 1%   0% 
Italy 1993 Net 0.472 0.339 0.339 0.132 28% 97%     0%     2% 1%   0% 
Italy 1991 Net 0.415 0.291 0.291 0.124 30% 98%     0%     2% 1%   0% 
Italy 1989 Net 0.428 0.304 0.304 0.124 29% 98%     0%     1% 0%   0% 
Italy 1987 Net 0.452 0.332 0.332 0.120 27% 97%     0%     2% 1%   0% 
Italy 1986 Net 0.424 0.306 0.306 0.118 28% 95%             5%   0% 
Japan 2008 Gross 0.382 0.321 0.302 0.080 21% -6%   3%       1% 78% 24% 0% 
Luxembourg 2013 Gross 0.475 0.317 0.283 0.192 40% 60% 0% 12% 0% 4% 1% 4% 1% 18% 0% 
Luxembourg 2010 Gross 0.462 0.304 0.271 0.191 41% 60% 1% 12% 0% 4% 1% 4% 1% 18% 0% 
Luxembourg 2007 Gross 0.456 0.309 0.276 0.180 39% 64% 1% 11% 0% 2% 0% 2% 1% 19% 0% 
Luxembourg 2004 Gross 0.454 0.307 0.269 0.184 41% 61% 0% 11% 0% 4% 1%   2% 20% 0% 
Luxembourg 2000 Net 0.428 0.262 0.262 0.166 39% 79% 1% 15% 0% 1%   4% 0%   0% 
Luxembourg 1997 Net 0.432 0.261 0.261 0.171 40% 78% 1% 14% 0% 2%   3% 2%   0% 
Luxembourg 1994 Net 0.388 0.235 0.235 0.153 39% 80% 1% 11% 0% 1%   3% 4%   0% 
Luxembourg 1991 Net 0.372 0.239 0.239 0.134 36% 83% 1% 10%   0%     6%   0% 
Luxembourg 1985 Net 0.375 0.236 0.236 0.139 37% 85% 0% 11% 0% 1%     3%   -1% 
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Mexico 2012 Net 0.486 0.459 0.459 0.027 6% 16% 0%   2% -1%   1% 64%   18% 
Mexico 2010 Net 0.487 0.455 0.455 0.031 6% 23% 0%   2% 0%   1% 55%   20% 
Mexico 2008 Net 0.497 0.469 0.469 0.028 6% 18% -1%   2% 0%     56%   25% 
Mexico 2004 Net 0.473 0.457 0.457 0.016 3% 40%     2%       57%   1% 
Mexico 2002 Net 0.484 0.468 0.468 0.016 3% 37%     7%       57%   -1% 
Mexico 2000 Net 0.491 0.486 0.486 0.006 1% 68%             30%   2% 
Mexico 1998 Net 0.494 0.486 0.486 0.007 1% 78%             20%   1% 
Mexico 1996 Net 0.478 0.470 0.470 0.009 2% 57%     8%       33%   2% 
Mexico 1994 Net 0.495 0.485 0.485 0.011 2% 51%     8%       43%   -1% 
Mexico 1992 Net 0.483 0.475 0.475 0.008 2% 96%     4%       0%   0% 
Mexico 1989 Net 0.457 0.452 0.452 0.005 1% 104%     -4%       0%   0% 
Mexico 1984 Net 0.431 0.430 0.430 0.001 0% 97%     3%       0%   0% 
Netherlands 2013 Gross 0.475 0.323 0.264 0.212 45% 56% 1% 3% 2% 4% 3% 6% 0% 28% -2% 
Netherlands 2010 Gross 0.461 0.318 0.257 0.205 44% 56% 1% 3% 2% 3% 3% 5% -1% 30% -3% 
Netherlands 2007 Gross 0.468 0.331 0.274 0.194 41% 56% 1% 2% 2% 3% 2% 4% 1% 29% -2% 
Netherlands 2004 Gross 0.461 0.309 0.266 0.195 42% 57% 1% 3% 2% 4% 3%   9% 22% -1% 
Netherlands 1999 Gross 0.426 0.274 0.231 0.196 46% 64% 1% 4% 1% 3% 1% 4% 0% 22% 0% 
Netherlands 1993 Gross 0.460 0.300 0.257 0.203 44% 58% 1% 5% 2% 8% 1% 5% 0% 21% 0% 
Netherlands 1990 Gross 0.451 0.287 0.266 0.185 41% 65% 2% 5%   2%     14% 12% 0% 
Netherlands 1987 Gross 0.475 0.287 0.236 0.240 50% 45%   4% 9% 5%     15% 22% 0% 
Netherlands 1983 Gross 0.483 0.296 0.252 0.231 48% 46%   4% 12% 8%     10% 19% 0% 
Norway 2013 Gross 0.446 0.293 0.248 0.198 44% 60% 4% 6% 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 22% 0% 
Norway 2010 Gross 0.447 0.287 0.243 0.204 46% 58% 4% 6% 2% 3% 1% 2% 4% 22% 0% 
Norway 2007 Gross 0.439 0.286 0.244 0.195 44% 55% 4% 7% 2% 1% 1% 2% 7% 22% 0% 
Norway 2004 Gross 0.456 0.293 0.256 0.201 44% 53% 11% 9% 2% 3% 1% 3% 0% 18% 0% 
Norway 2000 Gross 0.428 0.291 0.250 0.178 42% 58% 4% 9% 1% 2% 1% 2% 0% 23% 0% 
Norway 1995 Gross 0.422 0.279 0.239 0.183 43% 60%   6% 1% 5% 1% 4% 1% 22% 0% 
Norway 1991 Gross 0.392 0.271 0.231 0.160 41% 62%   7%         6% 25% 0% 
Norway 1986 Gross 0.362 0.262 0.234 0.128 35% 5%   6%   1%     66% 22% 0% 
Norway 1979 Gross 0.372 0.273 0.224 0.148 40% 4%   4%         58% 34% 0% 
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Panama 2013 Gross 0.514 0.482 0.467 0.048 9% 33%   8% 21%   0% 8% 0% 31% 0% 
Panama 2010 Gross 0.512 0.482 0.471 0.041 8% 28%   24% 8%   0% 12% 0% 27% 1% 
Panama 2007 Gross 0.516 0.494 0.481 0.035 7% 28%     6%   0% 24% 4% 38% 0% 
Paraguay 2013 Net 0.472 0.463 0.463 0.008 2% 62%             18%   20% 
Paraguay 2010 Net 0.471 0.469 0.469 0.002 0% -52%             97%   54% 
Peru 2013 Gross 0.483 0.465 0.455 0.028 6% 21%   16% 3%   0% 23% 0% 37% 0% 
Peru 2010 Gross 0.496 0.479 0.470 0.026 5% 24%   16% 5%   0% 23% 0% 32% 0% 
Peru 2007 Gross 0.524 0.508 0.500 0.024 5% 23%   15% 5%   0% 26% 0% 31% 0% 
Peru 2004 Gross 0.536 0.526 0.519 0.017 3% 33%     1%   0% 27% 0% 39% 0% 
Poland 2013 Gross 0.484 0.317 0.316 0.168 35% 86%   6% 0% 2% 1% 4% 1% 0% 0% 
Poland 2010 Gross 0.477 0.311 0.310 0.167 35% 86%   6% 0% 2% 0% 3% 2% 1% 0% 
Poland 2007 Gross 0.490 0.313 0.310 0.180 37% 84%   7% 0% 1% 1% 3% 1% 2% 0% 
Poland 2004 Gross 0.526 0.323 0.315 0.210 40% 81% 0% 7% 0% 3% 2% 3% 1% 4% 0% 
Poland 1999 Gross 0.475 0.293 0.286 0.188 40% 81% 0% 6%   5% 1% 2% 1% 4% 0% 
Poland 1995 Mix 0.534 0.325 0.318 0.217 41% 76%   8%   9%     5% 3% 0% 
Poland 1992 Net 0.403 0.262 0.262 0.141 35% 68%   14%   18%     0%   -1% 
Poland 1986 Net 0.366 0.271 0.271 0.095 26% 80%   2%         17%   1% 
Romania 1997 Gross 0.375 0.296 0.280 0.095 25% 66% 0% 12% 0% 4%     1% 16% 0% 
Romania 1995 Gross 0.376 0.298 0.279 0.097 26% 65% 0% 6% 0% 7%     2% 20% 0% 
Russia 2013 Net 0.457 0.331 0.331 0.126 28% 94%   3%   0% 0%   2%   1% 
Russia 2010 Net 0.450 0.338 0.338 0.112 25% 92%   4%   0% 0%   2%   1% 
Russia 2007 Net 0.446 0.350 0.350 0.096 22% 93%   3%   0% 1%   3%   0% 
Russia 2004 Net 0.492 0.388 0.388 0.104 21% 95%   2%   0% 0%   2%   0% 
Russia 2000 Net 0.507 0.408 0.408 0.099 19% 87%   4% 1% 1% 3%   5%   0% 
Serbia 2013 Net 0.518 0.332 0.332 0.187 36% 88%   3%   2%     5%   3% 
Serbia 2010 Net 0.513 0.324 0.324 0.189 37% 89%   3%   2%     4%   2% 
Serbia 2006 Net 0.472 0.343 0.343 0.129 27% 91%   4%   3%     3%   -1% 
Slovakia 2013 Gross 0.425 0.287 0.268 0.157 37% 73% 0% 9% 0% 1%     5% 12% 0% 
Slovakia 2010 Gross 0.429 0.280 0.262 0.167 39% 74% 1% 7% 1% 2%     4% 11% 0% 
Slovakia 2007 Gross 0.503 0.389 0.248 0.255 51% 39% 0% 3% 0% 0%     2% 55% 0% 
Slovakia 2004 Gross 0.474 0.332 0.269 0.205 43% 55% 0% 5% 0% 2%     6% 31% 0% 
Slovakia 1996 Net 0.430 0.250 0.250 0.180 42% 73% 1% 19%   7%     0%   0% 
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Slovakia 1992 Gross 0.401 0.216 0.189 0.212 53% 53% 2% 14%   3%     17% 12% -1% 
Slovenia 2012 Net 0.449 0.271 0.271 0.178 40%     6% 2% 4%     88%   0% 
Slovenia 2010 Net 0.415 0.252 0.252 0.163 39%     7% 2% 3% 0% 2% 86%   0% 
Slovenia 2007 Net 0.395 0.230 0.230 0.165 42%     8% 2% 2% 0% 2% 86%   0% 
Slovenia 2004 Net 0.396 0.231 0.231 0.165 42%     10% 2% 3% 0% 3% 83%   0% 
Slovenia 1999 Net 0.372 0.232 0.232 0.140 38%     8% 2% 6% 0% 2% 82%   0% 
Slovenia 1997 Net 0.366 0.229 0.229 0.137 37%     8% 2% 6% 0% 1% 83%   0% 
South Africa 2012 Gross 0.664 0.625 0.572 0.093 14% 24%   17%         -1% 58% 1% 
South Africa 2010 Gross 0.665 0.639 0.585 0.080 12% 19%   12%         -2% 68% 3% 
South Africa 2008 Gross 0.661 0.621 0.596 0.065 10% 41%   21%         1% 38% -1% 
South Korea 2012 Gross 0.337 0.314 0.306 0.031 9% 43%             32% 25% 0% 
South Korea 2010 Gross 0.341 0.316 0.309 0.032 9% 40%             36% 24% 0% 
South Korea 2008 Gross 0.344 0.323 0.314 0.030 9% 29%             40% 30% 0% 
South Korea 2006 Gross 0.330 0.313 0.305 0.025 7% 26%             42% 31% 0% 
Spain 2013 Gross 0.520 0.379 0.343 0.177 34% 59% 1% 1% 1% 17% 0%   2% 20% 0% 
Spain 2010 Gross 0.547 0.426 0.333 0.214 39% 45% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0%   1% 43% 0% 
Spain 2007 Gross 0.475 0.368 0.307 0.168 35% 55% 1% 0% 0% 5% 0%   1% 37% 0% 
Spain 2004 Net 0.446 0.316 0.316 0.131 29% 85% 2% 0% 1% 8% 0% 0% 0%   5% 
Spain 2000 Net 0.476 0.336 0.336 0.140 29% 88% 1% 1% 1% 7% 0% 0% 0%   3% 
Spain 1995 Net 0.503 0.353 0.353 0.150 30% 82% 2% 1% 1% 11% 0% 0% 0%   1% 
Spain 1990 Net 0.419 0.302 0.302 0.117 28% 82%       13%     5%   0% 
Spain 1985 Net 0.433 0.314 0.314 0.119 27%         16%     83%   0% 
Spain 1980 Net 0.415 0.318 0.318 0.097 23%                     
Sweden 2005 Gross 0.466 0.274 0.237 0.229 49% 0% 5% 7% 5% 7% 4% 3% 54% 16% 0% 
Sweden 2000 Gross 0.470 0.289 0.252 0.218 46% 52% 6% 6% 3% 8% 5% 3% 0% 17% 0% 
Sweden 1995 Gross 0.490 0.263 0.221 0.268 55% 45% 3% 12% 4% 11% 6% 4% 0% 15% -1% 
Sweden 1992 Gross 0.461 0.260 0.229 0.232 50% 51% 4% 8%   10%     13% 13% 0% 
Sweden 1987 Gross 0.429 0.253 0.212 0.218 51% 56% 5% 6% 3% 4%     6% 19% 0% 
Sweden 1981 Gross 0.411 0.241 0.197 0.214 52% 53% 4% 5%   3%     15% 20% 0% 
Sweden 1975 Gross 0.400 0.274 0.215 0.185 46% 45% 5% 4%   1%     13% 32% 0% 
Sweden 1967 Gross 0.391 0.316 0.260 0.130 33% 40% 7% 8%   2%     1% 43% 0% 
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Switzerland 2013 Gross 0.425 0.300 0.295 0.130 31% 77% 0% 6%   4% 0%   9% 4% 0% 
Switzerland 2010 Gross 0.411 0.294 0.294 0.117 28% 84% 0% 5%   6% 0%   6% 0% 0% 
Switzerland 2007 Gross 0.410 0.307 0.311 0.099 24% 91% 0% 5%   4%     6% -5% 0% 
Switzerland 2004 Gross 0.394 0.265 0.268 0.127 32% 82% 2% 4%   8% 0% 2% 3% -2% 0% 
Switzerland 2002 Gross 0.391 0.276 0.273 0.118 30% 82% 3% 5%   4% 0% 1% 3% 2% 0% 
Switzerland 2000 Gross 0.385 0.278 0.280 0.105 27% 87% 2% 5%   4% 0% 1% 3% -2% 0% 
Switzerland 1992 Gross 0.401 0.322 0.307 0.094 23% 77% 1%     3% 0% 2% 0% 16% 0% 
Switzerland 1982 Gross 0.398 0.330 0.309 0.089 22% 71%       1%     4% 24% 0% 
Taiwan 2013 Gross 0.333 0.304 0.308 0.025 8% 39%           6% 70% -15% 0% 
Taiwan 2010 Gross 0.329 0.307 0.317 0.012 4% 84%           10% 81% -75% 0% 
Taiwan 2007 Gross 0.329 0.304 0.307 0.022 7% 47%           4% 60% -11% 0% 
Taiwan 2005 Gross 0.324 0.309 0.305 0.018 6% 49%           5% 25% 21% 0% 
Taiwan 2000 Gross 0.306 0.292 0.289 0.017 6% 31%           4% 47% 18% 0% 
Taiwan 1997 Gross 0.300 0.289 0.287 0.012 4% 34%           5% 48% 14% 0% 
Taiwan 1995 Gross 0.313   0.284 0.029 9%                     
Taiwan 1991 Gross 0.281 0.277 0.271 0.010 4% 16%             31% 53% 0% 
Taiwan 1986 Gross 0.275 0.274 0.269 0.007 2% 4%             16% 80% 0% 
Taiwan 1981 Gross 0.272 0.271 0.267 0.005 2% 4%             13% 84% 0% 
United Kingdom 2013 Gross 0.537 0.364 0.330 0.207 39% 47% 0% 14% 0% 2% 11% 4% 5% 17% 0% 
United Kingdom 2010 Gross 0.542 0.370 0.334 0.208 38% 46% 0% 12% 0% 2% 11% 5% 5% 17% 0% 
United Kingdom 2007 Gross 0.524 0.372 0.339 0.186 35% 47% 0% 11% 0% 1% 10% 7% 5% 18% 0% 
United Kingdom 2004 Gross 0.527 0.367 0.344 0.183 35% 52% 0% 10% 1% 1% 11% 8% 3% 13% 0% 
United Kingdom 1999 Gross 0.530 0.373 0.346 0.184 35% 50% 0% 8% 1% 3% 12% 10% 2% 15% 0% 
United Kingdom 1995 Gross 0.538 0.380 0.344 0.194 36% 44% 1% 6% 1% 1% 10% 15% 4% 18% 0% 
United Kingdom 1994 Gross 0.535 0.368 0.339 0.196 37% 47% 0% 5% 1% 1% 11% 15% 4% 15% 0% 
United Kingdom 1991 Gross 0.501 0.368 0.336 0.165 33% 47% 1% 5%   1%     27% 19% 0% 
United Kingdom 1986 Gross 0.500 0.340 0.303 0.196 39% 41% 1% 8%   4%     28% 19% 0% 
United Kingdom 1979 Gross 0.410 0.295 0.267 0.143 35% 48% 0% 10%   4%   2% 16% 20% 0% 
United Kingdom 1974 Gross 0.374 0.307 0.268 0.106 28% 54% 1% 5%   2%     2% 37% 0% 
United Kingdom 1969 Gross 0.360 0.295 0.267 0.093 26% 45% 4% 11%   4%     6% 30% 0% 
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United States 2013 Gross 0.509 0.418 0.377 0.132 26% 53% 0% 8% 2% 2% 1% 5% -1% 31% 0% 
United States 2010 Gross 0.507 0.411 0.367 0.140 28% 47% 0% 8% 2% 5% 1% 5% 0% 32% 0% 
United States 2007 Gross 0.483 0.409 0.371 0.111 23% 51% 1% 8% 1% 1% 1% 4% -1% 34% 0% 
United States 2004 Gross 0.487 0.409 0.364 0.124 25% 49% 1% 8% 1% 1% 1% 3% -1% 37% 0% 
United States 2000 Gross 0.477 0.409 0.357 0.120 25% 46% 1% 5% 1% 1% 1% 3% -1% 44% 0% 
United States 1997 Gross 0.483 0.407 0.360 0.123 25% 47% 1% 7% 1% 1% 1% 4% 0% 38% 0% 
United States 1994 Gross 0.487 0.406 0.361 0.126 26% 46% 1% 8% 2% 2% 1% 6% 0% 35% 0% 
United States 1991 Gross 0.467 0.388 0.346 0.121 26% 47% 2% 7% 1% 2% 1% 6% 0% 35% 0% 
United States 1986 Gross 0.459 0.386 0.340 0.118 26% 44% 1% 6%   2% 1% 5% 3% 39% 0% 
United States 1979 Gross 0.428 0.356 0.310 0.118 28% 42% 1% 7%   1% 0% 5% 4% 39% 0% 
United States 1974 Gross 0.412 0.352 0.316 0.096 23% 43%       2%     17% 38% 0% 
Uruguay 2013 Net 0.466 0.372 0.372 0.094 20% 76%   9%   3%   9% 2%   1% 
Uruguay 2010 Net 0.498 0.405 0.405 0.093 19% 78%   9%   2%   7% 2%   1% 
Uruguay 2007 Net 0.521 0.423 0.423 0.099 19% 69%   8%   2%   20% 1%   1% 
Uruguay 2004 Net 0.529 0.424 0.424 0.105 20%     3%   2%     95%   0% 
                                  
Observations   291 290 293 291 291 280 141 223 162 226 134 165 289 206 289 
Mean (rescaling)   0.461 0.345 0.318 0.142  31% 47% 3% 8% 1% 6% 2% 3% 8% 22% -1% 
 
 
Notes 
- See notes below Annex B1 
- Mean (rescaling): the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent due to missing observations. We rescaled the redistributive effects of each 
social program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs (over 
100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
